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Abstract
Early Political Discord in Kenya: European Settlers’ Political Struggles in
the East Africa Protectorate, 1902-1912
Makhete Fall

This study of European settlers’ political struggles encompasses a ten-year period (190212) during which the foundations of Kenya’s modern politics were established. The
dissertation follows political contestation originating from the East Africa Protectorate’s
small European settler community during the administrations of four
commissioners/governors. The politics of this period involved varied individuals and
organizations that sought to move the colonial state in the direction of policies
European politicians advocated in such critical areas as land and labor, the
administration of justice, and in the system of government that applied to them and
other residents of the protectorate. The settler politicians pushed for a voice in
protectorate affairs on the way to the achievement of responsible government on the
pattern of South Africa, from which so many of them came to the Kenya highlands. The
drive to attain a “white man’s country” that marked this decade was thus very critical for
future politics. The segregated system demanded by the Europeans had a huge impact
on Kenyan history as did the types of organizations they founded and the tactics they
adopted. Nevertheless, the European political struggles, while influential, never led to
European political control and the establishment of a minority-ruled Kenya as the
political agitation did not cause the Colonial Office to bow to the settler politicians’
demands.
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Chapter 1
Background to European Settler Politics in the East Africa protectorate,
1902-1912
Introduction
Although now largely forgotten, the political history of Kenya for the first half of
the twentieth century was dominated by the politics of race. The East Africa Protectorate
(EAP), later the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, was a British colony characterized by
a plural society. There were European, Asian and Arab minorities resident in the
protectorate as well as the African majority. That diversity had the potential of creating
a dynamic market and boosting commerce along the Uganda railroad and in the growing
cities. Agriculture and trade were thought to be the pillar foundation for a rapid
economic development beneficial to all parties present in the protectorate and mostly to
Britain, the new mother country. Since Kenya stood as a Crown Colony (Kenya became a
crown colony in 1920), it was normally from Downing Street, the political nerve center
of the empire, where future policy towards the region was formulated.
Nevertheless, constructing an effective and fair administration of the protectorate
from the metropolis was not an easy task. Apparently, the officials representing the socalled “good intentions” of the British Crown in the region had their own agenda.
Among them, Sir Charles Norton Edgecombe Eliot (1862-1931), the Commissioner of
the EAP from 1900-1904, decided that the influx of European settlers would be a key
factor for the future economic development of the region. Eliot thought that European
settlement in the EAP, if well managed, would significantly reduce or even eliminate the
British government’s subsidies to the protectorate. Throughout his tenure, he worked on
encouraging European settlement coming mainly from South Africa. Eliot believed that
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future policy in the EAP should be based on European primacy, which meant that
European interests should override those of the African, Arab and Asian communities.
Eliot did not last very long as Commissioner of the EAP, but he set the tone for nearly all
the following officials who also felt pressured by the settlers’ persistent push for more
political concessions. That mind set turned Kenya into “one of the most controversial
dependencies of the British Empire.”1 There were always political problems in
coordinating policies between London and the EAP. The ten years covered by this study
(1902-1912) indicate that throughout the entire period of British rule, the colonial rulers
as well as the inhabitants of the region struggled to find the most appropriate political
structure for the colony. In Struggle for Kenya, Robert Maxon dealt with the issue
arguing that: The CO [Colonial Office] in London “struggled to maintain initiative and
control in these years in the face of several, often contradictory, interested parties and
pressure groups” among the most influential were “Kenya’s colonial state, the European
settlers and Indian residents there, the India Office (IO) and the government of India,
missionaries, humanitarians and capitalists in Britain itself, and the African majority in
Kenya.” 2
An adequate political structure for the colony always included a prominent role in
the apparatus for the European residents who were thought to be the exclusive agents of
any potential economic development. The unofficial or European settler segment of the
white population played a very critical role in the political struggles that marked the
early colonial period. For example, the demands made by the European settlers have
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more often been interpreted by colonial and imperial historians as providing a target for
protest from African, Arab and Asian political leaders.
After the initial years of colonial rule, European settlers played the largest and
most influential role in the colony’s political system. As late as 1955, for example,
influential American writer John Gunther confidently predicted that Kenya’s first prime
minister at independence would be a European settler. He affirmed that if he were an
African, he would rather be under British administration than any other, for "Great
Britain is the only colonial power that has as its official policy the systematic training of
Africans for self-government.”3 He did not fully understand that the British did not just
pour money into East Africa to lift up the Africans and show them a potential political
path leading to future economic development. Self-government, moreover, in the eyes of
the Europeans, referred to the possibilities of political independence for the settlers who
wanted to control the protectorate for their own gains. The EAP was never like the case
of South Africa, where the European settlers had self-government.
From the time ministerial government was introduced in 1954 until 1969, there
was at least one European in Kenya’s Council of Ministers. In light of this information, it
is important to examine the early examples of European political activity in the region
just before, and just after, the CO assumption of supervision over the EAP in 1905. This
study will seek to provide such an examination in the period stretching to the end of Sir
Percy Girouard’s administration 1909-1912.
The 1902-1912 periods, though relatively brief, is nevertheless a particularly
critical one in the history of Kenya. During this time, European settlement entrenched
3
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itself as a major factor in the EAP’s economic and social fabric. These years witnessed
the demand that land be set aside exclusively for European farming, known as the white
highlands, and European agriculture began a struggle for prosperity.
Those economic goals played a large part in European settler politics during this
earlier formative period as settler leaders organized politically and began agitation for
exclusive control of land in the highlands as well as favorable conditions relating to
purchase and tenure. The settler farmers also mobilized politically in an attempt to gain
the backing of the CS for markets and infrastructure and, most importantly, cheap
African labor. Just as significant, these years also saw the emergence of demands for
representation within the CS so as to have a voice in policy-making and as a means of
turning the EAP into a white man’s country with all that implied in terms of economic
and social policies.
Thus, the period 1902-1912 deserves study as a significant foundation period for
the European dominance that later came to characterize colonial Kenya and has had
such huge impact on that country’s history. Just as important, these years witnessed the
formation of the first political associations among the European settler community and
the start of political agitation. The forms that these associations took as well as the type
of political agitation and protest require careful study in this early period of colonial rule
as many of the issues that featured then, such as single political parties led by wealthy
and outspoken men and their political actions characterized by impunity and a lack of
accountability, remain powerful factors in present-day Kenya politics.
Research Objectives
This study will examine the political demands made by the European leaders and
the reaction of the CS and the CO. The context of this analysis reflects Winston
4

Churchill’s famous description of his visit to the EAP in 1907. He noticed that there was
an air of social stratification already blowing like a wind in the highlands of East Africa
where race and color would be determinant in defining the political future of the
protectorate. Churchill underlined it in his own words: “’We mean to make East Africa a
white man’s country,’ cries, in strident tones, the CA on every occasion. [This is] truly a
respectable and impressive policy; but one which seems, at first sight, rather difficult to
achieve… where there are… fewer than two thousand five hundred whites and more than
four million black aboriginals.”4 Churchill’s observation of the evolving political scene
led him to ask a pertinent question. He wanted to know if East Africa could ever become
a country for the white settlers’ convenience. He did not underestimate the fierce
determination and dedication of the men on the spot who constantly pushed for more
political concessions. He noticed that:
Every white man in Nairobi is a politician; and most of them are leaders of
parties. One would scarcely believe it possible, that a center so new should be
able to develop so many divergent and conflicting interests, or that a community
so small should be able to give to each such vigorous and even vehement
expression. There are already in miniature all the elements of keen political and
racial discord, all the materiel for hot and acrimonious debate. The white man
versus the black; the Indian versus both; the settlers as against the planter; the
town contrasted with the country; the official class against the unofficial; the
coast and the highlands; the railway administration and the protectorate
generally; the King’s African Rifles and the East Africa Protectorate Police; all
4
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these different points of view, naturally arising, honestly adopted, tenaciously
held, and not yet reconciled into any harmonious general conception confront the
visitor in perplexing disarray.5
Churchill’s advice was not to side with any particular party in the evolving
situation in East Africa. The settlers had no intention for cohabitation in a region where
they were invited to partake in the process of economic development. From that
perspective, the Europeans and their descendants believed that the other races must
submit to them.6 The first officials who ran the protectorate also thought that any
prospect of economic development had to rely on settler entrepreneurship and
agricultural production. Such was the prevailing climate that existed between different
interest groups in the early years of the protectorate, as epitomized in a 1907 address by
the Pastoralists’ Association stating that: “The evils the Colonial Office intended to
prevent were already in existence: ‘Monopoly, with all its abuses and dangers, is an
acknowledge fact. The dummy system is a flourishing institution. Already there were
signs that the Legislative Council is passing in its cradle days under the influence of one
class of special interests. Already it does not pay the small man fearlessly to speak the
truth in the public interest.”7
In this atmosphere, there were some political organizations that emerged to
articulate the settler demands (such as the Convention of Associations), and these will
be a focus of study. These associations made persistent demands for political
concessions. Some examples of the demands developed by the settlers include the
Ibid., 14.
Brett L. Shadle, The Souls of White Folk: White Settlers in Kenya, 1900s-1920s (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2015), 5.
7 Address of the Pastoralists’ Association, enclosure in Sadler to Elgin, 9 December 1907, CO 533/33, cited
in M. P. K. Sorrenson, Origins of Settlement in Kenya (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968), 94.
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establishment of legislative and executive councils, the right to vote, no taxation without
representation, an important voice in the development of policy directed towards the
colony’s African population, and minority rule. All of these demands will be examined in
this study. These demands seemingly indicate the type of political system that the
Europeans desired was one in which only whites have political rights and participate in
the governance of the colony. Other racial groups were not to be included in the political
system. They were subjects.
The dissertation will also examine how these demands were met by the CS and
the British government. Also to be examined is the question of the degree to which
European political demands actually inspired those of the Asians, Africans and Arabs in
the early period of colonial rule. The dissertation will thus establish the reasons for the
success or failure of the numerous European political demands. It will also consider the
impact of the organizations and of their political protest during the respective times of
the EAP and later Kenyan history.
It is clear from this that in the early history of the EAP, the political aspiration of
the settlers was high. They strongly believed that self- government, if achieved, was the
best way to go. They wanted to be in charge politically and economically without taking
into consideration the majority of Africans and Asian workers already present in the
protectorate. These newcomers were not simply ambitious by nature. They had powerful
advocates and supporters among the colonial administration. They had the sympathy of
Eliot and most of his successors who tried vigorously to transform the highlands of East
Africa into a white man’s country.

7

Background to the Study
The desire of transforming the highlands into a white man’s country was mainly
based on economical reasons. Opening the protectorate for trade was vital for the
British Government which had, since the early 1890s, been planning to build a railroad
as a strategic measure to secure its presence on the Upper Nile River. The EAP officially
became a part of the British Empire on 1 June 1895. The decision to establish a
protectorate over Uganda led the British government to realize the necessity of linking
the east coast to the interior for a greater penetration and exploitation of resources. On 5
August 1896, the construction of the Uganda Railway started in Mombasa. The railroad
marked the beginning of colonial conquest, justified on the basis of practicality and
profitability. The building of the railway did not lead to profitability for the EAP. From
1895 until 1913, the colonial administration was forced to rely on annual grants-in-aid
from the British government.
British conquest and interference in African societies was the logical consequence
of the railway project. It also had an emotional justification. For those who believed that
the Africans still needed protection against slave traders, a stronger British presence in
Africa was quite understandable. Beside protection from the evils of enslavement, the
civilizing mission found good ground in justifying the British presence in the region.
Christianity was introduced inside East Africa to educate and turn the Africans away
from their traditional beliefs. The advent of colonial rule reinforced and encouraged a
greater propagation of the gospel. The missionaries set the stage for the westernization
of East Africa by diffusing their culture and values. These were important vectors of

8

social change for the so-called “lower races.” When numbers of European settlers
arrived in East Africa from 1902, they embraced the same attitude.8
Civilizing the non-white races, from the British perspective, was philosophically
up-to-date in the beginning of the 1900s. John Atkinson Hobson (1858-1940), in his
work Imperialism: A Study, justified his choice of the term “lower races” because of the
prevailing Eurocentric interpretation of non-white cultures. Hobson argued that the
non-whites brought under imperialist rule were at the mercy of European powers who
promoted their economic interests under the blanket of civilizing missions and
philanthropy at any cost. For Hobson:
The real issue is whether, and under what circumstances, it is justifiable for
Western nations to compulsory government for the control and education in the
art of industrial and political civilization of the inhabitants of tropical countries
and other so-called lower races. Because Rhodesian mine-owners and Cuban
sugar-growers stimulate the British or American Government to Imperialism by
parading motives and results which do not really concern them, does not follow
these motives under proper guidance are unsound, or that the results are
undesirable.9
However, he also admitted that the native races cannot be left alone; though he
insisted upon the necessity of certain safeguards to avoid their exploitation for
mercenary purposes. The British presence on the Upper Nile was not meant to protect
de facto the Africans from exploitation, but rather to solidify Britain’s grasp in that very
strategic part of Africa. Their presence in East Africa was practical and tactical in order
to keep other European powers from monopolizing trade.
To maintain British leadership and economic predominance, new markets and
raw materials had to be found and seized by force, or through policy manipulation of the
8
9
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local people. For an empire that spanned the globe, pacification was considered a
practical policy. The construction of the railway aided in the pacification of the interior
and also facilitated the economic development of the interior. The line was completed
on 20 December 1901. With the high cost of the project, the pressure to make the
railroad pay for its investment rose.
Sorrenson’s work pinpointed the high cost of the Uganda railway as a concern for
some important British politicians. He noted that: “Chamberlain and those who
accepted his idea of developing Britain’s imperial estates expected private citizens to
carry the burden of development.”10 Any settlement that could reduce the financial
burden of the British taxpayer was welcomed to justify the positive presence of the
expanding empire. The railroad construction was considered as a public undertaking
managed by a committee of experts in London. Sufficient investment became a burden
because the capital costs were financed by British Treasury loans. There was
disagreement about the sufficient budget allocation for building the line from Mombasa
to Kisumu:
In August 1895, when a vote of £20,000 for preliminary expenses was requested,
the estimated cost of the line was fixed at £1,755,000. A year later, when the
Uganda Railway Bill was introduced, the cost was raised to £3,000,000. This
sum was not nearly sufficient: in 1900 the Foreign Office had to ask for another £
1,930,000 and in 1902 for a further £600,000. As the annual interest and sinking
fund charges on these loans amounted to £319,112 the Treasury was to insist on a
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more rigid supervision of the East Africa Protectorate finances and the disposal of
land than was normally the case.11
With financial difficulties such as these, there was no time, energy or budget for
any kind of regional conflict. The British expected revenues to cover the cost of the
project once the trains started rolling. The question of profitability and economic
prosperity became a priority for the Foreign Office (FO).
It was after the completion of the railroad that some British officials, like Eliot,
decided to shape the economic and political future of the protectorate. Eliot “took the
initiative in both formulating and executing a policy which had as its ideal the
foundation of a white man’s country.”12 That would affect all parties in a plural society
that resulted from Eliot’s invitation. Accommodating the settlers became a priority for
him. It is important to understand that Eliot’s intention in promoting and regulating the
settlement process was due to the fact that the first British adventurers who stepped foot
in the region saw an apparent under-population. The new strategy emerged under the
name of the “land distribution” or “the local partition of interior Africa” for the benefit
of any settlers. The settlers seemed already to have developed a pattern of behavior in
which they thought that they could settle anywhere, as they did in New Zealand and
South Africa; so why not in the “New Virgin Plains” of pre-colonial Kenya? In his book,
Sir Charles Eliot stated that, “We have in East Africa the rare experience of dealing with
a tabula rasa, an almost untouched and sparsely inhabited country, where we can do as
we will, regulate immigration, and open or close the door as seems best.”13

Ibid., 20.
M. P. K. Sorrenson, “Land Policy in Kenya 1895-1945,” in History of East Africa, vol. 2 eds. Vincent
Harlow, et al. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 672.
13 Sir Charles Eliot, East Africa Protectorate (New York: Barnes & Nobles, 1966), 103.
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Nevertheless, before Eliot’s arrival in the protectorate, the idea of European
settlement was not thought of as something to be encouraged. The first Europeans who
carried out expeditions in the region did not think it possible or suitable for Europeans
to settle down. There was a cloud of skepticism about the possibilities of being
successful in the far interior. The early attempts at settlement during the Imperial
British East Africa (IBEA) Company period resulted in great disappointment, before the
railroad era. Some British citizens who attempted to settle in the highlands got
discouraged. They packed and went back to their true native land in Europe. Sir Harry
Johnston, an important explorer, linguist and colonial administrator, was among the
early skeptics who did not believe that Europeans could adapt in the region easily.
Johnston had long believed in the development of Africa in racial harmony, and so could
speak of this land also as a possible “America of the Hindu.”14 John Dawson Ainsworth,
another important actor, further espoused the same attitude as Johnston.
With all the incertitude and speculations about a European future in the region,
Indian peasants and traders were thought to be the best alternative for settlement. Just
before the completion of the railroad, Ainsworth suggested the idea of introducing
Punjabi cultivators to back up African agriculture. Ainsworth’s view was to first develop
agriculture in the region before any plan of European involvement in local economic
development. On July 13, 1899, from his provincial headquarters, he wrote to acting
commissoner C. Craufurd stating that “there would not be the same scope for European
emigrants as is for Indians. For a large number of Europeans the country does not, at
present, hold out sufficient inducements; naturally Europeans need to make more
14 G. Bennett, “Settlers and politics in Kenya,” in History of East Africa, vol. 2 eds., Vincent Harlow, et al
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1965), 265.
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money than does a native of India.”15 Johnston saw the Indian alternative with a very
positive eye, too. The Indian settlement proposal in the almost “vacant” highlands, if
successful, would be the pillar foundation to encourage Europeans arrival and definitive
takeover. Yet, such Indian experimentation in the highland was not well received by Sir
Charles Eliot, who replaced Sir Arthur Hardinge as commissioner of the EAP on
December 30 1900.
Following Eliot’s arrival, the settlement proposal that was going to encourage
Indian influx into the region changed. For Eliot, the best plan was to deal with the
tabula rasa by encouraging European settlement in the highlands and redirecting
Indians into the lowlands. Any other aliens or indigenous group must stay away from
the activity zone of the railroad. The policy of exclusion took shape under Eliot’s
administration. The scheme was for people of European descent to have the best land
for free, upon invitation, the Indian to be confined in the lowlands and the local people
to accept the new socio-economic order. It was a clear scheme of segregation,
discrimination and arrogance. In Eliot’s plan of regulating immigration, Europeans
could come and settle down as long as they were white and Christian like Lord
Delamere, one of the most influential early settlers. Under that indirect requirement for
settlement, immigrants came from South Africa. Most of them had to be placated
because Eliot promised land to whites coming from South Africa; and so they came,
armed with a spirit of adventure. The promise of getting free land in the highlands was
too succulent to resist.

15 Ainsworth to Crauford, 13 July 1899, quoted in Robert Maxon, John Ainsworth and the making of
Kenya (Lanham: MD: University Press of America, 1980), 78.
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From Eliot’s time, European settlement was the means used to encourage the
economic development of the protectorate. The authorities on location in the EAP hoped
to make the railroad pay for its cost by accommodating settlers in the best areas possible
along the railroad. Some of the Europeans, guided by a spirit of opening a new frontier,
wanted land wherever they thought was most convenient for them. Europeans,
Australians, New Zealanders, and South Africans were informed about the prospect of
enjoying a potential paradise in the EAP. Those invited to settle in the protectorate, were
in one sense, unwanted people, during Britain’s great industrial revolution of the
nineteenth century. Some of the Europeans from South Africa were Boers who already
had a reputation of being racist. This attitude, de entrada, stripped away all hope of
future cohabitation between settlers and Kenyans, spawning a disaster waiting to
happen. The socio-political upheaval caused by the influx of European settlers would
later have its impact in Kenya’s political history. The seed of injustice was sown when
the Africans started to realize that they were losing their land. For instance, the Kikuyu
community that was affected the most by that phenomenon of land grabbing later
described the process as such:
When the Whitemen first came we did not understand that we were to be
deprived of any of our land, nor that they had really come to stay. A small piece of
land here and there was sold to a few of the first pioneers and to one or two
Missions voluntarily by its owners in the time of the I.B.E.A. Company. When the
British Government took over the administration of the country we still were
unaware that our possession of our land would be questioned of challenged.
Then from about the year 1902 increasing numbers of Whitemen arrived, and
portions of our land began to be given out to them for farms, until large areas in
Kyambu, Limoru, Kikuyu, Mbagathi, about Nairobi, and at Ruiru and beyond,
had been disposed of in this way. These land were not bought from their Kikuyu
owners, and any compensation they received (for land actually under cultivation
only, and at an extremely small rate per acre) was quite inadequate. The Natives
on them had either to become squatters (on what had been their own land) or
14

else move off. Many of them to-day are squatters on up-country European estates
and many have become wanders, moving from one estate to another. 16
It was clear that from the beginning of European settlement in the EAP, the legitimacy
of the process of land acquisition became a concern of the authorities in London.
The plan for the EAP was based on a “fair land policy” and legislation dictated by
London. In the early settlement days, the British authorities, “very loyal to their Crown,”
managed to define and acquire land through their legislation. With that mind set, their
legislation allowed them to have the right to consider, and strongly believe, that all land
in the EAP, apart from the coastal areas, was to be for the Crown. White settlement
received paramount consideration, which meant that land policy favorable to them had
to be pushed before any African interests.
In the early EAP administration, the arrival of the European settlers left a
considerable political and economic imprint. They vehemently tried to obtain
representative government without inclusion of the others races that could just be taxed
as subjects. John Lonsdale depicted it in this paragraph he wrote about the attitude and
impact of the newcomers on the white highlands.
White settlement was both the baronial consolidation of conquest and the chief
threat to the politics of control. If it could not have politically dependent but
independently productive small farmers, the Colonial Office came round to the
view that it must have big capitalists instead. Big capital would provide the state
with a different but equally controllable answer to the nervous ‘rhinoceros
questions’ of African rights in expanded production. It was ‘no good trying to lay
hold of Tropical Africa with naked fingers’. What was wanted was ‘tireless
engines, not weary men; cheap power, not cheap labour’. Capital was the axe with
which to cut a path through political jungles as well as nature’s. If only it could be
16 Extract From a Memorandum presented to the Parliamentary Commission in November 1924 by
Kikuyu (Native) Association in William McGregor Ross, Kenya From Within (London: Frank Cass and
Company, Limited, 1968), 56.
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given room to exploit African land, then the state could ‘regulate in full and
intricate detail’ the relations between capitalists and the few skilled workers they
would need. And the colonial state was indeed a cartographer; maps were its
image of order. They showed strategic bases and frontiers zones, they marked
property and the absence of it. White settlement filled in dangerous spaces with
roads, fields and boundary beacons. The imagery should not be underestimated,
and the reality hoped for, contented black labour on quiet farms with mortgages,
producing payloads for a railway with a sinking fund [that] was itself the image of
the civilizing mission, the self-justifying myth of the state as well as its mirage of
calm.17
Meanwhile in London, totally ignoring African rights pertaining to the delicate issue of
land was a question of concern. For Eliot, however, the matter was simple. Europeans
were not to be compared with any other group of people in the region. They were on top
of the developing situation and in control of the terrain. This attitude inspired much of
the European political activity described in this dissertation.
Study Area
The arrival of the settlers caused a sudden transformation of the highlands when
the early officials decided to open vast tracts of land for development. Generous
subsidies were given to fortune seekers like Delamere for cattle ranching and cash crop
production like sisal and coffee. The geographical characteristic and diverse climate of
East Africa gave hope to a possible economic boost that would hopefully alleviate the
burden on the Treasury from pouring more money into the protectorate. The new land
must be opened for business. The highlands, situated perfectly in the central part of the
EAP, were seemingly waiting for new owners to make them flourish. They were highly

John Lonsdale, “The conquest state, 1895-1904,” in A Modern History of Africa 1895-1980, ed. W. R.
Ochieng’, (Nairobi: Evans Brothers, 1980), 25.
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viewed as the ideal place for settlement. These highlands also stretch into the presentday nations of day nations of Tanzania and Uganda.
These spectacular elevations stem from the legacy of our planet reshaping itself
through volcanic activities in the remote past. The mightiest highlands are the ones
found in central Kenya, which is covered in the geographical context of this study. The
eastern branch of the famous Rift Valley snakes its way throughout the highlands.
Tectonic forces caused geologic movements that gave birth to the Rift Valley. Opposing
parallel cliffs with various elevations, extending as far as the eyes can see, delimit the
Rift Valley giving it a unique topography and climate that characterizes central Kenya:
Kenya is about as large as France, with an area of around 582,600 sq.km, or
225,000 sq. miles. Most of it is arid steppe, in some places virtual desert, usable
only for extensive pastoralism by sparse populations. Not more than about 14 per
cent, or 80, 000 sq. km, is suitable for agriculture or more intensive grazing. This
high potential land is concentrated in the south-western corner of the country,
400 km (250 miles) and more from the coast. It is enclosed by the 1,000 mm (20
inches) for at least seven years in every ten. This is the area of the Kenya
highlands, split down the middle by the Rift Valley. It was the scene of the second
and third phases of the colonial conquest.18 The region is one of natural beauty
and the first Europeans who surveyed this land marveled at it. The highlands of
central Kenya later became the stage of important political and social
developments because, in the process of territorial expansion, land became very
important. Land was a valuable source of income and a good way to have social
and political prestige. Consequently, land ownership became critical in Kenya.
The amazing topography of inland Kenya and its nearly temperate climate
triggered a land rush for British citizens. It also attracted settlers coming from
South Africa. British officers assigned to the EAP decided to accommodate their
compatriots, who logically chose to settle on the best land. New towns developed
with the consolidation of power in the protectorate. Nairobi became the most
important town in the interior with the highest numbers of settlers.
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Nairobi was founded in 1899 and owed its expansion to the railway that
connected it to Mombasa. It became an important center of political decisions that
would shape not only the economic destiny of the protectorate, but also its political
future. Nairobi became a politically active capital. Settlers arrived and voiced their
demands for economic assistance and total political control. Nairobi provided all the
services that one could expect from emerging colonial town embracing a capitalist
system at the expense of the Africans who lost their land and rights to be politically
involved in the administration of the protectorate. In the growing town of Nairobi,
African and Indians were relegated to the worst areas.19
Structure of the Dissertation
Following this introductory chapter, this study of European political activity
during the 1902-1912 period will be roughly structured around the administrations of
the British commissioners/governors appointed to administer the EAP. These were
short but eventful as each of the administrations, beginning with that of Sir Charles
Eliot, dealt with similar issues closely related to European settlement, such as land,
labor, and the settlers’ demands for a voice in administration of the protectorate.
Nevertheless, each administrator approached his charge in differing ways and met with
varied challenges in dealing with those and other issues.
This principle of organization has produced chapters of varying length for, as will
be seen, all but one of these leaders served an incomplete term in charge. Thus chapter 2
focuses on Sir Charles Eliot’s term in office that marked the start of European
settlement and the initial European political activity and organization. The next chapter
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focuses on the brief tenure of Sir Donald Stewart (1904-05) which was marked by the
CO takeover of supervision of the EAP. Chapter 4 details European agitation during the
turbulent administration of Sir James Hayes Sadler (1905-09) while the fifth chapter
details the disastrous tenure of Sir Percy Girouard (1909-1912). The final chapter will
provide a conclusion and perspective for the study.
Review of Related Literature
In the EAP, the European settlers’ quest for political dominance was inspired by
the southern African–style minority self government that led to white supremacy in
South Africa. It was clear that the political situation in South Africa translated into the
political mind set of the settlers originating from the south. Their political aspirations
were part of the settlement scheme started by Eliot. When Eliot gave the best lands to
the settlers to develop, the stage was set for the guests to enter into the political arena of
the protectorate’s administration.
The newcomers started echoing their voices in the affairs of the protectorate and
the way local officials responded did not always please London, who had to recall some
of them. The formulation of policy was often very controversial. The political effect of
the settlers’ initial presence in the EAP has not been adequately examined. Today the
critical primary documents of the communication between offices and officials in
London and in the protectorate are available. The early political history of the EAP can
now be reevaluated with tangible sources, which will be of great historical significance to
the colonial and most recent history of the people of Kenya.20
Among the most important primary sources are the files containing original correspondence between
the CO and the EAP. These are found in the British National Archives in the CO 533 series. The files cited
in this dissertation were consulted at the Syracuse University Library.
20

19

A study of the settlers’ political demands in the EAP will mainly be based on the
CO archives that are now accessible. Few scholars who were interested in the early
political stage of the protectorate have touched these. Despite that interest, there are not
many specific studies that have made extensive use of CO records for the period
delimiting this work. This is due to the fact that the primary sources were not available
when most of the studies about the settlers’ political demands were conducted. The
economic history of the protectorate and its consequences seemed more worthy of
attention in its own right. British policy in the EAP merited a more detailed study than
had been attempted. Retracing the settlers’ political demands and their consequences is
intended to be a new pedestal for further work to build upon; and that is why it is
important to cover the critical ten year period before the protectorate became a crown
colony.
Among the most prominent published works relevant for this dissertation are
from Marjorie Ruth Dilley and George Bennett. They pinpointed the relevance of the
political climate of the protectorate as soon as the settlers started growing in numbers in
the protectorate. Their work represented a great attempt with good intention to
recapture the British policy in the EAP. In British Policy in Kenya Colony, Dilley
recognized the difficulties she faced in backing up her research.21 Prior to the
publication of her work, she affirmed that there was a certain amount of unpublished
material which she used during the course of her study but which she was not permitted
to cite. Her work was done in the early thirties when access to the colonial records was
not yet allowed. Dilley recaptured the nature and spirit of the newcomers who saw
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themselves as frontiersmen entitled to lands and rights of their own. Dilley showed the
key aspirations of the settlers, which was to acquire land, exploit it, obtain cheap labor,
and indirectly impose a favorable political system for themselves without paying
attention to the purpose and meaning of a protectorate. She shows that the term
“protectorate” did not fully encompass the right of the Africans, Arabs and Indians. Her
work would have been excellent if there was not a hold on the sources she needed to
better express the political mindset of the officials who ran the protectorate.
The work of George Bennett, Kenya’s pioneer political historian, on the same
topic fell in the same category as Dilley’s.22 More work has been done about the
administration of the protectorate. A detailed analysis of the settlers’ political demands
has been overshadowed by the economic issues that the protectorate faced and also the
question of land distribution and labor. Robert Maxon’s work, mentioned earlier,
recaptured the power struggle over the control of the protectorate.23 Maxon showed
that the CO did not always exercise total control over the region due to the fact that,
most often the wrong officials, but with impressive credentials, had been sent to the
protectorate, but had no idea or did not care about the political consequences of their
actions. His work benefited from the use of available sources, but covered the years 1912
- 1923. This period overlaps with this research that will start in 1902.
British Rule in Kenya by G.H. Mungeam covered the period of 1895 to 1912.24
His work retraced the experience of the men on the spot. Despite his emphasis on the
importance of British policy formulation enforced by commissioners, governors and
other officials in a chronological manner, his work is more of a biographical
George Bennett, Kenya, A Political History, (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1963).
Maxon, Struggle for Kenya, 13.
24 Mungeam, British Rule.
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compilation than a deep insight into the political climate that existed between
interested parties in the protectorate. Mungeam pointed out that British rule interfered
with the African way of life and marked a beginning of change, but he did not develop
the primary reasons for that mutation. Change had been triggered by the British
presence in the region and had been accentuated by Eliot’s invitation extended to
European settlers who were coming mainly from South Africa. As soon as they grew in
number, they felt the need to organize themselves. However, Mungeam’s book does not
make settler politics its main focus, and neither does Origins of European Settlement in
Kenya, by Sorrenson.
Nevertheless, Sorrenson underscored how the problem of land distribution
triggered the tension between the CO and the settlers. Massive land alienation for white
settlement gave birth to political aspirations for a potential control of the protectorate.
That meant gearing towards self-government. His work shows the concerns of the CO
about the economic and political future of the protectorate. He focused more on the
origins of land appropriation and the redefinition of the idea of pushing the frontier for
settlement and its consequences. Settlers came from South Africa, and the CO that
assumed responsibility for the EAP in April 1905 had to monitor them by formulating
the right policy from the East African Department. Sorrenson did not make the settlers’
political demands that followed settlement the main argument of his work.
The origins of settlement had a direct connection with the question of occupation
without taking full consideration of the African rights. The protectorate could become a
country carved for white settlement, catering to their needs. Sorrenson considered
arbitrary land grabbing at the expense of the African as a developing problem that could
degenerate into a conflict in the region between newcomers and Africans. The idea of
22

establishing a white man’s country was on the horizon in the early administration of the
protectorate. The work of some Europeans who also came as settlers flirted with the idea
of a white man’s country in the making.
E. Huxley’s most prominent work valued the entrepreneurial character of settlers
like Delamere.25 Studies of the political changes due to settlers’ influence had not been
extensive and objective at all. Nevertheless, a two volume biography of the most
influential political leader among the settlers was written by Huxley. She introduced
Delamere as a model among the settlers. She considered the presence of the settlers as
beneficial for the protectorate. Huxley could be considered as a woman of her time
whose parents came to seek fortune as well in the EAP. Her first book was a reflection of
how some settlers like Delamere saw themselves in the early years of the EAP. Lord
Delemere (Hugh Cholmondely, 1870- 1931) was a fortune seeker and pioneer before he
decided to permanently settle in Kenya. He was a farmer and an active politician
representing the settlers’ community. He loved hunting, land and power. He almost
achieved all under the watch of weak officials who sympathized with his ideas. The
success of Delamere was what most settlers were seeking. Huxley’s work praised the
achievements of Delamere, who rubbed shoulders with important officials and almost
all the governors sent to the protectorate. He used his reputation and charisma to
influence the policy making of the protectorate for the benefit of the settlers. The settlers
organized themselves around him. Huxley’s book about Delamere was published in
1935, and paradoxically, a similar definitive work about another influential and
eccentric settler was published long after the demise of the British Empire.
E. Huxley, White Man’s Country- Lord Delamere and the Making of Kenya (New York: Macmillan
1935).
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Delamere was not the only settler with a high desire of success and adventure.
Ewart Scott Grogan (1873- 1967) was another flamboyant settler and adventurer who
fell in love with the exotic character of Africa through readings while growing up in
London. In 1896, he traveled from Capetown to Cairo. He arrived in the EAP in 1903,
and rode the wave of settler support. He became the president of the Colonists’
Association (CA) and then the Convention of Associations (C of A). Grogan served in
the Legislative Council (Legco), and was not shy in confronting the colonial officials in
Nairobi or even the British government itself. Nine decades after Grogan’s arrival in the
protectorate and thirty-four years after his death, Edward Paice paid him a tribute by
writing his biography.26 Paice portrayed him as a formidable adventurer, risk-taker and
go-getter, despite the fact that Grogan advocated European political supremacy in the
protectorate. Paice’s work followed the same line as Huxley’s book about Delamere. The
biography of the settler leaders like Delamere and Grogan were mostly based on secondhand information written by admirers of the adventurers. What makes Paice’s work
important is that it brings back the context in which policy was formulated in the EAP,
and the people who at that time were involved and the consequences that defined the
political future of the region.
There is no doubt that biographical works about the newcomers in the EAP have
been extensive; but again, they rarely retraced objectively the real political aspirations of
the settlers. Most of these works did not use viable primary sources. Huxley and Paice
never had the opportunity to interview the leaders of the settlers’ political movement.
Their works glorified the determination of the daring settlers who truly believed in the
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idea of transforming the political economy of the EAP and obtaining self-government.
There were contradictions between what the settlers wanted and what the CO was being
briefed. Reports of the political development of the protectorate to London did not
reflect the true reality of how policy was being formulated by the men on the spot. There
were favoritism and a laissez-faire attitude triggered by the tremendous pressures that
the settlers’ associations exercised on almost all the governors who were sent to
administer the protectorate.
Bruce Berman captured the contradictions of policy within the CS when the
settlers arrived and tried to survive and prosper in a new social, economic and political
environment. In Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya,27 Berman used extensive
primary sources, including numerous interviews with Kenyan and British participants to
show these contradictions and their consequences. As Richard Waller pointed out in a
review:
Professor Berman argues that the colonial state was shaped by the
contradictions between maintaining effective political control with limited
coercive force and ensuring the profitable articulation of metropolitan and
settler capitalism with African societies. This dialectic of domination resulted
in both the uneven transformation of indigenous societies and in the
reconstruction of administrative control in the inter-war period. The study
traces the evolution of the colonial state from its skeletal beginnings in the
1890s to the complex bureaucracy of the post-1945 era which managed the
growing integration of the colony with international capital. These
contradictions led to the political crisis of the Mau Mau emergency in 1952 and
to the undermining of the colonial state. 28
Berman’s work benefited more from the availability of extant archives than
some earlier works did. Nevertheless, other important works from people who
Bruce Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1990).
Richard Waller, “Kenya’s Contradictions: Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of
Domination,” Journal of African History, 34 (1993): 155-156.
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witnessed the early political development of the protectorate should also be
considered as relevant, but not fully satisfactory. It is complex to really know the
motives that prompt them to denounce the way the protectorate was run by most of
officials sent by London. The poignant records of a medical officer like Norman Leys,
and also an official like McGregor Ross in the British administration in East Africa,
ideally reflected the results of the impact of British colonialism on traditional African
life. Norman Leys and William McGregor Ross witnessed the political development of
the EAP and wrote about it.
The publication of Kenya by Leys was a critique of the interference caused by the
new system established in the EAP. 29 The British presence in East Africa brought
change that led to a collision of cultures. Leys’ work was an effort to denounce injustices
and mismanaged capitalism and its impact on Africa and Africans. Leys’ book was a
radiant critique of European imperialism, contrary to many officials and settlers who
thought that there was little worth preserving in Africa’s traditional social fabric that
they viewed as “primitive.” As the society changed with the arrival of the Europeans, the
political affairs of the protectorate became more and more a concern for the CO and
humanitarians like Leys. There was favoritism encouraged by the men on the spot due
to the settlers’ constant push for more political concessions. Starting from
Commissioner Eliot, all the governors that followed in administrating the protectorate
fell under the pressure of the settlers who wanted more representatives in the Legco.
Leys comments on these developments:
Nominally the governor, who can dispose of an official majority in his councils, is
under the control of the Colonial Secretary, who in turn is responsible to
29
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Parliament. Actually the influence of the European colonists has hitherto been
decisive of events. Governors are frequently referred to in public as the colonists’
defenders against the Colonial Office, and most recently, governors have
acquiesced in such a conception of their position. The passage of the Duke of
Devonshire’s dispatch, in which he dismisses the proposal of responsible
government, is not taken seriously by the European Colony, but is regarded as
one of those merely formal statements whereby humanitarian sentiment in
England is satisfied. 30
The Devonshire dispatch was a huge political blow for the settlers. Partisan
politics was obvious in the protectorate and Leys denounced it in his work. He blamed
the officials who sympathized with the settlers, who were a numerical minority, and the
last to arrive in the protectorate. The newcomers wanted to be served first. That itself
created concerns in London and also among some humanitarians like Leys himself. The
problem with Leys’ work as being critical by directly pointing a finger at the officials
formulating policy that benefited European settlers, and undermining the Africans’
rights, is that Leys’ political ideology was not sympathetic to the extreme capitalist
system being set up in the EAP. Leys, therefore, was viewed as an unsentimental
socialist who thought of the British rule of Africans as an unnatural monstrosity, a well
packaged system that tagged capitalism at its worst. Leys’ work is often classified as
belonging to the less sentimental groups of white critics of British imperialism. His work
was geared toward the defense of African rights in the face of the evils of capitalism and
extreme European interference that was a threat to traditional African societal settings.
Keeping up with political developments in Kenya became so captivating that
Ross decided to keep track of it. He kept his records straight and wrote about Kenya.
The publication of Kenya from Within in 1927 was an immense effort that tried to keep
30
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track of the political developments in the protectorate.31 Ross, while in the service of the
British Government, kept a dairy of all the political developments that were
transforming the protectorate and its mixed population. Ross acknowledged the
difficulties of his task while attempting to record the political transformation of the
protectorate. He stated that: “It is only to be expected that this book suffers, in places
from faults inherent in accounts of heated political happenings written by one who
played parts, varying from inconspicuous to prominent, in some of them, and who took
a lively interest in them all.”32 Ross admitted that he tried to be accurate, and he
modestly opened the door for any correction by any who might discover inaccuracy later
on. Ross’ work had a great significance because it pointed out the direction to follow to
properly understand the struggle within the protectorate among all parties involved.
Ross’ major deficiency was the unavailability of primary sources to back up his research.
The most recent work relevant to this study is Brett Shadle’s The Souls of White
Folk: White Settlement in Kenya, 1900s-1920s. Shadle provides a detailed account of
the early social history relating to Kenya’s settlers, including their views on their lives
and experiences in the highlands. His conclusion that “White settlement was based on
the equation of civilization with (a difficult to define) whiteness was emotionally
enriched through notions of paternalism and trusteeship; appeared consistently under
threat from Africans, colonial administration, judiciary, and fellow settlers; and was
shored up daily through rituals of prestige, difference, humiliation, and violence” is
important in providing and understanding for the attitudes adopted by European
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migrants.33 While Shadle’s book sheds much light on the attitudes of Kenya’s early
settlers, the book gives little attention to politics and political organizations.
Conclusion
This chapter presents a case for a need to reevaluate the political history of the
EAP between 1902 and 1912. The challenge here is to chronologically follow the settlers’
political demands in the EAP according to each administration. This work will analyze
the political demands of the European settlers, starting from Eliot’s time in the
protectorate (1900-1904), being the first commissioner sacked by the CO, through that
of Sir Percy Girouard, who also was sacked in 1912. The administrations of these two
officials, who formulated policy that deliberately facilitated the interest of the settlers,
provide the purpose of this work. The political arena of the protectorate, and what
politically happened on that stage, per se, is worthy of re-enactment, taking into
account the availability of the original nature of all the communication between Nairobi
and London. It is well known that there were dispatches sent by the CO to intervene and
readdress the political destiny of the protectorate. Some of them brought news of top
officials who were supposed to run the protectorate fairly and effectively, as being
recalled. The political stage looked like a political fiasco because there was no room or
will for a political co-habitation that would welcome all the people in the so-called
“protectorate.” Commissioners and governors sent to the protectorate during the
decade under study did not last long.
They did not administer the protectorate in a satisfactory manner that would
have benefited all the people then present in the region. Navigating through the CO
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records will finally help to reopen and reevaluate the early political history of the EAP,
with the European settlers as the main focus. They tried in vain to achieve self
government in East Africa, which they thought would be an exclusive white man’s
country. As most of the works mentioned in the literature review did not use the CO
records to shed light on the settlers’ political aspirations, this work seeks to
chronologically re-navigate the critical political history of the EAP according to the
successive line of British officials and their failed policies for an evolving melting pot of
society. The settlers’ growing political influence and extreme aspirations raised
fundamental moral and political issues concerning the existence of a timetable to fully
implement African rights in the protectorate.
The settlers’ pursuit of happiness, prosperity and full political rights turned the
protectorate into a subject of national debate in the British parliament. The rights of the
Africans, who supposedly needed “civilization,” were ignored by important officials like
Eliot. The political developments following the building of the railroad and European
settlement are worthy of a detailed study in order to understand the notion of empire
and interference in what is often called the “Dark Continent” or “white man’s country,”
specifically in the early days of the protectorate.

30

Chapter 2
An Open Invitation to some Conflictive British Outlanders into the EAP: A
Social and Political Struggle in the Making
Introduction
The arrival and settlement of people of European descent in the EAP in the early
twentieth century was mainly the work of Commissioner Sir Charles Eliot. He promised
land to settlers who were willing to come and help develop the region. Settlers from
South Africa took the lead and others came from Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand
and other British colonies. The commissioner did all that he could to attract settlers
from different classes and backgrounds. There were aristocrats, business adventurers,
small and big farmers, Anglo-Boer war veterans and land speculators. W.S. Churchill,
who visited the EAP in 1907, took particular notice of them, describing the whole lot as
typical “political animals”.34 The then under secretary for the colonies’ remark meant
that the European newcomers were not just actively engaged in politics; but they were at
the same time big trouble makers, very demanding and difficult to please. Their
presence and political ambition in this new British dependency signaled the beginning
of an era of ambiguous and contradictory policy formulations that solely benefited
them. The new situation became a mounting problem for the powers in London. That
way of doing politics by leaving the majority population behind did not last forever, but
it left an enduring legacy in Kenya’s political history.
The influx of European settlers brought a new socio-political dynamic to the
protectorate. With the commissioner on their side, they tried to define, develop and
defend their interests. The settlers saw the need to form political parties, a key
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instrument for the acquisition and exercise of state power in a British colony. They
sought to use party politics to achieve their group and personal interests. The future
terminus of their political ambition was the attainment of self-government on the model
of South Africa. In other words, they progressively wanted total political control of the
protectorate. Their demands sparked a struggle between differing, competing and often
antagonistic interests. The rights of both the Africans and the Indians, who came before
the European settlers, were to be taken into account by the FO.
Nevertheless, under the supervision of the FO and the eye of British
humanitarians and the India Office, Eliot simply did not have all the power in his hands
to formulate policies solely benefiting his preferred settlers. Settlers’ political demands
were not totally accepted by the FO, which sent the commissioner to administrate the
protectorate. Despite this limitation of power, he started formulating policy that he
thought was the best for the protectorate. Eliot’s failure to listen and report to the FO
officials in London about the question of his arbitrary land allocations to some settlers
led to his dismissal. However, it remained manifest that the impact of his
administration triggered a political contagion dominated by settlers’ demands that
successive governors sent to make the protectorate profitable had to wrestle with. The
political struggle of the settlers was not yet over with the sacking of Eliot. In fact, the
settlers geared their political parties to channel their demands in order to protect their
interests and increase their power. Eliot just set the tone and left.
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Sir Charles Eliot: The progenitor of European settlement in the EAP
In December 1900, Sir Charles
Eliot succeeded Sir Arthur Hardinge as
Commissioner of the EAP. In February
1901, he arrived in the EAP. He was also
responsible, as the Consul-General, for
the administration of Zanzibar, an island
off the coast of East Africa. He was a
career diplomat who had served in the
United States of America, Russia, and the
Near East. He thus had international
experience that could potentially help
Image 1: Sir Charles Eliot. Source: Mungeam,
British Rule, 70.

him administrate the EAP. That was the
main reason why the FO sought him out

as a replacement for Sir Arthur Hardinge. The new commissioner was well educated
and charismatic. Eliot projected an image of being the right man on the spot, ready to
defend British interests in East Africa.
Most of his contemporaries thought quite highly of him, esteeming Eliot as one of
the most able men for the administration of the protectorate. As nice as the first
accolades from the officials in the protectorate were, Eliot was not the most affable
diplomat. Within a few months of his arrival, he complained that so far his subordinates
had acted “‘much as Consuls act in the Levant’, merely confining their duties to hearing
complaints, redressing grievances and writing reports. They had done little to
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administer or develop the country.”35 Unlike these officials, the second commissioner
displayed the zeal of a pragmatic administrator in his objectives to change the economic
direction of the protectorate.
However, Eliot did not receive any specific instructions to prepare him for the
work of mainland administration. He took initiatives to run the protectorate the way he
thought was the best without seeking extensive guidance from the FO. Eliot was very
confident with his plan to bring positive changes in the protectorate. The commissioner
made suggestions for improving administration and investigating the commercial
possibilities of the country. The FO listened enthusiastically to him as he made his first
moves towards developing the protectorate. In addition he had gained “a most
favourable impression’ of the prospects for European colonization in the highlands.”36
It was apparent that the commissioner seemed to have fostered a hidden political
agenda, one that favored the European settlers above all others, like in South Africa. He
had a vision of transforming the highlands of the protectorate into a white man’s
country. Eliot argued “the interior of the Protectorate is a white man’s country…. It is
mere hypocrisy not to admit that white interest must be paramount, and that the main
object of our policy and legislation should be to found a white colony.”37 Eliot did not
have to look far to find a model of success for European settlement in Africa. As the
European emigration to South Africa proved to be successful, Eliot decided to adopt the
same strategy to create a white man’s country in East Africa. He strongly believed that
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the opening of the protectorate could give an avenue to European settlers who could
later reproduce the South African model of self- government.
The commissioner’s energetic approach resembled those of the former autocratic
governor of the Cape Colony, Lord Charles Somerset (1814-26), who in his intention of
transforming that colony into a prosperous British holding declared that:
Settlers possessing sufficient means were encouraged to engage at least ten ablebodied individuals in agricultural pursuits rather than in the maintenance of large herds
of cattle, thus forming a cordon of close settlement against the inroads of savage life. On
100-acre allotments for each adult male emigrant ‘in most healthy and temperate
climate in the universe,’ distressed labourer and aspiring lord would come together in
the re-creation of their vision of English landed society. Free from ‘contamination of
slavery,’ independent of native labour, and based on ‘mixed body of agriculturalists and
mechanics,’ gentry and laborer would ‘reciprocally create and remove wants, and thus
stimulate each other’ to increased productivity, social order, and social cohesion.38
Eliot embraced Somerset’s idealism and strategy. There was no need to reinvent the
wheel. The formula was simple; it consisted on the paramountcy of the settler’s right to
dominate the socio-economic and political fabric of the protectorate. He had to pave the
way for the settlers whom he believed would be the pillar foundation for his plan to
develop and eventually run the protectorate. His first step was to brief the FO about the
potentialities of the region. He informed the Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, that
peace, stability and the advent of the railroad had transformed the EAP, which must be
opened for business to generate revenue to balance the annual protectorate budgets.

38

J. Reader, Africa: A Biography of the Continent (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1998), 465.

35

Eliot’s vision was to turn the protectorate into a profitable and well-administrated
crown colony. On 5 March 1901, he enthusiastically expressed the situation to
Lansdowne stating that:
I do not think you quite realise at home what an immense change has come over
the East Africa Protectorate in the last few years. About 1895 East Africa was still
what it purports to be —a Protectorate superintended by Consular officers. . . . In
the last few years all this has been suddenly change by two events, the
suppression of the Mazrui rebellion and the building of the Uganda Railway. The
former broke the power and influence of the Arabs, the latter opened up a new
country in which no one could pretend that British officials were Consuls
supervising a local administration. The consequence is that the country has
unconsciously grown from a Consular District into a Colony. . . . I felt—as every
official out here must feel –as if I were administering a Crown Colony or an
Indian Province. Unfortunately the Administration has not changed with the
condition of the country; it is still organised on an old Consular theory; it still
leaves undone the things which Consuls do not do but which people who are
practically, if not theoretically, an independent Government ought to do.39
Eliot’s letter to Lansdowne suggested that the FO and the people of England had
no substantial information about the potentialities of the region. According to him the
main obstacles hindering development were the passivity of the British officials in the
protectorate and their lack of vision. Eliot vowed to rigorously administrate the region
like a full grown crown colony. Although Eliot gave an exaggerated and negative
evaluation of how the protectorate was administrated to Lansdowne, he progressively
made it his business to work on opening the door to the European expatriates. By 15
May 1901 he had visited the interior, he went on to describe the protectorate as if it was
an el dorado consisting of a “’large area of highland with a cool and invigorating climate,
fertile soil and wide pasture grounds.’ which he believed to be suitable for European

39 Eliot to Lansdowne, Private, 5 March 1901, as quoted in G. H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya 1895 –
1912 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 76.

36

colonization.”40 Eliot officially manifested his inner desire to incorporate European
settlers in the region ipso facto.
Eliot’s Plan to introduce European Settlers
The idea of bringing European settlers into the protectorate was not new to the
FO. Before Eliot’s arrival, only a few Europeans were able to settle in the interior of the
protectorate. It was deemed precarious to remain isolated in the middle of the country,
surrounded by Africans without British protection. James McQueen, a blacksmith,
immigrated there in 1896. T.A Wood also settled in, and even opened a hotel in 1900,
just when Nairobi was in the process of becoming the center city of the protectorate.
Wood’s hotel later became the ideal meeting place for the Europeans who came in after
the completion of the railway. Social gatherings at Wood’s hotel set the stage for the
settlers’ future political claims and aspirations.41 The quasi-inexistence of a great
number of European settlers in the interior was not a problem. The FO could keep on
relying on Indian labor. After all, they helped to build the railroad and develop trade in
the region. They were good traders and the Africans knew who they were. Some British
officials and other European settlers, who were aware of the presence and value of the
Indians, entertained the idea of encouraging them to permanently settle in the
protectorate. They noticed that the Indians could cohabitate peacefully with the Africans

Eliot to Lansdowne, private, 15 May 1901 as quoted by Mungeam, British Rule, 77. Sir Harry Johnston
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and help develop the protectorate. In fact they were doing that long before Eliot took
charge of the protectorate.
John Ainsworth,42 an experienced official who knew well the protectorate,
advised the FO to encourage Indian settlement. Ainsworth served the protectorate well
holding various positions from 1895 up to 1917. He was sub-commissioner and later
provincial commissioner of Ukamba, Naivasha and Nyanza provinces. He was very
familiar with the issue of African land rights and also acknowledged the important
contributions of the Indians in the region. Even before Eliot took charge of the
protectorate, Ainsworth noticed the importance of having the Indians in the region and
advised the FO to push for their permanent settlement. “There would not be the same
scope for European emigrants [sic] as there is for Indians…. For a large number of
Europeans the Country does not at present hold out sufficient inducements; naturally
Europeans require to make more money than does a native of India,”43 he asserted.
Ainsworth knew that the Indians integrated well and developed trade and could play a
significant role in improving the Kamba agricultural system. European settlement also
drew more skepticism from other officials like Sir Harry H. Johnston, Special
Commissioner for Uganda. In 1899, he wrote that “East Africa was unsuitable for
European settlement but that in time there would be a great overflow of India into these
insufficiently inhabited, uncultivated parts of East Africa now ruled by Britain and
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Germany.”44 Johnston held the idea that a progressive incorporation of Indians would
activate trade and agriculture for the development of the protectorate. Indians could
live without quarreling with Africans. There was more evidence that Indians were
efficient and peaceful workers. The construction of the railway was the blueprint of their
labor contribution and trade was their entrepreneurial endeavor. Unfortunately, Eliot
came to change that dynamic. He is credited with having initiated the policy of white
supremacy in the British East Africa Protectorate.
Eliot did not have to wrestle with the question of introducing European settlers in
the protectorate. For him the answer to a stagnant economy was a considerable influx
of desirable capitalists who would be accommodated in the highlands. There was no
need for speculation on the part of the charismatic career diplomat. The measure was
simple for him. Eliot truly believed that he had the key for a positive socio-economic
change in the EAP. According to the man on the spot, Indians should be confined in the
lowlands and Africans dispossessed of their land, used as laborers for the new invaders
and taxed to generate revenue. The commissioner had come to the conclusion that the
main issue the protectorate was facing was the completion of the railway and its
economic implication. It was crucial to make it pay. For that to happen it was necessary
to start collecting taxes from the local population. In addition to that proposal the
commissioner highlighted that the protectorate offered a “large area of highland with a
cool and invigorating climate, fertile soil and wide pasture grounds.”45 The
commissioner’s correspondences with the FO revealed the character of a diplomat who,
from the early months of his administration, decided to have no mercy or consideration
44
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for the Africans, regardless of their economic situation. Also, Eliot took a stand in firmly
believing that the highlands were the ideal ground for European settlement.
The man on the spot was already proceeding quickly, envisioning the highlands
to soon turn into many white settlers’ new destination and country. Lansdowne
expressed some criticisms about the levying of a hut tax suggested by Eliot. It almost
became a moral dilemma for London to enforce a taxation system from a “poverty
stricken peasantry with a backward agriculture.”46 The Africans in the protectorate were
just starting to recover from natural calamities they suffered a decade before Eliot
arrived. There was not enough land to support land-hungry migrants even though the
region seemed apparently under populated. The paucity in the Kikuyu region, mainly
along the railway, was due to natural disasters. The famine and smallpox epidemic of
1898-99 ravaged the local population. Eliot was not an exception among the
intellectuals who drank from the cup of social Darwinism. Africans, who might perish
under any circumstances, were the ones who were not fit enough to continue in the
protectorate. Eliot had only a vague idea of the interior of the protectorate but kept
trying to convince the FO of the need to encourage European settlement. Of course, the
FO had no exact, defined policy of developing the protectorate. Incorporating and
integrating European settlers was not going to be simple if the best land was going to be
arbitrarily alienated for the newcomers at the expense of the Africans.
Nevertheless, the commissioner negotiated his case for European settlement with
the FO. As there was no concrete plan from the FO to develop the protectorate, Eliot’s
proposal then started to take shape. He planted an idea in the officials’ minds in
46 C. C. Wrigley, “Kenya: The Pattern of Economic Life 1902-45,” in History of East Africa, vol. 2, eds.
Vincent Harlow, et al. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 211-14.
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London that something had to be done and something like his plan was better than no
plan at all. After all, in capitalism risks must be taken to generate revenue. It should be
a well-calculated risk. In the case of the EAP, Eliot took an unfair calculated risk
because it tended to undermine the incorporation and integration of Indians and
Africans in the new system of production. Eliot’s plan for the protectorate was the
development and growth of a ruthless form of capitalism best illustrated in South Africa,
solely based on European settlers’ production. He envisioned the European settlement
as his best choice to justify the theory of the fittest individuals in society whom in
practice would benefit from his guidance and make the protectorate profitable. His plan
was to accommodate a “superior race,” the white man’s race in the protectorate, and
gave them unlimited support to help exploit the region for the benefit of the British
Empire. This was the agenda of a typical unethical rationale for a laissez-faire
capitalism. “Sir Charles Eliot predicted that if his advice to found a European colony was
followed the country would pay its way, certainly in ten years, perhaps less,”47 Dr.
Norman Leys asserted. That was a bold prediction, but it was surely comforting for the
FO to see Eliot’s optimism. Yet, the FO did not know about the dark intentions of the
well-trusted commissioner to favor the settlers only and the future political
consequences of such a policy. Lansdowne ordered him to proceed with care, mainly
with the question of land and taxation vis a vis the Africans.48
New Rules under Eliot
When Eliot came up with the idea of taxing the Africans as part of his solution to
generate money for the financially stressed protectorate, Sir Clement Lloyd Hill, the
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Superintendent of the African Protectorate Department (APD) at the FO, revised Eliot’s
proposal for taxation and noticed that the success of any plan to administrate the
protectorate depended on finance, but somehow he agreed with Eliot’s suggestion. He
informed Lansdowne on the matter. Lansdowne responded with the following minute
arguing that: “For the present the problem seems to be how to tap the undoubted
resources of the country without assuming too many of the responsibilities of
administration.”49 What Lansdowne did not know was that Eliot was on the way to
assuming more responsibilities; he was paving a way for the settlers. He started
updating the FO with reports about the prospects for the protectorate.
In June 1901 he dispatched his first annual report, again underlining the great
potential of the protectorate suitable for European colonization. He pushed hard to
seduce the FO about the exotic nature of the well-watered protectorate with its
comfortable climate that European settlers would find ideal.50 According to Eliot, the
protectorate was a vast no-man’s land that could be transformed by the fittest European
settlers. At no time were the Africans or the Indians part of his scheme to resolve the
financial equation of the EAP. In his second annual report, he reiterated his strong
belief of having encountered the perfect land for his upcoming discriminatory policy
that was to take place once the FO took up his plan to bring in the European settlers.
The commissioner exaggerated his description of the protectorate. In his view, as
described by Sorrenson: The Kikuyu country had a native population unusually dense
for East Africa but claimed it was not too dense to prevent European settlement. “He
49Minute
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went on to describe the Kikuyu country as ‘one of the richest and most promising
districts in the Protectorate.’ Njoro in the Rift Valley was considered as ‘one of the most
favoured’ districts, with scenery ‘strikingly English.’ The Nandi country was described
as ‘perhaps the most beautiful district in the Protectorate.”51
The commissioner drew a similitude of the protectorate with other British
colonies like Australia and New Zealand to make his case before the FO. Under Eliot’s
eyes, the EAP was not different from those countries that welcomed European settlers,
but his comparison was not accurate. Australia and New Zealand offered more land
suitable for European settlement. Land was more available in both Australia and New
Zealand, which were less populated than the EAP. Still for Lansdowne, full control of
the protectorate had to be secured first. That meant that money had to be channeled for
military and police measures not for administrative concerns. The confident
commissioner promised that he could make the protectorate profitable if fully trusted
with his plan to secure more revenue. Eliot’s dedication to carry on with his scheme
paid off when Lansdowne agreed to a careful levying of a hut tax and introduction of
settlers in a wider and diverse aspect. Lansdowne’s response to Eliot demonstrated his
agreement with the general idea of introducing settlers into the country. Of course,
Indian settlers might be encouraged, especially with a view toward increasing the
prosperity of some of the up-country stations. The European settlers would also be
welcome as a useful source of revenue: “Speaking generally, His Majesty’s Government
are most anxious to encourage settlers, and would welcome any well considered
enterprises involving the expenditure of British capital and energy in the British
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Protectorate.”52 However, he warned Eliot that lines of future development were not
yet clear, and that great care should be exercised to avoid the difficulties likely to be
created by excessive grants of land to would-be settlers. And when military and police
had become more efficient, and communication with Lake Victoria had been established
with the completion of the railway, it would be easier, in Lansdowne’s opinion, for the
Government to study and profit from the economic wealth of the country, which Eliot
had so stringently emphasized.53
Lansdowne’s dispatch clearly mentioned the inclusion of Indians in Eliot’s intent to
bring settlers in the country. In addition to that, he made it clear to the commissioner
that great care should be taken in the process of land allocation. Furthermore
Lansdowne manifested concern about the importance of security and stability for trade
to carry on safely.54 That meant that Eliot should be fair and careful in the execution of
his plan.
Eliot understood Lansdowne’s instructions but putting them in practice proved to
be very controversial. The man on the spot was gearing towards a deliberately
discriminatory immigration scheme. He focused on the mission of inviting settlers of
European descent by promising them land that they could develop. Eliot engaged
himself into diffusing the good news of the opening of a quasi-virgin country where
settlers of his choice could prosper.
After the release of his first annual report that did not lack glowing accounts of an
ideal territory of rich game consisting of beautiful highlands, with almost temperate
52
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climate reminiscent of the cool weather one feels in Britain, Eliot still found it not
ineffective. The commissioner “prepared a pamphlet on settlers’ prospects and had it
published by the Emigrants’ Information Office in London.”55 He reiterated the
opportunities the protectorate offered to potential settlers. Eliot was indeed moving fast
and was not shy on formulating policies to assist the settlers from the get-go by
“reducing freights on the railway and reducing customs duties on seeds and agricultural
implements. He created Agricultural and Veterinary departments to carry out
experimental work on stock and crops, and provide services to settlers at subsidized
rates.”56 In the midst of these first steps taken to change the economic direction of the
protectorate from stagnation to miraculous rapid growth, while in London on leave, the
commissioner was meticulously amending the land regulations to really attract and
accommodate the potential European settlers who would take the initiative to resettle in
the EAP. These first steps taken by the man on the spot and his earnest desire to count
on a settlers’ influx indicated his own aspirations to gain more power for the
concretization of a white man’s country that he firmly intended to create in the EAP.
In fact, it was during Eliot’s absence from the protectorate in September 1902,
that the Crown Lands Ordinance was introduced. It made possible the sales and leases
of land, but also the provision of licenses allowing temporary occupation of the then socalled Crown land. The ordinance clarified that the Crown had original title to land, and
in case where the Africans vacated or deserted their land, they would de facto lose their
property. That meant that, out of the blue, any unsupervised African land, in any case,
was considered waste and reverted back to the Crown to be technically given to the soon
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coming settlers. The condition for the sale of land was clearly determined not to exceed
1,000 acres per lot without the approval of the Foreign Secretary. Also, more power was
vested to the commissioner who, after considering that the purchaser of a land did not
occupy and develop his parcel, could declare that land forfeited. As for the term of
leasehold, the Ordinance provided that the settler-farmers would lease land for 99 years.
That term replaced the 21 years land lease of the 1897 Ordinance. That resulted to each
settler obtaining 160 acres of land free of charge as an inducement to develop it. The
occupant could not transfer that land without the approval of the commissioner and was
required to pay taxes to help build and maintain the infrastructure. Eliot turned the
amended ordinance of 1902 into a discriminatory law allowing leases for European
settlers and supposedly gave temporary occupation licenses for Africans and Indians.
Unfortunately for the Africans and the Indians, it proved impossible to obtain a license
to occupy land to farm or develop a trading business.57
By the time that the Crown Lands Ordinance was introduced in September 1902
there were already some Europeans settled in the highlands. It was noted that there
were only eight or ten settlers in the Kikuyu country, the most popular locality in the
highlands.58 T. A. Wood, who was one of the rare early settlers, ran a hotel frequented
mostly by other newcomers in the highlands. Wood’s hotel became their political
meeting ground. George. Bennett noted the following:
Early in January 1902 twenty-two Europeans met at Wood’s to elect a committee
to encourage white settlement. Their letter to Eliot seeking government support
epitomizes the future themes of the settlers in Kenya: Land, labour, and
opposition to the Indians. They want land to be granted in freehold, help through
the establishment of model farms and a forestry department, and the passing of
57
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mining laws; they asked that the natives should be made more ‘amenable to
European supervision’ and describe Asiatic immigration as ‘detrimental to
European settlers in particular and to native inhabitant generally.59
The commissioner took notice of their demands and promised to encourage European
settlers to come to the EAP.
Looking closer at Eliot’s willingness to collaborate with the early limited
numbers of settlers to meet their demands, it stands manifest that any further influx of
settlers would increase their number and result in generating new aspirations for more
concessions. A stronger European settlers’ presence in the protectorate would be of
great significance when the urge for self government claims emerged. The early settlers’
platform, generated at Wood’s hotel in Nairobi, and focusing on land, labor and
opposition to the Indians, resonated without reason. It was their first political
manifesto. They much sounded like a group, such as a political party, that made its
appeal directly to the commissioner. Churchill summarized it best in his African
journey account. He stated that:
White settlement was both the baronial consolidation of conquest and the chief
threats to the politics of control. If it could not have politically dependent but
independently productive small farmers, the Colonial Office came round to the
view that it must have big capitalist instead. Big capital would provide the state
with a different but equally controllable answer to the nervous ‘rhinoceros
questions’ of African rights in expanded production. It was ‘no good trying to lay
hold of Tropical Africa with naked fingers’. What was wanted was ‘tireless
engines, not weary men; cheap power, not cheap labour’. Capital was the axe with
which to cut a path through political jungles as well as nature’s. If only it could be
given room to exploit African land, the state could ‘regulate in full intricate detail’
the relations between capitalists and the few skilled workers they would need.60
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White immigration sought to fetter Indian settlement and hoped to suppress any
African initiative in organizing ways to be part of the system of production by reducing
them to the status of squatters once their land has been alienated. The EAP political
future was being shaped by Eliot’s readiness to fully back up the European settlers.
Following the gathering at Wood’s hotel, another event worthy of consideration took
place in November 1902, when Frederick Jackson, the acting commissioner, set rules for
the protection of native rights and care for all the inhabitants, protection of forest and
development of holdings and fencing. Nevertheless, many of the early settlers in
Nairobi were not pleased with Jackson’s new measure, even though it was along the
lines of the 1902 ordinance. That sparked an agitation among the settlers who
demanded Jackson to withdraw the rules. The leader was the Church of Scotland
missionary, Dr. D. C. R. Scott, who considered the rules detrimental to the settlers’
interests.61 Dr. Scott’s reaction signaled a will of self-aggrandizement, ironically, in the
name of a larger moral cause. The settlers were not to be held at the same level as an
Indian or an African in the rise of a new developing socio-economic and political era of
the protectorate. The settlers had the commissioner on their side, embracing the same
philosophy of occupation, domination, production and accumulation of wealth without
integration or the sharing of the market with the so-called other races or new subjects.62
In fact, when Eliot returned from London, he went to meet with the early settlers
who were not pleased with Jackson’s introduction of the new homestead system of
settlement. After hearing their complaint, the commissioner, without officially meeting
with Jackson on the issue, withdrew the rules. It was noted that, “Under Eliot’s rules the
61
62

Sorrenson, Origins, 63.
Ibid.

48

area of homestead was to be 160 acres but, if three-tenths of this was cultivated within
three years, an additional area of 480 acres could be granted. The purchase price of Rs 2
(2s. 8d.) per acre could be paid at once or spread over sixteen years. A freehold title was
to be granted on payment of the purchase price or after cultivation conditions had been
fulfilled.”63 The new rule was intended to benefit the settler planter. Also, the drafting
of the rule opened the door for potential speculators. Any land speculator and ordinary
profiteers could fulfill their payment and obtain their land title without meeting the
development conditions. Eliot’s new rule was porous in its drafting because it read “or
after the cultivation conditions had been fulfilled,” instead of “and after” fulfillment of
the set requirements.64
Meanwhile Eliot had so far taken sides in favoring the first settlers, who knew to
whom and where to direct their demands. The cynical political agitation caused by the
settlers in January and November 1902, combined with Eliot’s readiness to listen to
them, marked the beginning of the struggle for the control of power in the EAP. The
first settlers also took notice of the way to proceed to defend their interests. They were
aware of the fact that a considerable influx of settlers, well organized, could put pressure
on any official sent to run the protectorate. Eliot triggered a land rush, opening the door
for more eccentric settlers who accentuated the struggle for more concessions and
political rights.
Moreover, Eliot’s administration of the protectorate in the year 1903 was
dominated by the extension of the homestead rules and the arrival of more settlers of all
kinds who felt the need to organize themselves to defend their interests. In Eliot’s
63
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theory, unoccupied and sparsely occupied land could be reserved for settlers who would
make good use of it. He sought the approval of the FO, suggesting the making of land
within the railroad zone available for the good cause of European settlement. Offering
free grant of 640 acres, east of Nairobi from Mazares to the Machakos road, and west
from Naivasha to Fort Ternan, and affordable grazing land at minimal, nominal rent
outside of the railway zone, would attract desirable investors. The FO naturally listened
to Eliot because they knew nothing concrete about the African and the protectorate
itself. On the other hand, the Treasury first remained skeptical and insisted on the
importance of generating revenue to cover the cost of the railway construction. Land
within the railway zone was a good asset for that cause. After a short deadlock, the
Treasury allowed Eliot to proceed with his plan in March 1903 under the following
measure: “The free grants were to be allowed in the districts Eliot had suggested but
outside of the railway zone. Inside the zone he was to be allowed to sell one-third of
each 640 acre block and lease the remaining two-thirds. The price was to be substantial.
Lansdowne instructed Eliot not to sell more than one-quarter of each block of railway
land, but allowed him to fix the prices.”65 Once again, Eliot succeeded in convincing
officials in London to accept his initiatives. His work would benefit potential
newcomers entering the protectorate. In 1903 117 whites applied for land grant, and in
a following year “599 immigrants made three hundred applications.”66
European colonists’ response to Eliot’s settlement invitation
Before the first considerable wave of settlers entered the protectorate to claim
and occupy land in April 1903, talks about experimenting in settlement with other races
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had long been discarded: “The state’s early essays in immigration had an air of
desperation about them: Punjabi peasants, Finnish homesteaders, and persecuted Jews
from eastern and central Europe; all had their passing attraction.”67 It was under Eliot’s
administration when the protectorate saw the arrival of some eccentric settlers who later
became charismatic political leaders defending their interests. The settlers who
responded to Eliot’s invitation were from different social backgrounds, but nevertheless,
their interests in obtaining land and political aspirations for the acquisition of power
would eventually emerge and converge. They felt the need to form political entities to
secure leverage at a crucial time in order to defend their interests. That common
denominator drove the settlers’ community into the political arena of the protectorate.
As stated earlier, among the group of settlers who set foot in the protectorate, there were
aristocrats, business adventurers, small and big farmers, Anglo-Boer war veterans and
land speculators.
The most prominent aristocrat and business adventurer was the third Lord
Delamere who was already familiar with the region.
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Lord Delamere was born Hugh
Cholmondeley in 1870 at Vale Royal in
Cheshire, England, and died in 1931.
He was a pioneer European settler,
farmer, and politician. Educated at
Eton, at the age of 17, he succeeded his
father as the third Baron Delamere of
Vale Royal. In 1897, Delamere first
entered Kenya on a big-game hunting
expedition. In 1903, he returned to
Kenya, where he remained for the rest
of his life. Historians have noted that,
“Shortly after Delamere’s arrival, Sir
Charles Eliot granted him 40,500
hectares (100,035 acres) of land on a
99-year lease in the White Highlands;
subsequent land grants/purchases
increased the size of his estate.”68
Image 2: Lord Delamere. Source: Huxley, White Man’s
Country, see preface.

Delamere’s peculiarity, spirit of
adventure and ambitions soon caught

the attention of the first government officials like Ainsworth and Jackson. Note the
following description in the account from Ross, Kenya from Within:
One afternoon in 1898 the District Officer in charge of the inland station of
Machakos was informed by his wife that there had just arrived upon the verandah
a singularly dishevelled traveler who announced himself as Lord Delamere. After
tea with this Mr. and Mrs. Ainsworth, Lord Delamere excused himself from
returning for dinner on the grounds of the disrepair and scantiness of his outfit.
He had not known when he first called that ‘there were any ladies in the station.’
He had come South through Jubaland and Tanaland by camel and porter
caravans, and was now proceeding to meet the railway construction parties as
they approach the site of Nairobi, and so go on to Mombasa. His camp exhibited
all the evidences of a dashing and adventurous journey through wild country, and
next morning he moved away Southward with his companion, Dr. Atkinson.69
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Delamere sure left an impression on Ainsworth, the main official who, to some degree,
fought for the consideration of African rights to land and their incorporation in the
economic system of the protectorate.
In 1903, a different Delamere again crossed the path of Ainsworth, but under
different circumstances. This complex figure was also an active political advocate for a
white man’s country. Even before settling permanently, he gained the sympathy of
Eliot. When he applied for a government post under the motive of alleviating settlers
struggles under official hostility, the commissioner created a position to fit him in his
scheme of carving out a white man’s country: Eliot offered him one “specially charged
with the affairs which concern the white settlers,” and recommended his appointment as
a sub-collector, coupled with that of Land Officer as an experiment. He apparently
accepted Delamere’s views, for he explained to the Foreign Office that Ainsworth, the
then Land Officer, had too much to do and was “quarrelsome with the settlers.” Before
the appointment could be concluded Delamere was laid up as result of a riding
accident.70
Delamere and Eliot strengthened their ties prioritizing white settlement to the point
that Jackson, Eliot’s Deputy Commissioner, alerted the FO. Bennett well illustrated it
with Jackson’s dispatch to the FO. Jackson claimed that: “The protectorate was
becoming a country of ‘nigger-’ and game-shooters.” He described one leading settler as
“a well know filibuster,” saying that he and Delamere were “as thick as thieves.”
Moreover, he believed that Eliot had come under Delamere’s influence and was kow-
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towing to the settlers, the majority of whom Jackson regarded as “a lot of scalliwags.”71
Delamere went on to whole-heartedly believe that the opening of the protectorate was a
period of enlightenment beneficial for the Africans that he viewed as inferior to the
white civilized races and whom he thought, for a long time in history, remained in
darkness. He was a man of his time, a deluded social Darwinist. By trying to justify the
antiquated theory, he was undermining the Africans and Indians’ rights. Social
Darwinism embedded in many Europeans’ minds. These were so-called “men of their
time.” Delamere’s ideology did not stop him from dispossessing Africans from their
land. He permanently settled down in the protectorate and applied for land in 1903.
Upon obtaining a good portion of land, he vehemently sought to succeed in agricultural
and pastoral experimentations.
Nevertheless, after permanently settling down in the region, Delamere became
deeply involved in politics. His volatility and determination to transform the
protectorate into a European settlers’ colony propelled him to become the political
leader of the commissioners’ guests. His political career was dominated by the defense
and promulgation of white interests and the quest for political control of the
protectorate. As depicted by Maxon and Ofcansky, he hit the political ground of the
EAP running.
Within a year of arriving in Kenya, Delamere established himself in the political
arena by becoming president of the Colonists’ Association. In 1907, he was one of
the first two unofficial members appointed in the Legislative Council (LEGCO).
After his election to LEGCO for the Rift Valley in January 1920, Delamere
became the acknowledged leader of the European settler community. Apart from
advocating the policy that excluded African and Asian landowners from the
White Highlands, reserved for the exclusive ownership of European settlers, he
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also led the campaign for a popularly elected unofficial majority in LEGCO (never
achieved in his lifetime).72
Among the early settlers, the aristocrat adventurer and settler Delamere had no
parallel in his political influence, character, charisma and extremities, even compared to
other aristocrats who were also present in the protectorate. E. Huxley highlighted the
very nature of many of the settlers who were entering the protectorate with the following
description taking note that, “European settlement in Kenya has always had a strong
aristocratic flavour: one of Nairobi’s hotels became known as ‘the House of Lords.’ But
then, and for some years to come, Nairobi’s conditions were those of the frontier.
Delamere himself appeared as the typical frontiersman, with hair flowing down to his
shoulders, wearing disreputable clothes, and capable in irritation of locking the manager
of that same hotel in the meat safe with several dead sheep.73 Delamere’s use of threat
and violence to make an impact in the region would became a tactic that other vocal and
volatile settlers would also adopt in their intent of dominating the region socially and
politically.
Another Briton, who arrived in the EAP in May 1904 and immediately immersed
himself in settlers’ politics there, was Captain E. S. Grogan. In a character and
adventurous nature somewhat akin to that of Lord Delamere, Grogan came to be known
as the “boldest and baddest of a bold, bad gang” of outlanders proliferating throughout
the protectorate and making their marks in the region. Grogan lived up to his
reputation by violating the law in the protectorate without any severe consequences.
Grogan had no regard for the rights of the Africans he thought that he owned. In order
to set an example, he dispensed cruel punishment to any of his workers whom he
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thought misbehaved. It was Grogan who opened the very chapter of the question of
impunity in the protectorate. Would the newcomers face the law in case of any violation
of African rights? Would justice be served in any case of misconduct on the part of the
settlers? The answers to these questions depended on how London supervised the
protectorate. With the presence of the European settlers in the protectorate as a fait
accompli, the question of the maintenance of law and order became a must for the
authorities in London. Settlers of the likes of Delamere and Grogan were politically
active and conflictive.
Grogan was not an aristocrat like Delamere. However, he was a risk taker who
gained his fame for being the first recorded British adventurer who successfully made
the journey from the Cape to Cairo; and like Delamere, Grogan was familiar with the
interior of the protectorate.
Grogan, Ewart Scott (1873-1967). Explorer, farmer, entrepreneur, and staunch
advocate of European settler rights. Born in London and educated at Jesus
College, Cambridge. In late 1903, he arrived in Kenya and quickly acquired a
considerable amount of land, including the Chiromo area of Nairobi, the Kilindini
region of Mombasa Island, and a timber concession in the Rift Valley.
Additionally, he was a coffee and sisal farmer. He also used his skills as a writer
and orator to gain influence among Kenya’s European settler community as an
advocate of white supremacy and a critic of Colonial Office rule.74
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The news of Grogan’ accomplishment echoed in London and the rest of the
colonies. When he came to settle in the EAP in
May of 1904, he was not alone, and
considering that Eliot was desperately in
search of large or small scale investors for his
scheme of European settlement to concretely
materialize, the commissioner and Grogan’s
visions quickly started to converge. The two
men entertained the belief that European
settlers with some initial investment, could
indeed, turn the protectorate into another
Image 3: E. S. Grogan. Source: Pace, Lost Lion, 126.

white settler colony, parallel in standard to

the self-governing system extant in South Africa. The commissioner was quickly
enchanted by Grogan’s entrepreneurial plan of engaging in a lumbering business in
Lembus. Lembus was a region of immense ecological importance, characterized by its
rich forest land lying across the water stream separating the river systems of the Rift
Valley and the western part of the protectorate. Although, the Nandi occupying the
region remained to be dealt with militarily, Eliot allowed Grogan to inspect the forest,
which should have been done by a competent land surveyor, not by an adventurer
venture capitalist with an appetite for land acquisition. He finally obtained the area of
land he specifically wanted and was going to exploit it with African labor.
Grogan was the prototype of the settler that the commissioner, as well as the FO,
wanted to welcome for the development of the protectorate, investors with capital and
clear ideas. Grogan eventually settled and got involved in the timber industry in
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partnership with other investors from South Africa. Lingham & Neame, a South
African timber company based in Johannesburg hired Grogan in May 1904 as their
agent. They entered into an agreement with two of their compatriots, land speculators
Charles Grant and George Fotheringhame, to exploit and export timber. The
commissioner opened the door for Grogan and accommodated him. Like Delamere,
Grogan permanently settled in the protectorate.
Such was Grogan’s growing influence on the commissioner to the point that in
March of 1904, he requested land to be reserved for his brother in law, E. J. Watt, who
might visit and possibly settle permanently in the newly opened protectorate. In this
case the commissioner could bypass the FO.75 Although newcomers could easily apply
for land of their choice, obtain their prize and settle down; Grogan’s request of 500,000
to be reserved for Watt and other potential settlers coming from New Zealand was
treated with caution. Considering the commissioner’s commitment to populate the
country with European settlers, his response was more likely to be interpreted as a
measure of caution vis a vis the officials in London about his flagrant violation of
African land rights. It was a matter of time before the FO found out Eliot’s illegitimate
practices of facilitating land to his preferred settlers. The commissioner attracted
Delamere and Grogan, two of the most influential and conflictive settlers who
contributed to the reason why the EAP became what some considered the most
troublesome dependency of the British Empire. Eliot had his own formula of land
regulation that benefited the European settlers in general.
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Widening the gate for more settlers
The changes made on the 1902 land regulations opened an avenue for a direct
settlement for those who would make the journey to the protectorate. It was based on
that power to manage land that in June 1903, Eliot promised to set apart land for Robert
Chamberlain and A. S. Flemmer, who had helped in the scheme of attracting some 100
farmers from South Africa. Chamberlain and Flemmer wanted 100,000 acres of real
estate as compensation for their effort in bringing in settlers. In addition to this in
August 1903, the commissioner took another step ahead to reinforce his campaign of
inducing European settlers from the south of the continent to come make a fresh living
in East Africa. He sent his Collector of Customs, A. Marsden, to do the task of spreading
the good news from the newly opened EAP. Marsden did not fall short in describing the
protectorate as a heavenly region, which was in reality a bubble of extrapolations.76
Eliot was ready to sell the most exotic and healthiest land of the protectorate for
an unreasonably cheap price, which of course was a contradiction to the very logic of
higher land prices for the most valuable land. Eliot’s land policy attracted more
speculators and also turned some regular farmers into speculators. The price of land
bounced up. Ross underlined that: “One English farmer received a freehold estate of
some 2,000 acres close to Nairobi, which he worked as a lucrative dairy farm for ten or a
dozen years, and then sold for £20,000 as a building estate.”77 Eliot’s policy and
promises of land excited other investors who thought of the protectorate as a potential
region sitting on mineral resources that could be very lucrative if well exploited. Some
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Englishmen gentlemanly capitalists thought of the EAP as maybe another South Africa,
a region rich in gold and other minerals. They decided to claim big portions of land.
Some respectable investors from London and South Africa formed a coalition
under the umbrella of the East Africa Syndicate in May 1902 and demanded a large
portion of land to be prospected for minerals. After a year-long expedition directed by
Major Burnham, the search for minerals proved fruitless. There were no considerable
deposits appealing enough for any enterprise, because it may have involved risky
investments. The project was abandoned but the desire of acquiring land remained
intact. That burning aspiration led the Syndicate to push for land request. Burnham
entered into negotiations with Eliot about acquiring a vast agricultural land around
Nairobi. Having again convinced the FO of the need of attracting investors, Eliot
facilitated Burnham’s huge land concession with a cheap price.78 The commissioner was
catering to some would be speculators and it was just a matter of time before the very
officials that Eliot once viewed as mere English gentlemen lacking colonial incentive,
reacted to his extravagant land alienation by alerting London about the reigning
situation in the EAP.
The number of speculators disguised as settlers could have been higher, if it were
not for the constant concern of Lansdowne warning Eliot against large sales of land to
grazers or land speculators. As Sorrenson observed, in January 1904 G. V. Stewart,
“who had established two settlements of Ulstermen in New Zealand in the 1870’s and
1880’s, proposed to settle 200 families from ‘home’–presumably Ulster-in the
Protectorate in return for an undisclosed fee. Eliot decided that it was unnecessary to
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pay Stewart to obtain settlers.”79 Eliot’s decision on Stewart’s proposal seemed to have
been motivated by Lansdowne’s pressure for caution. But in reality there was already a
saturation of land demand in the protectorate. The local administration had to deal with
the overwhelming land applications in a region that had not been properly surveyed.
Eliot triggered a land rush that was out of proportion.
It was not until May 1903 that it was deemed necessary to have a Land Officer for
the work of the Land and Survey Department to be more effective, if it had ever been in
any case. R. Barton Wright, a railway surveyor, was appointed to the task while the
influx of settlers from South Africa was at its peak. To make the situation worse, more
settlers, who knew their veldt pretty well and also understood the meaning of the South
African political system, were coming to the EAP. “Every steamer brought its quota of
intending settlers. The growing crowd soon overran the limits of Nairobi’s
accommodation and a canvas village, locally called Tentfontein, sprang up near the
Land Office in the valley of the river Nairobi.”80 That was an indicator of the birth of a
new socio-economic dynamic that will be cemented by the settlers’ common interests in
the furtherance of their political aspirations. The settlers growing numbers and their
political history experienced in South Africa, turned out to be important factors when
the time to organize themselves around political entities arrived. “One friend of the
South Africans described them as ‘an exceptional stamp of colonist, accustomed to
taking and giving hard knocks in life: even better still, [they] had mostly farmed in
Southern Africa and fully understood the handling of native African peoples.”81
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The migration from South Africa was a minor repercussion of the Anglo-Boer
War and post-war depression caused by the withdrawal of troops, a shortage of labor in
the mines and the slow recovery of the war-torn economies.82 To many settlers from
South Africa, the Anglo-Boer war was detrimental to their interests. The war brought
nothing new but the control of the mining magnates. Some discontented settlers of
British descent represented the first wave that came to start a new living in the EAP.
The immediate post-war era and its consequences, coupled with the effort of inducing
potential newcomers by promising land on easy terms, attracted antagonistic settlers
from South Africa to East Africa. Sorrenson argued that: “The South Africans formed the
most volatile, vocal and influential element in the pre-war settler population of the
protectorate. They were at first almost entirely of British descent. Later, when the Boer
‘Irreconcilables’ and another party of Boers under the leadership of J.A.J Van
Rensburgh arrived, it appeared likely that the old South African antagonisms between
Briton and Boers would be reproduced in the East Africa Protectorate. But the Boers
took little part in Nairobi politics and most of them, characteristically, trekked to and
settled the isolated Uasin Gishu plateau.”83
Although, the highest number of migrants that settled in the protectorate came
from South Africa, it is worthwhile to take into account another group of war veterans of
the Anglo-Boer war that moved to the EAP. They were Australians, New Zealanders and
Canadians who could cohabitate with the South Africans of British descent and share
the same political ideology and aspirations. The desire to establish an exclusively white
man’s country, by systematically excluding other races, undermined the basic rights of
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the people whom the protectorate by righteousness, and responsibility was supposed to
protect for the sake of revenue and good moral cause, to per-se, justify the need of
expanding the Empire.
The people who were not part of Eliot’s plan to develop the region were those
who remained to be considered and qualified in the very darwinian context as the
unwanted Jews, the undesired Boers, the feared Indian traders and the despised
Africans. Such was the social nature of the country that the man on the spot, the welleducated diplomat Sir Charles Eliot, was pioneering. A country, as Hobley observed in
1904, where the settlers stood “indifferent as to the line that the Administration took
with regard to native affairs as in a very few years it was probable that the country would
fall under the Colonial Office and that they would then insist on local autonomy and the
formation of a legislative assembly, this body would then dispose of native rights in a
very summary fashion and put the Masai etc. where they could not interfere with
anyone.”84 To reach that stage in the EAP, the settlers started by the formation of
political organizations to channel their political agenda.
The start of European political organizations
Commissioner Eliot succeeded in introducing settlers in the protectorate and the
consequences of the social changes that came along with their presence led to a political
conflict of interests. A power struggle in the EAP started to be determined by the
settlers’ relationship to the state. As a group, the settlers’ capacity to define, defend and
develop their interests would ultimately determine the meaning and use of power in the
political context of a newly established social order. The settlers whom Churchill
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referred to as, “political animals”, during his 1907 visit to the protectorate, understood
the process that could lead to the acquisition of power due to the fact that many were
unconditionally familiar with the South African political system that left less to desire
from the perspective, if even perceived, of the Africans.
The settlers were able to define their interests by articulating and establishing
them through the creation of political parties. They knew how vital it was to protect
themselves and their interests against any potential challenge because in Eliot’s white
men’s country, divided and defined by the concept of race and class, any conflict of
interests in that context consequently assumed a race and class character. The
safeguard and development of the settlers’ interests depended on how they organized
themselves to first promote and expand their political influence in the protectorate to
further reach the full stage of acquiring and controlling power. The settlers influence as
a group was felt early in 1902 when they gathered at Wood’s hotel to elect a committee
to encourage white settlement and oppose an Indian presence in the region. A group of
settlers, of a number no larger than 22 members, was starting to be politically active.85
In September that same year, the settlers gained political terrain and consideration
when they pushed for changes on the homestead rules put in force by Jackson under the
terms of the 1902 Crown Lands Ordinance. The rules were reversed due to settlers’
complaints, influence and Eliot’s support for their claims.
The small European community gained influence, which directly depended on
their relations with the commissioner who acted as if he was very keen on listening and
advising the newcomers. That revealed a striking dissimilarity between his true nature
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and the way he dealt with the settlers. Eliot did not intermingle with the settlers very
often. He invited them to the EAP as a result of his vision of establishing a prosperous
white men’s country. He did not consult his subordinates or set any meeting before
engaging in negotiation with the newcomers asking for their share of real estate. His
subordinates obviously noticed the commissioner’s daring and unfair policy making.
Some officials under Eliot took notice of the evolving situation with settlers growing
influence in the protectorate. Jackson and Bagge’s (then a sub-commissioner)
opposition to the man on the spot dragged on and eventually reached its climax when
they finally alerted the FO about the developing situation in the EAP where the political
climate was dominated by the political shaping of what was intended to become a self
governing country with successful and influential Europeans settlers.86
Settlers like Right Honnorable Lord Delamere, Lord Cardross, Captain Grogan,
T. A. Wood, S. C. Fichat and few others present in the EAP during the early stage of
Eliot’s administration gained considerable influence. In the new social context of the
EAP, it is important to draw the line between the control of power and influence. For
whereas the commissioner appointed by the FO to handle British interests in a
supposedly dignified manner with regard to the subjects’ rights, had the capacity to
formulate and execute policies which meant the exercising of power, political influence,
which meant the ability to affect important political decisions making, rested entirely on
a few settlers hands. In the EAP, a small group of settlers had tremendous influence
with Eliot and that passed in their circles’ as having the control of power itself, but that
was a huge political misconception from their part because the FO was still in control of

86

Mungeam, British Rule, 108.

65

the protectorate. A laissez–faire policy violating African rights in the protectorate was
not going to sit well in the England where the public opinion can shape debate in
parliament and question the very meaning of the protectorate vis a vis African rights in
Africa itself.
The settlers’ socio-political capacity was rooted in their main collective group
ability. The settlers’ leaders had the organizational and institutional ability to match
their agenda with the commissioner’s vision. They understood the rationale for party
politics, and that brought them to form key political structures which were the right
locomotive that could carry them to the station of self-government sanctioned by the full
control of power. As Bennett described it: “In 1902 the committee to encourage
European settlement had led to the formation of a Colonists’ Association, which Eliot
had welcomed as a source of valuable advice. Delamere, on his arrival in January 1903,
formed the Planters’ and Farmers’ Association. Concerned initially with the marketing
of potatoes in South Africa, it soon turned to a more vital life in politics and superseded
the older body.”87 An only white man’s political party was born to stay active and
influential, not hesitant to raise hell and intimidate authorities. They posed proud and
looked confident in the following picture with Delamere in the middle of everything and
everywhere when it came to the political direction they should take.
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Image 4: Officers and Committee of the Colonists’ Association of British East Africa, 1903. Source: Gale, East
Africa (British), 166.

Under Delamere, the association went active pressing for the best land to be
reserved for white settlement. Delamere, in particular, categorically opposed the
presence, cohabitation or participation for economic development of any other race in
the new region solely opened for white settlement according to his logic shared by the
commissioner in person. So influential was Delamere that he made it clear to the FO
that the European settlers would go as far as necessary to oppose any interference that
could threaten their hegemony or interests.88 Eliot advised them by pointing them the
right direction to follow after the creation of settler political party. Nevertheless, it was
88
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not until 1904 that Eliot gave full support to the settlers for the initiative of a LegCo. He
suggested it in these terms: “One consisting only of officials, but in a final
communication to the Planters’ and Farmers’ Association, he said that they must strive
for ‘some local Government’: they could not expect representative government, but they
could have a council with unofficial members. He believed that such a council, with
some financial power, could have taken the initiative in providing roads and services to
intending settlers and thus might have prevented many of the difficulties of the past
eight or ten months.”89
It was clear in his dispatch to the FO that political power meant the domination of
the very institutions which were essential to carry on governance and insure social
control. Eliot’s suggestion was a total turn away from his passive approach first taken
in 1902 when an earlier petition for Advisory Council with unofficial members was made
by a group of Europeans and Asians in Mombasa. He then dismissed the Europeans,
just temporarily, and as regard to the Asians, it was a systematical and direct dismissal
for any form of political hope.90
For their part, the settlers engaged in a political party to achieve their group and
personal interests. Within the framework of their party’s focus, the European settlers
believed that they could ultimately control or effectively participate in state power.
Their party was a very important link to power to defend and promote their interests, to
have the means of becoming their own group representative via elected or appointed
members. The party also gave them an opportunity to hopefully participate in the
determination of the East Africa white protectorate’s public policy and to ultimately
89
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reach the level of being able to affect, for their own advantage, the power of distributing
governmental funds, jobs or political positions. The sharing of party patronage was
crucial for the settlers’ interests, and Eliot did show signs leaning to that direction when
he offered a position of sub-collector coupled with that of Land Officer to Delamere who
opted instead to apply for land. Delamere was best suited with being the president of
the CA while possessing a big estate with quasi-free labor from the Africans’ who would
remain as land-losers, forced to pay tax. European settlers’ political aspirations echoed
all the way to London and the FO had to intervene because of the obvious violations of
Eliot regarding the issues of land promises, land alienations and segregationist policy
that tended to exclude the African and Indians in the protectorate. In 1904 the FO had
enough of Eliot’s stubbornness and policy making. The well-regarded commissioner,
who only catered to European settlers, had to go. Eliot himself knew that his fate was
sealed. He precipitately anticipated his departure by quickly tending his resignation to
Lansdowne.
The end of Eliot’s administration and its consequences
Eliot’s resignation was the result of a clear mismanagement of land just to please
some of his favorite newcomers. From the beginning of his mandate, Eliot’s
administration was mainly dominated by a policy of land alienation favoring the
European settlers he invited to develop the protectorate. The process of land
distribution on easy terms was disorderly conducted. Land was not properly surveyed
and a laissez-faire of first come, first served policy followed. Officials like Jackson,
Bagge, Ainsworth and the land officer Barton Wright were overwhelmed by the
situation. No measure of caution was taken by Eliot not to infringe with African rights
to land in the EAP. The Kikuyu and the Maasai were among the most affected. The
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situation reached a climax when “in pushing ahead with the settlement of the Kiambu
district, Eliot ignored the warnings of his local officials who reminded him of the danger
of dispossessing the Kikuyu. Because of the chaotic situation, the officials under Eliot
could only manage to achieve “a haphazard division of the land between the settlers and
the Kikuyu, with payment of compensation for dispossessed Kikuyu. Eliot attempted to
use the policy in the Rift Valley, this time in the face of protests by Jackson and Bagge
who appealed to the Foreign Office, not merely over the Maasai rights, but also over the
question of granting concessions in the Rift Valley.”91
The commissioner went too far in his intention of creating a white men’s country
ipso- facto without taking into account the Africans or Indians rights, at least as subjects
by right in the same protected crown land to say the least. Under Eliot the EAP
highlands were reserved for the arriving European settlers. Eliot felt justified in
sanctioning large freehold grants of land to prospective speculators disguised as
desirable investors without the full consent of the FO and the Treasury. The case of the
East Africa Syndicate that went to engage in negotiations with Eliot to cut what became
their greatest land deal was a result of an effective scheme of persuasion used by one of
their managers in London. In the FO, Hill worked on behalf of the syndicate to
persuade the Treasury to allow them a large concession because of their possible large
investment.92 The protectorate was in need of money and big investors seemed to be the
best answer for Eliot and officials like Hill at the FO, who was lobbying for the
syndicate’s interests.
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Sir Clement Hill fell under the influence of the syndicate’s London manager,
Major C. H. Villiers, who sought Hill’s backing to bring the Treasury to come on board
and allow their freehold deal to concretize. Hill’s collaboration with Villiers was a clear
indicator in his belief to the importance of attracting investors who could benefit with a
grant of large concessions suitable for the development of their business adventure.
Hill’s approach about revitalizing the economy of the protectorate was parallel to Eliot’s
vision, which created the situation of having to fill up the protectorate with desirable
investors. Eliot did his best to widen the door for whoever he also promised land. The
commissioner was in tune with the big men who claimed land that was promised to
them. In the following case, Eliot circumnavigated the vigilance of the FO and Treasury
to facilitate large portions of land to Chamberlain and Flemmer for their labor of
bringing around 100 settlers in the region in 1903.
In that case, it later resulted that the two South Africans that were working for
Eliot to attract settlers were really interested in the business of land speculation. That
was the reason why they wanted a large portion of land to make a maximum profit by
selling back their real estate when the land prices soared up. Jackson complained again
to the FO about Eliot’s practices. Lansdowne demanded explanation on that issue,
thinking that the land deal for the case of Chamberlain and Flemmer was not yet
concretized. Surprisingly, “Eliot went on to admit, for the first time that he had
instructed the Land Office to draw up leases with Chamberlain and Flemmer. They had
signed the leases and, accordingly, the Law Officer, J.W. Barth, had established a prima
facie claim.”93
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That was it, when Eliot could not legally back track from Chamberlain and
Flemmer’s land deal; he decided to face the FO with dispatches trying to justify his
decisions. His exit option was a precipitate resignation because he could not make his
case hold ground before Lansdowne who in return may have to appear before
parliament on issues related to the handling of the EAP territory. Eliot completely
disregarded the question of African rights to land; to him; no valuable land was an
exception for alienation. With that firm belief, even the Rift Valley felt in the same
sphere of territory to be purely and simply alienated. Dispossessing the pastoralist
Maasai from their grazing land and even eradicating them from the face of the earth in
the process was, according to Eliot, a great service to humanity. That was one of his
argument points when in April 1904; he invaded the FO with a series of dispatches
explaining the why of his resignation.94
The resignation of this renowned intellectual and diplomat was not amiable at all.
Eliot went on to play the victim’s card that seemingly meant giving the impression of
being blamed by the FO for intending to accommodate settlers of his choice, even
though during his tenure, the commissioner was far from being easy to approach by his
new guests. The commissioner held grudges against Jackson, Bagge and mostly Hill,
whom he directly attacked in his evaluation of the whole situation. Eliot was not shy to
express his feelings and what he stood for. His dispatches clearly reflected his firm
belief in the necessity of forging a white men’s country at the expense of the Maasai and
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the Kikuyu in general. To the FO, Eliot sent his poignant letters of complaints, disgust
and intent of self-justification.95
The commissioner was a career diplomat with a monumental pride and having
been by-passed by Jackson and Bagge, who were his subordinates, brought him to
tender his resignation to Lansdowne. Eliot took it as an insult, a despicable and
disrespectful maneuver against his good intentions and initiatives towards opening the
protectorate for European settlement. Concerned with the probability that the delicate
question of land grants and native rights could be raised in parliament, Lansdowne
explained to Eliot the reason why Jackson and Bagge were consulted. At first,
Lansdowne did not accept Eliot’s resignation based on the criteria that the refusal of the
Chamberlain and Flemmer land application was a measure of prudence. In the EAP,
arbitrary land alienation was feared to lead to outrageous violations of African rights to
their most valuable locomotive of subsistence. For instance the pastoralist Masaai had
long been using the Rift Valley to raise their cattle by seasonally grazing the highlands,
conducting it up and down the interior of the region. Considering that reality of Maasai
tradition, a careful management of their territory was deemed necessary. Lansdowne
argued that caution and wisdom was the best approach in the conduct of land policy in
the EAP. Lansdowne had to cover his back, in case that the subject of land grants and
native rights in the protectorate was to be raised in the parliament.96
The foreign secretary’s approach did not please the commissioner. There was a
paradox in the way that Eliot reacted after hearing from Lansdowne’s concern about the
risk of possible swift alienation of Maasai land. The man who felt by-passed by his
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subordinates did not in return inform the FO about the signed leasehold agreement in
favor of Messrs Chamberlain and Flemmer. Lansdowne instructed Eliot not to exceed
1,000 acres of freehold land . Eliot did not pay attention at all. He had his own way of
conducting business with the settlers. At the beginning of the 1904, he claimed that;
“Although Messrs. Chamberlain and Flemmer are nothing to me, I am quite determined
to resign if I cannot do them what I consider justice”97 Doing justice to Chamberlain and
Flemmer meant paying them with African land and Lansdowne did not want to hear
that.
Behind closed doors, the two gentlemen who advertised the EAP natural wonders
in South Africa got their recompense. As Sorrenson observed, “Eliot admitted that their
colonization scheme had been abandoned, but, as Lansdowne had instructed him to
encourage ‘small capitalists’, he had offered them ‘moderate’ grants.”98 Again Eliot
insisted on trying to justify his actions. One thing was encouraging small capitalists,
and why not big gentlemanly capitalists investors, and another was where to let them
settle and how they were going to purchase a lot of cheap land. Knowing that he had
already exceeded his powers, Eliot blamed Jackson, Bagge and the FO for belittling and
overruling him. His dispatches were filled with rage. One was a general defense of his
actions and policy. Still hurt by the Foreign Office consultation of Jackson and Bagge,
or as he put it ‘overruled by my own officers’, Eliot believed that “there was ‘not a Head
of a Mission in the Diplomatic Service who would not send in his resignation when so
treated.’”99
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There was no doubt about the fact that Eliot was an intelligent diplomat, not
short of intellectual vision, but he seemed not to realize that he did by-pass the head of
the FO with Chamberlain and Flemmer’s lease agreement. There was no reason for the
proud Eliot to be offended on that matter to the point of having to resign. The
commissioner even went so far in his reflections and confession about the futility of the
Maasai rights to land and their existence in general. Eliot viewed the Maasai as a
nuisance and believed in their extinction. The man on the spot was a man of his time
who fully embraced social darwinism, after encountering so many non-British people,
usually described as uncivilized subjects, he manifested a particular disdain vis-a-vis the
Maasai. In another dispatch, marked private but not top secret, because Hill later used
it against the man on the spot, Eliot made a self-destructing remark. The content was
shocking. On April 1904, Eliot stated that:
No doubt on platforms and in reports we declare we have no intention of
depriving natives of their lands, but this has never prevented us from taking
whatever land we want. . . .Your Lordship has opened this protectorate to white. .
. . colonization, and I think it is well that, in confidential correspondence at least,
we should face the undoubted issue --- viz., that white mates black in very few
moves. . . . There can be no doubt that the Masai and many other tribes must go
under. It is a prospect which I view with equanimity and a clear conscience . . . . I
have no desire to protect Masaidom. It is a beastly, bloody system, founded on
raiding and immortality, disastrous to both the Masai and their neighbors. The
sooner it disappears and it is unknown, except in books of anthropology, the
better.100
That was a critical analysis and the commissioner missed the point of the very
essence of social darwinism. If cruel, beastly and bloody as Eliot stated, the Maasai then
would prevail and totally dominate the region. They would remain as the fittest, but with
the presence of the newcomers that very darwinian theory was reversed and that meant
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that white mates black in very few moves according to Eliot. The commissioner’s
confession bared enough evidences for the FO to clearly understand Eliot’s intention of
again bypassing all African rights without any remorse, to create a country of white
settlers. Specifically, he envisioned how ideal it would be to see a final solution for the
Maasai threat. Eliot predicted that the mere presence of the Maasai in the highlands
could trigger a clash with the arriving settlers aspiring to find good land. He also
pointed out that it could be a bloody affair of the same magnitude as the Jameson
raid.101 Eliot’s reference to the Jameson raid sounded like a recipe that could well suit
the case of the Maasai occupying valuable land suitable for European colonization.
Eliminating the Maasai would not even have a repercussion worthy to be mentioned in
the annals of African history.
Eliot never seemed to fully understand how history would record a sudden
extinction of the whole Maasai community without digging into the origins of such a
tragic event. If that was the case in history, archeologists would sure dig deep and ask
questions about the dark history behind such a crime scene. It does not take an
extraordinary mind to realize that history would also have to write about how that
terrible tragedy happened? Who were the perpetrators and what were their motives?
The answer to that historical query would simply be: land alienation and greed at the
expense of simple African people who never asked for a railway to be built in their
country and neither wanted to see some alien non- residents come and take their land
by force. If force could not be used to alienate land, there was another alternative.
Legally agreed land leases’ on easy term would mean alienation as well. In the case of
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Messrs Chamberlain and Flemmer, if Lansdowne firmly rejected their land deal that
could cause a scandal with grave legal ramifications that would sure get the attention of
parliament. As the syndicate land deal was approved, Eliot then considered it unfair not
to let Chamberlain and Flemmer have their reward because after all they helped in
bringing settlers in the region. Eliot was now an empty bag of policy formulation and
sought to blame everybody but himself.
The commissioner went on to blame Hill, who was the head of the APD, for his
lack of competence and full assistance to him in his mission of land alienation. He
underlined to the FO that Hill was quarrelsome and not even apt for the job of managing
the APD. Eliot revealed that Hill confessed to him how he had respect and admiration
for Coronel Ternan, who served as Deputy Commissioner in the Protectorate after
Hardinge’s departure and before the arrival of Eliot, and how he acknowledged that that
decorated military servant was a better choice for the APD. Following the negative
critique directed to Hill, the unrepentant commissioner called it quits by officially
resigning in a letter where he wrote how he really felt, not his violations. He put it this
way:
I have put my back against the wall & if I cannot give Europeans justice & if I
cannot receive from your Lordship that confidence and support to which position
entitles me, I am determined to go. I can hardly exaggerate the bitterness or the
regrets which I feel in thus leaving East Africa. It was my hope to devote my life
to giving it the position in the world which it deserves and I am conscious of
having made a good beginning but I would rather leave it than be forced to
manage it under the trammels imposed by those who have neither the knowledge
nor impartiality. The Evil of East Africa is that it is not managed by your Lordship
or by the F.O. as a whole but by a Department. It is impossible for you to devote
time to it yourself: the work lies apart from general business in London and it has
lost touch with reality out here.102
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Eliot’s resignation letter underlined the importance of giving justice to European
settlers and that translated into accommodating them on the highlands and
paramounting their rights in the protectorate. He criticized every department in
relation with the protectorate and its officials but himself. It was really the
commissioner’s general attacks on everybody and specifically on Hill that bitterly ended
his political career in the protectorate. After Eliot’s deluge of criticism, and blame, it
was time for the APD head, chief of all affairs as Eliot underlined it, to methodically
formulate his response, and that was going to totally dismantle all the commissioner’s
case.
Sir Clement Hill, as head of the APD, had access to all the correspondences going
to or coming from the EAP. Not only that, he assumed the responsibility of analyzing
and interpreting them for the Foreign Secretary who apparently did not have the will to
spend his hours dealing with the internal problems of an infant protectorate. Hill then
gathered all the primary dispatches that Eliot ever sent during that ugly episode of
complaints followed by his resignation and cross examined them carefully. The dispatch
of Eliot’s damaging confession about how he viewed the Maasai was a document of
immense importance for Hill when it was his turn to defend himself. Conveniently, Hill
used that confession document, as if he himself truly believed and cared about the
importance of the protection of Maasai rights to land. Paradoxically in 1904 , it was
proven that Eliot’s departure did not prevent the signing of first Maasai treaty that
meant direct interference with the transhumant activities of the Maasai and the
shrinking of their ancestral land. It was indeed very hypocritical for Hill to have used
what Eliot wrote to make his case, to an extent; Eliot at least truly believed in what he
wrote and worked consistently to alienate Maasai land. Hill was aware of the fact that if
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the dispatch was fully published, it would have a great impact at home by awakening all
kind of public opinion reactions.103
Hill meticulously explained to Lansdowne all the possible negative consequences
that could derive from Eliot’s dispatch and its dangers. Hill referred to a potential
scandal of great proportion that could spread like wild fire within the press at home. He
then socratically presented to Lansdowne the case of what could be the resulting
implications of a moral response to all these following questions.
Is it likely that a Commissioner with such views will seriously try to do his duty
and control the settlers? Is it just to oust the Masai from their ancestral lands
because the latter are good to the eye, and because we chose to run a railway
through them—not to develop those lands but because they are on the shortest
route to Uganda? Is it expedient at this moment to risk a native rising and the
massacre of scattered settlers, to say nothing of the slaughter of natives which
would ensue? Is it politically wise, in the face of public opinion at home, of the
international obligations imposed upon us by the Brussels Act and of our
discussions with the Congo State, to take a step which will lay His Majesty’s
Government open to serious charges of indifference to native rights which it will
hard to refute? And for what objects? To make revenue a little faster; to please
South African settlers or speculators who are already hawking their grants in
South Africa markets; to save the Commissioner’s amour proper; and perhaps to
avoid claims for compensation arising out of his premature action.104
Hill’s strategy worked well, no official would like to face parliament to answer to
those delicate questions about the violation of African rights. As the whole problem
facing the EAP was Eliot’s failure to plan well in administrating the budget, Hill
convinced Lansdowne about the fact that the commissioner had no reason threatening
to resign. Hill won the battle of minds. His proximity with Lansdowne gave him
advantage. Eliot’s resignation was accepted. It could be interpreted as such, meaning a
resignation of Eliot based on principles and pride, or as an action taken by the FO in
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order not to lose control of the EAP. Nevertheless the protectorate was already turning
into a political circus maximus with the few settlers already present in the region
aspiring for power. When news of Eliot resignation reached the settlers’ community in
the protectorate, opinions about the well educated, disciplined and reserved
commissioner started to change. The settlers now re-embraced Eliot. As Sorresnson put
it: “According to Grogan, the settler feelings were so high that they intended to call for
Eliot’s resignation. When they realized he had resigned on their on their behalf
‘everyone realized he was right’, so they demanded an inquiry into the circumstances of
his resignation.”105
The settlers’ support and sympathy towards Eliot took a new hype after his
resignation. On one hand, settlers considered Eliot as their defender, a man who stood
for their rights and would be missed. To say the least, that was quite a strange legacy of
Eliot’s administration. The man on the spot made his mark in the protectorate. The
settlers organized him a well deserved dinner at the Mombasa Club before he left the
EAP for good in July 1904
Conclusion
The arrival and settlement of the Europeans in the EAP was the ongoing work of
the commissioner. In less than four years, the EAP saw the introduction of a conflictive
group of people who not only wanted to alienate the best land, but also usurp political
power. Their major obstacle was that they represented but a miniscule fraction of the
EAP’s population. Therefore, the powers-that-be in London could hardly consider that
such a minority could be solely entrusted to develop the region. As the FO was still
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concerned with the question of how to quickly recover the Empire’s investment in the
railroad, and perhaps even show a profit from it, the commissioner insisted that the best
way to lift the protectorate was through perpetuating the influx of European settlers and
investment throughout East Africa. Nevertheless, not all the colonists who arrived were
able to establish themselves without the support of the local administration. The “big
men” were able to benefit from large alienated areas of land, but found it difficult to
develop this acreage without African labor. Legal land survey, acquisition and
development became subjects of intense debate at the FO. Eliot started his
administration with the wrong approach, insofar as a discriminatory system within a
British colonial protectorate was not going to prevail without political repercussions at
the FO, ultimately responsible for supervising the region for the benefit of all His
Majesty’s subjects.
The commissioner pointed the way to the newcomers who thought of running
the protectorate along the model of South Africa, where the rights of the Africans were
ignored. With Eliot’s backing and the settlers’ nature and aspirations, the stage was set
for a long political struggle in the EAP. Eliot’s legacy upon the protectorate would later
have far more political consequences. An economic plan of development based on race
and excluding the Africans and the Indians was being hindered at every turn.
Nevertheless, with Eliot’s administration, the stage was already set for political conflicts.
The latecomers had their agenda, which was not suitable for the EAP; but they were
determined to carry on with their dream of achieving- sooner or later- a self-governing
country. The FO was being overwhelmed with news of the settlers’ demands for the best
lands and racial privileges. Changes were sorely needed for an equal and fair society.
With Eliot’s resignation, the EAP was to enter a new phase. Stewart was appointed
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commissioner; and in 1905, the Colonial Office (CO) took over the protectorate to the
relief of the FO, an agency whose officers found themselves too busy for dealing with the
entire minutia continually popping up in the troublesome protectorate.
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Chapter 3
Shifting Gears: A new man on the spot, Colonial Office Takeover and
European Settlers’ first Politics demands

“ The question just here is not whether we are governing those colonies and
subject races well and wisely, better than they could govern themselves if left
alone, or better than another imperial European nation could govern them, but
whether we are giving them those arts of government which we regard as our
most valuable possessions.”106
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Introduction
In July 1904, Sir Donald Stewart107 succeeded Eliot as commissioner of the EAP
upon recommendation of the CO. The new man on the spot already had experience with
matters concerning white settlers on the Gold Coast. That experience was to be valuable
in the handling of the political situation evolving in the protectorate. The settlers that
Eliot invited arrived and were pressing persistently for large land concessions. This
became a big issue with the Land Committee appointed by Stewart. The FO instructed
Stewart to pay special attention to the relations between the Africans and the latest
white arrivals in the protectorate. Even after Eliot’s departure, the FO was still
concerned with the possibility of the European settlers’ takeover of the best land on a
massive scale.
W. McGregor Ross emphasized that “the story, so far, has been one of the
occupation by some Europeans of the property of African natives, and this with the
assistance of Government, and the settlement of other Europeans upon vacant land to
which Government gave them not only safe access but also secure titles.”108 That
created a problem that Stewart inherited and had to resolve. Ross asserted that, “the
Government created a caste of landed proprietors a privileged class. Its members can
certainly not be blamed for accepting the chances of wealth which a British Government
placed before them.”109 The settlers whom Churchill called “political animals” were

107 Captain Sir Donald Stewart was a military man who served the British Empire fighting wars in
Afghanistan (1879- 1890) and Transvaal (1881). He also served in India (1882-1884) and the Gold Coast
(1897-1904) before being appointed as Commissioner of the East Africa Protectorate. He was always
ready for punitive expeditions against an African group threatening to challenge the colonial grip on
British East Africa. Stewart’s tenure in the protectorate was short lived. He died in 1905. M. P. K.
Sorrenson, Origins of Settlement in Kenya (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968), 84.
108 William McGregor Ross, Kenya From Within (London: Frank Cass and Company, Limited, 1968), 68.
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ready to fight for their interests. In the midst of this new situation created by Eliot,
Lansdowne reiterated that Great Britain had a moral obligation in looking after the
welfare of the native population of the protectorate. He told Stewart that: “The first
question which must engage your attention on your arrival in East Africa is that of the
relations between white settlers and natives, more especially in those regions between
Nairobi and Lake Victoria which present a possible field for European colonization on a
large scale … On its proper solution the future of the Protectorate will largely depend.”110
That had to be a priority in Stewart’s administration of the protectorate
However, the European settlers had their own idea about how the protectorate
should be run. Talks of the primary interests of the newcomers were long entertained by
Eliot and the European settlers even before Stewart’s arrival.111 It was not a surprise
when, in 1905, after the transfer of the protectorate to the CO, the CA presented their
first demands. They desired a LegCo containing elected members and a crown colony.
Since it was their first general political statement, it is important to analyze it well.
Their aspirations gave birth to a struggle about the control and administration of the
EAP. In analyzing the loss and reassertion of imperial initiative in the EAP that later
became Kenya Colony in 1920, Maxon raised a significant issue that the CO faced.
Maxon explains that “the Colonial Office in London struggled to maintain initiative and
control in these years in the face of several, often contradictory parties and pressure
groups; among the most influential were Kenya’s colonial state, the European settlers
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and the Indians residing there, the India Office (IO) and the government of India,
missionaries, humanitarians, and capitalists in Britain itself.”112
The root of the problem that Maxon stated took shape early when the CO took
over the protectorate and when the European settlers articulated their first demands in
1905. As soon as the settlers’ demands went public, different positions and opinions
started to emerge from the protectorate and London. The CS and the CO were both
involved. Lord Hindlip supported the settlers in England. There were also the responses
of Sadler, who succeeded Stewart as commissioner in 1905, and other officials as well as
the reaction in London. It was under this political turmoil that a Legco and a new
constitution for the EAP were agreed upon. The settlers had pressed for the transfer of
the protectorate to the CO, believing that it would lead to a more sympathetic and less
miserly administration. They had their demands on the table and had to deal with a
new commissioner. This is the setting of this chapter, the purpose of which is to bring
light to the nature of the early political struggle in the protectorate, sparked by the
presence of the European settlers that Eliot attracted there. They came to settle and
fight for what they believed was their right to rule the protectorate based solely on their
own interests.
Stewart’s administration and the European settlers’ influence
The appointment of Sir Donald Stewart as commissioner was the result of Eliot’s
precipitate resignation due to the fact that he was stymied in his plans to assist the white
settlers he had invited to the EAP. Mungeam gave the following evaluation of the former
commissioner’s administration, emphasizing that:
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Although Eliot had only been Commissioner for three and a half years, he had clearly
made his mark upon the Protectorate. He had taken over a country in the throes of
revolt, and had seen a measure of law and order established, and frontiers extended.
Most important of all, when faced with the need for quick return to pay for the railway,
he had turned to the deliberate encouragement of expatriates. Through the
introduction of the settlers he hoped to secure the rapid results that he believed the
local Africans to be incapable of achieving by themselves. 113
Eliot administrated the protectorate with a firm belief that Africans were incapable of
developing the region and preferably should work as squatters in white men’s farms, leaving
the public square to the European settlers. Eliot was the progenitor of European settlement
in the EAP and pushed for an establishment of a white man’s country in the highlands of the
protectorate, thus undermining the rights of the Africans and the Indians altogether. Eliot
discredited the highest office of the protectorate with his own unfair policy that tended to
favor the settlers who wanted free or cheap land, more political recognition, and participation
in the internal affairs of the region.
Eliot’s plan did not sit well with the FO because any flagrant violation of African
rights would make it difficult and even more embarrassing for His Majesty’s
Government to justify their presence in the EAP. For that reason, Lansdowne did not
want to allow any more grants of large areas to individuals or syndicates although he
was aware of the presence and continuing arrivals of expatriates who answered Eliot’s
call.114 An adequate land survey was needed to prevent speculation and accumulation of
land by a few settlers with capital. The firing of Eliot, followed by the rapid appointment
of Stewart, was a strong statement from the FO. The FO’s intervention meant that
London was still in charge of maintaining initiative and control of the protectorate in its
early stage under British rule.
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Although Eliot was sacked, it remained clear that he made a lasting mark upon
the protectorate by setting the stage for a tense political atmosphere that prevailed after
his departure. It was under his tenure that the EAP was becoming a hodge-podge of
disparate ethnic groups, with the settlers scurrying to protect and advance their
interests under London’s supervision. That was an important aspect of Eliot’s legacy
that carried within itself a ripple effect with which Stewart had to deal. The troublesome
relationship between Eliot and the FO about how to run the protectorate had a lasting
impact in the executive office of the EAP before Kenya became a colony.
For the first decade of the EAP’s administration, a series of weak or pro-settlers’
rights commissioners, and later governors, occupied the office and had to deal with the
European settlers’ agitations and ever-increasing political demands. Stewart was the
man appointed by the FO to assess and control the situation in the EAP in 1904 and was
not the last one. Finally, Stewart’s arrival also meant that change was needed and
following Eliot’s footsteps was not the right way to proceed.
Stewart was called upon to run the protectorate because of his extensive military
background and his experience in the Gold Coast where he dealt with other Europeans
looking for wealth. The CO considered him as a man well-suited to administer the EAP.
His military background made him appear as the right man to continue potential
military expeditions on the frontier. At a time when Britain needed to strengthen its
grip on the protectorate, Stewart’s credentials made the CO’s recommendation of him to
the FO seem justifiable.
The FO had the habit of shuffling officials from one colony or district to another
without first considering if experience gained in another British territory would be
valuable in the context of the EAP with its troublesome settlers, the majority of whom
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came from South Africa. It was along that trend of decision-making that stimulated the
FO to send a man with military experience to administer the EAP. Some officials like
Alfred Claud Hollis, who served directly under Stewart, and interim Deputy
Commissioner C. W. Hobley, expressed their opinions about Sir Donald Stewart.
Hollis noticed that the new commissioner “was a very different type of man from
Sir Charles Eliot. Sir Donald Stewart was a soldier. Though indolent, he was a
disciplinarian, and he thought that no country could be properly administrated until (to
use his own phrase) the natives had been ‘knocked into shape.’”115 He loved action in
the vast wilderness far more than the details of administrating the problematic EAP.
While Eliot, the educated diplomat, did not socialize with settlers, officials or military
personnel during his tenure, Stewart was “a better friend to the military than to his
officials; he frequently dined in their mess, and took part in ‘cock-fighting’ after
dinner.”116
Stewart was better-suited for a mission of pacification of the Africans than for the
task of having to deal with correspondence or with how to turn the protectorate into a
profitable enterprise. Stewart was content to intermingle with other army officers who
also welcomed the idea of the need to control the region by no other means but the use
of force on the Africans. They also enjoyed chasing after the Africans literally, for to
them, it was a game of a bloody punitive expedition that could earn them promotions.117
Hobley, a long-serving official who was transferred to the EAP from Uganda in
1902, was quick to notice the character of the new commissioner. Hobley described
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Stewart as “a man of considerable force of character and shrewd common sense, but
without business experience or training, except perhaps in the racing world. He was
what might be termed an illiterate man, having no knowledge of other than of the good
side of life. His powers of application were underdeveloped; he rarely read files, and as
he went to bed late and rose late the affairs of the country had scant attention.”118
Stewart was a military commander who adopted a militaristic approach when he had to
deal with the day-to-day office work. He simply relied on his subordinates like Hollis to
do the administrative tasks while being loyal to him. Policy formulation was difficult
and confusing for him.
When it came to matters related to the presence and interests of European
settlers in the EAP vís a vís African rights to land and self-assertion, both the CO and
the FO did not do their homework before agreeing to send Stewart as the one qualified
to administer the protectorate. This was due to the fact that in the context of the EAP,
Stewart’s experience with European settlers in the Gold Coast was not much help.
Stewart was not a bureaucrat, a good negotiator, an economist or a politician who could
devote enough time to European settlers’ grievances along with the need to turn the
region into a profitable area for Britain. Stewart was not prepared to deal with the
settlers’ agitations and their push for political aspirations. He had no valuable
experience that could help him for the social, political and economic challenges ahead.
The Europeans that Stewart dealt with in the Gold Coast were different from the
settlers that Eliot invited in the EAP. Settlers in the EAP had a reputation of being
political animals and go-getters who imbibed prejudice. In contrast, Europeans in the
118 C. W. Hobley, Kenya from Chartered Company to Crown Colony: Thirty Years of Exploration and
Administration in British East Africa (London: H. F. & G. Witherby, 1929), 127.
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Gold Coast had different goals. They were not after land and power. They were not
inclined to own land there, as it was the case in the EAP. European gold traders were
not allowed to own land. The Concession Bill of 1900 required the Europeans to pay
rent to the chief or the community that owned the land. In the Gold Coast, as its name
indicated, gold was what the Europeans were after. The gold-mining industry justified
the presence of only a few Europeans, who were gold traders and were not permanent
settlers aspiring for self-government.
In addition to that fact, Europeans in the Gold Coast could not successfully settle
in the interior of the region. In any case, the interior of the region from the western
coast of Africa was inhospitable for many Europeans and it had a reputation of being the
white men’s graveyard. This was largely due to the intense presence of malariavectoring mosquitoes. There were other factors for white Europeans not to attempt
settlement there. In the Gold Coast, there were no speculations about the right
economic direction to follow, because local production for export rested in African
hands.119
In contrast, the main economic concern in the EAP was how to make the
protectorate pay for the railroad’s construction cost first and when faced with that need
the departing commissioner Eliot called upon the European settlers. Taking into
consideration the settlers’ readiness to defend their interests through their political
organizations, it remained clear that the FO rushed into judgment by appointing
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more physical space for European settlers without damaging African rights. That was the estimation at the
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Stewart. The FO threw him in the midst of an evolving political struggle with the
unavoidable question of African rights versus European settlers’ interests.
Stewart did not know the kind of settlers that were waiting for him in the EAP.
Some valuable government officials who had been serving the protectorate since the
early days of the Imperial British East Africa Company reported on the spirit and nature
of the settlers present in the EAP.120 The latter were prejudiced in general. In addition
to that reputation, some of them were aggressive land grabbers, speculators and
politicians who thought that Eliot fought for their rights to own land and was wrongly
crucified by the FO. The expatriates came to believe that any official sent by London to
administer the protectorate should stand up to the FO, which was later replaced by the
CO, and advocate for their interests. They came to believe that every commissioner was
another white man like them who should join their side as they felt Eliot did during his
tenure.
After lamenting Eliot’s resignation, they were anxious to know whom the FO
would appoint and how the new man on the spot would run the protectorate. Among
the most eager to know about the new commissioner’s plan to run the protectorate were
the radical settlers, vocal and volatile minded go-getters like Grogan, Delamere and also
aristocrats of the class of Lord Hindlip, who vowed to defend settlers’ interests anyhow
and anywhere. Delamere especially stood for the protection of the European settlers
interests.
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In 1903, Jackson, who was Eliot’s Deputy Commissioner, noticed the rapid
increase of Delamere’s political influence in the protectorate. Delamere, whom Jackson
regarded as another “scalliwag” from the settlers’ camp, was rubbing shoulders with
Eliot and seeking governmental support.121 With Eliot and Delamere’s entente, all
political maneuvers were to encourage and benefit the settlers in the protectorate.
However, from the beginning of Stewart’s administration, Delamere was skeptical about
the new administrator and this time, Hollis took notice.
Hollis revealed that Delamere was not enthusiastic to meet with Stewart.
According to Hollis, Delamere had his doubts about Stewart’s sympathy towards his
compatriots. Delamere confessed to Hollis that he “never knew when he went to
Government House whether the A.D.C. would be instructed to give him a whisky and
soda or to kick him down the steps.”122 This was a red flag. It signaled the potential
opposition of Stewart to settlers’ interests in the EAP. Stewart could meet the CA’s
leader’s demands with a strong response. At the beginning of his mandate, the new man
on the spot found it unnecessary to deal with the settlers’ nonsense, as he viewed it.
Stewart wanted to enjoy life with his military peers in a beautiful part of Africa with its
agreeable climate.
The character of the new commissioner, who did not put up with nonsense from
the settlers, paradoxically set the stage for an upcoming political struggle with settlers
who were determined to use their influence to gain power. A strong commissioner was
needed to evaluate the situation and to stop possible arbitrary land alienations and
violations of the Africans’ rights. However, having a strong man in charge that could
121
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slow down or derail settlers’ political agendas and promote African rights had its
consequences. Any commissioner or governor sent by London to stand against the
settlers’ attempt to politically dominate the EAP faced the expatriates’ agitations and
pressures. The settlers had no moral concerns for the well-being of the Africans and the
Indians.
Stewart was about to face a group of European settlers who believed in the
possibility of building a white men’s country at the expense of the Africans. That meant
pushing for transition to a self-governing dominion. Reproducing the South African
model of self-government was considered feasible to many European settlers who
responded to Eliot’s call by moving to the protectorate. Eliot’s vision of establishing a
white man’s country was parallel with the European settlers’ expectations of reaching a
status of a self-governing dominion.
The first step of the settlers, though not directly political, was to have ownership
of the protectorate. That passed for owning land a priori. For many expatriates,
acquiring the best and largest portion of land in the highlands was a matter of an
undeniable right, sine qua non for a successful settlement. They thought themselves
entitled to occupy the highest echelon of the new social context and wanted land to be
granted in freehold. That was the mindset of most of the settlers who came to stay.
Lansdowne instructed Stewart to pay careful attention to the evolving situation with the
settlers’ objectives and more importantly, the issue of land. Lansdowne recognized that
although the settlers’ presence in the protectorate was a reality to accept, the idea of
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prioritizing their rights in the midst of a region dominated by the presence of Africans
and Indians would not be a popular one in London.123
Stewart was instructed, therefore, to focus specifically on tasks related to the
mainland. His duties were many. He was to administer the protectorate while having
the responsibilities of dealing with internal affairs, especially with regard to arriving
settlers requesting land, while also serving as the Agent and Consul General for
Zanzibar. Lansdowne hired Stewart “as Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief” of
the EAP to attend to the relations between Europeans and Africans in the Highlands.124
The presence of the settlers in the interior brought the need to limit the task of
the commissioner who had to contain a big political crisis in the making. Separation of
power through decentralization from the coast to the mainland meant that the FO
finally “recognized the increasing settler influence on the mainland, and the necessity of
employing a man experienced, to some extent at least, in African conditions and
European pressures at first hand.”125 Despite the FO’s acknowledgment of the situation
in the protectorate, Lansdowne believed that Stewart was up to the task.
Lansdowne gave specific instructions to Stewart underlining this contradiction.
How best to harmonise their indisputable rights with the requirements of white
settlers is a problem which will require your closest attention . . . . It is only by a
most careful insistence on the protection of native rights that H.M.G. can justify
their presence in East Africa, and the imposition of the taxes which are levied
from the natives on the grounds of such protection . . . . The collection should be
exercised with the greatest care, for whilst the development of the Protectorate
revenues is of great importance on behalf of the taxpayer of this country, the
primary duty of Great Britain in East Africa is the welfare of the native races.126
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The instructions Stewart received suggested that he had to do his best to make
co-habitation possible in the interior of the protectorate. For that to be possible,
securing equal rights and justice for all people in the protectorate was fundamental.
Despite Lansdowne’s good intentions to advocate respect of the Africans’ rights, as
noted above, no efforts were made by the FO to follow up with that ideal. The FO failed
to publish Lansdowne’s instructions that insisted on the necessity to look after the
welfare of the Africans. That was supposed to be the definite policy to follow in the EAP,
but reconciling African rights with the interests of the expatriates trying to take over the
protectorate was difficult. Thus it was clear that administrating the protectorate was a
complicated mandate for Stewart because of the difficult nature of the European
settlers. Although the instructions of the FO to the new man on the spot seemed logical
on paper, executing them was a monumental task. The reason for that difficulty
centered on the fact that the real priority in the EAP was the need to generate revenue
from the railway activities.
With the need to turn the protectorate into a profitable enterprise and to pay for
the railways project, unnecessary expenditures had to be cut. Economy was to be
practiced rigorously and that required the participation of the Africans and the Indians
as well as the settlers. Nevertheless, with the superior attitude and the political
background of the settlers, all expectations of rapid economic development were
hampered. The presence of the settlers was not a guarantee for peace or prosperity in
the region. It was rather the source of a perpetual political struggle that slowed any
potential economic development. In the EAP, as Wrigley stated, “everything then
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pointed to European- directed agriculture, and thus to European immigration and
European rights in land.”127
The European settlers wanted large blocks of land to be set apart for their needs.
The settlers’ expectations to obtain land in the best areas of the protectorate were
illustrated in the Maasai move, which was a direct consequence of their presence.
Mungeam pointed out that: “ Of all the problems connected with settlement, Lansdowne
recognized that the most pressing was of the Masai. He admitted that the entry of
settlers into their grazing grounds was likely to produce friction, and recommended that
Stewart should make his own investigation of the position. On arrival in East Africa he
should consult with local officials and with the Masai leaders, and report his conclusions
to Lansdowne so that His Majesty’s Government may reach a decision.”128 In fulfilling
this charge, Stewart relied on the work previously done by Hobley, who negotiated with
the Maasai and convinced them to move into reserved areas. As much had been done
already by Hobley, and therefore Stewart did not want to complicate his work with extra
investigation and papers.
To Stewart, the prospect of the Maasai move was a done deal. According to
Mugeam’s account: “Hobley, as Acting Commissioner, had prepared a series of papers
which he laid before his new chief. In these Stewart found that as early as December
1903 Hobley has been brought down from Kisumu to Naivasha to be in charge of the
Naivasha Province, and to study the whole Masai question. In company with Masai
elders Hobley has embarked on a series of tours in the Rift Valley, and as result of the
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investigations, he recommended (with Ainsworth’s support) that the Masai should be
moved to a reserve of their own on Laikipia plateau to the east of the Rift Valley.”129
As a result following Stewart’s arrival in August 1904, both Ainsworth and Hobley
presented him with the removal plans for the Maasai. Stewart, therefore, relied on the
advice of these two who had been working on the project. In the discussions in
Mombasa and Nairobi with the Maasai, Ainsworth served as the liaison, even though his
knowledge of the Maasai language was probably minimal, at best. In any event, a final
treaty with the Maasai elders was achieved, to which Ainsworth served as a witness on
behalf of the EAP. Taken altogether, the final agreement was much in line with
Ainsworth’s original proposals. He could rightly be considered as the prime mover in
the Maasai settlement scheme.130
This was the best thing that Ainsworth, along with the assistance of Hobley, had
thought of: the safeguard of the Maasai rights, because their land was subject to total
alienation, with the settlers as potential beneficiaries. Carving reserve lands was
thought to be the best option for the survival of the Maasai pastoralists. The quickness
with which the situation was dealt with took the FO by surprise. To the FO, all
information indicated that the Maasai were being rushed into a reserve, but that did not
stop the concretization of the move. The case of the Maasai move was the first example
of how reluctant Stewart was to deal with the internal problems that the protectorate
was facing with land being a major issue.
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Stewart, the Land Issue and the Colonial Office Takeover
Stewart’s passivity lent itself to exacerbating the ever-growing land issue in the
protectorate. Stewart did not want to dedicate too much of his own time investigating
the matter of land laws and their administration. This, in his opinion, would be a task
better suited to a committee, which he duly constituted on October 31st, 1904, for the
purpose of enquiring into and reporting on the following questions related to land in the
EAP. The terms under which it was appointed appeared in the Official Gazette of
November 1st, 1904.
The committee was specifically instructed by the commissioner to report on:
(1.) The general terms and conditions upon which sales and leases of Crown
Lands should be granted.
(2.) The prices of Crown Lands.
(3.) The desirability of reserving lands for natives, Europeans and others.
(4.) The survey of land and the working and organization of the Land Office.
(5.) Native rights to or over land.
(6.) The rights of the Crown and individuals to and over land within the Sultan’s
dominions and elsewhere.131
Stewart also authorized “the aforesaid Committee to call witnesses and take such
evidence as it may consider necessary and to add such persons to its number as it may
think fit.”132
At the outset, this committee was composed of three EAP officials: Judge R. P.
Cator as chairman, along with Judge R. W. Hamilton as honorary secretary and Crown
Advocate J. W. Barth. Of course, the members of the CA felt shunned and desired
representation on the committee. The claim of the need to have representation in the
land committee, although not loud yet, was indeed a crucial moment in the history of
“Report of Land Committee, Presented to His Majesty’s Commissioner, East Africa Protectorate, May
1905,” in Great Britain, Papers Relating to British East Africa, House of Lords (HL) 158 (London: His
Majesty’s Stationery Office (HMSO), 1907), 5.
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settlers’ politics in the EAP. It marks the beginning of the political struggle discussed
earlier, with the constant settlers’ interest factor, versus Africans’ and Indians’ rights in
the region.
The problem stemmed from Eliot’s administration. It was known that Eliot was
the commissioner who invited and accommodated some settlers with a huge political
zeal and pride. But, Stewart, without knowing it, was the one who provided them with
an opportunity that led to the settler’s adoption of an extreme political strategy.
The CA thought that any of their demands had to be met and they pressured the
officials in the protectorate and the CO consistently. They were frustrated with the FO
and some officials they thought were slowing them down. They wanted to build a
successful new white men’s country without hurdles in their way. The CA used the
formation of the land committee as a political testing ground. Some members were
ready to take action and stand for their aspirations. It was then under the pretext of the
last clause of Stewart’s reference that the association pushed for the nomination of
Frank Watkins to serve in that capacity. Lord Delamere, because of his image and
influence in the protectorate, joined the committee through the back door.
The committee went from three to five members but was reduced to four because
Judge Cator was transferred to the High Court at Zanzibar. Nevertheless, upon leaving
to his new post, Cator expressed his views on the matter of how to best create reserved
areas for white colonization. Cator favored a proposition that suggested, “If an area in
the highlands should be reserved for Europeans other areas equally suitable for
agriculture should be reserved for Asiatics.”133 That was a reasonable plea for the
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Indians’ rights to good land; but as noticeable in that proposition, the Africans’ rights to
suitable land for agriculture and pastoral activities was not mentioned at all. As a judge
by profession, Cator seemed not to realize the importance of the question of protecting
the Africans’ rights in the protectorate. His transfer to Zanzibar opened the door for
Delamere to promote the settlers’ rights with a pro-settler land report.
Delamere quickly maneuvered himself into the chairmanship of the committee
with little opposition. Apparently the others on the committee felt as if they were just
going to fill some chairs and the committee work was only going to be another task they
could gladly do without. Thus, Stewart’s efforts of appointing a team to look at the land
issue gave birth to a very pro-settler land committee. In regard to the whole situation, it
appeared as though Stewart’s lackadaisical approach to the land committee
appointment resulted in his failure to inform the FO of Cator’s needed role in chairing
the committee. Therefore, the colonial authorities ended up shooting themselves in the
proverbial foot by moving Cator to Zanzibar. That allowed Delamere to be able to
exercise his influence by influencing and altering the result of the report for the settlers’
interests.
With Delamere now chairing the committee, it was rather like the fox guarding
the hen house. The committee went to work right after the formation of their team at the
end of the year 1904. Although Stewart seemed to be collaborating with the settlers by
entrusting them with a land committee of their choice, some settlers were not pleased
with the new administration. Settlers’ frustrations were constantly on a rise.
In The EAP, the most vocal settlers maintained and expressed their belief that the
protectorate had the potential of being a profitable country. Their frustrations were
directed to the FO. Mungeum noted: “In January 1905 A. G. W. Anderson, one of the
101

leading European residents in Mombasa, addressed a long letter to the Colonial
Secretary. In it he complained of the general system of administration within the
Protectorate, of the type of men who served as officials, and the introduction of Indian
systems of law and currency. He bemoaned the fact that Eliot-‘a most able and upright
Administrator’- had resigned, and expressed the hope that Stewart would also do all he
could to entice the new settler into the country.”134
Anderson’s complaints reflected the early tension between the settlers and the
officials in the protectorate. The settlers also blamed the FO for its passivity and lack of
support for their cause. The settlers found the officials in their way as they attempted to
dominate the protectorate by occupying the best land of the Africans and by standing
against the promotion of the Indian traders. The settlers’ perception of the officials’ role
in the protectorate led to a struggle that grew and caught momentum during Sir Percy
Girouard’s administration from 1909 to 1912. The early European settlers’ political
strategy was to protest when official policy did not suit their interests. In such cases, the
officials often received the full benefit of the wrath of the most extreme settlers, when
some of their immediate demands they considered important were not met in time.
In the early days of the EAP the field officers were the pioneers of empire left in a
difficult situation, as it was impossible for any official to do all that was needed or
demanded by the settlers. “The East African administrator, unlike his counterpart in
West Africa or Uganda, was faced with the task of achieving cheap government through
African acquiescence, and at the same time of meeting the growing demands of white
settlers. These demands placed a heavy strain on the native agents and collaborators, no
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less than on the administrator. And amidst all his dilemmas, central policy offered
nought for his comfort, because it remained both ambiguous and inconsistent.”135 In
the EAP, the presence of the settlers was a huge factor when it came to the right policy to
follow to develop the region. The newcomers resented the ever-present shadow of some
officials serving in the region and also bureaucrats, politicians and humanitarians who
did not appeal to their cause in England.
Frustrated with the administration of the protectorate and the officials in place,
the newcomers often bypassed the CS authorities. They did so by remaining active and
made use of their association to push their agenda. The CA convened a special meeting
in January 1905 to devise a political strategy for advancing change in light of the new
circumstances. 136 The action of the CA and Anderson’s complaint to the CO were clear
examples of how the radical European settlers’ wing manifested their frustrations out of
the protectorate. Nevertheless, the settlers’ discontent was met with criticism in the CO
by some officials. On 14 February 1905, CO official A.L. Antrobus opinionated on
Anderson’s complaint. He anticipated problems stemming from the settlers’ camp in the
EAP. Antrobus warned that: “I am afraid that all the people who, like this writer, Lord
Hindlip and others, are finding fault with the Foreign Office and saying how glad they
are coming under the Colonial Office, will not like us any better when we take over the
administration.”137
Attitudes towards the FO supervision of the EAP left less to desire because
progress was sluggish and the protectorate still was struggling to generate substantial
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revenue. The CO seemed to be the best alternative to supervise the protectorate and the
settlers welcomed the idea of that very possible change with high expectations. The
settlers hoped that a transfer from the FO to CO would be conducive to better overall
administration of the EAP. More than any other group, the white settlers were
expecting changes in their favor. They were looking for the new commissioner to
formulate swift pro-white policies even in the face of opposition from some of the longstanding officials in the protectorate like Jackson, Ainsworth and Hobley. The settlers
claim was not a new source of struggle because since Eliot’s administration, they wanted
land to settle down, land to develop, land for speculation and political power.
Regarding the EAP land policy, the CO had been sending warnings to the FO
about the dangers of arbitrary land alienation. In July 1904, after an FO inquiry about
the land application of two settlers (Woodhouse and Cameron) for 500 square miles of
land in the Tana Valley, “the Foreign Office was advised not to grant more concessions
until the land regulation were put on a more satisfactory basis. ”138 Despite the
warnings, officials in the FO ignored the call for a measure of prudence when proceeding
with issues related to land, specifically in an infant protectorate experiencing the
increasing arrival of the so–called land-grabbers from South Africa. The CO’s advice
was seen by some FO officials as if it was a direct interference in their way of supervising
the protectorate.
Sir Clement Hill, who was the superintendent of the African protectorates from
1900 up to his retirement in 1905, considered that a busy CO did not have much to say
about the way business was conducted by the FO. In addition to that, “Hurst, who
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drafted the 1902 ordinance, denied that any Colonial Office criticisms of his ordinance
were valid: “It was working well as the local officials had not complained about it.“ He
concluded that “until the C.O. take over the administration of the protectorate and have
the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the facts, the assistance they can offer us
cannot be of great value.’”139 That was a response meaning that the EAP was too
troublesome of a region to administrate effectively.
In April 1905, the CO was in charge of the EAP. The CO was very familiar with
the issues that the FO was dealing with regarding the protectorate. A proper land
distribution under the pressure of an increasing number of settlers applying for large
concessions was a crucial issue with which the CO had to deal. Lord Hindlip, the British
aristocrat, who clearly sympathized with the settlers, commented on the status of the
protectorate. In his 1905 book, he argued that: “In East Africa you have a country where
at present there are some five hundred white families; land questions are under
consideration, the country is capable of supporting a large white population, and
perhaps in the future it will rank among the food-producing countries of the world.”140
Lord Hindlip believed in the possible economic development of the protectorate
conducted by the white settlers who were in fact the minority group in the region.
Lord Hindlip was even more enthusiastic about the end of the FO rule and had
high expectations about the potential of the protectorate if the CO could collaborate and
fully back up the settlers. Lord Hindlip welcomed the CO take over and stated that: “The
country had emerged from the condition in which it was subject to the bureaucratic
consular jurisdiction of the Foreign Office, and has passed under the experienced and
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enlightened rule of the Colonial Office.”141 He also manifested a degree of satisfaction
about the new commissioner’s first step in his attempt to resolve the ever pending land
issue in the protectorate. He acknowledged that “Sir Donald Stewart is working for the
settlers’ interests, and has even called meetings of settlers to discuss matters
appertaining to the defense of the country; a Land Commission has been sitting, on
which were appointed two unofficial members.”142 McGregor Ross, on the othr hand,
noticed the very beginning of a political pattern in the administration of the EAP that
was based on taking into consideration the opinions of the few European settlers who
simply wanted land and power. Ross asserted that “from the earliest days the
Government of the East Africa Protectorate displayed commendable willingness to listen
to advice from local European residents. Critics of a sardonic turn of mind might
perhaps interject that it had no option in the matter, the advice having been tendered in
such strident tones as to compel attention.”143 The settlers’ general opinion on how to
best run the protectorate grew to become their own political agenda. White settlers’
claims of the best lands in the protectorate were just the beginning of their struggle for
the control of the protectorate. They also progressively sought to gain full political
rights so that in a near future, they would have total control of the region. As noted
earlier, these problems that the protectorate was facing were not new to the CO, which
was often consulted by the FO before the transfer was effective in 1905.
Before the transfer, the FO did not seriously take into consideration the CO
advice about “the dangers of speculation in land and urged not to alienate large areas in
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freehold.”144 One clear example of how the FO conducted business was the case of the E
A S’s land application. Sorrenson pointed out: “One result of the Eliot-Hill controversy
was a renewal of Colonial Office apprehension about the Foreign Office administration
of the protectorate. There had been inter-departmental friction since 1902 when Hill
and Hurst ignored Colonial Office advice in drafting the Crown Lands Ordinance,”
adding that in November 1903, when the Foreign office was in the middle of
negotiations with the East Africa Syndicate, “the Colonial Office drew attention to
unsatisfactory features of the ordinance and suggested a New Guinea ordinance of 1899
as providing useful safeguards for opening up a new territory.”145 Hill just carried on
and pressed the Treasury to agree to the syndicate grant. That was possible because of
Hill’s influence and position in the FO. Also, in the midst of doubt about the
effectiveness of the Hurst’s land regulation draft of 1902, the protectorate desperately
needed big investors with capital to help jumpstart the economy of the region.
It is important to underline that on one hand, Hill’s scheme for the syndicate to
obtain land was possible because the FO and the Treasury had no clear idea about how
to pull profit from the infant protectorate. Hill’s work for the Syndicate was then
practical and justifiable because desirable capitalists were to be encouraged to invest.
The expectations were that the Syndicate’s deal was going to open the door for more
European settlers with big dreams and ambitions to invest in the protectorate. On the
other hand, Hurst believed that the drafted ordinance of 1902 was working well.
But, if indeed it did, it was because of Eliot, who relaxed the rules for the benefit
of his favorite European settlers. The settlers considered the rules as too rigid and
144
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against their interests. That was one of the problems that Eliot created and left for
Stewart, the FO and later the CO to better sort out. Though the CO tried to point out to
the FO the right way to cope with the issues of land and settlers who wanted to
transform the protectorate into a white men’s country, their suggestions were ignored.
In fact, the CO was overwhelmed by the poor management of the FO, which left them
with a mess to clean up.
The FO turned the protectorate to the CO and no steps to facilitate a smooth
transition were taken. The FO did not keep the CO informed about the general affairs
concerning the EAP. Just after the transfer, the CO officials realized that what they had
inherited was a mess. As long as the FO was concerned, after ten years since the
opening of the protectorate, all files were to be left in the disposition of the CO. It
resulted that “Only one volume was needed to file all the correspondence on matters
affecting the transfer, and this dealt more with routine questions than basic questions of
policy. There seemed to be no evidence that Lansdowne and Hill ever prepared a
comprehensive handover report for their successors.”146
The passivity and lack of diligence on the part of the FO upset Churchill, who was
the colonial undersecretary in December 1905, following the formation of the Liberal
Government. Churchill did not fall short in criticizing the FO for the chaos they left
behind. He noted, “The organization of such territory was not a work with which the
department was acquainted or in which they have displayed aptitude.” Once again the
need to shuffle officials for better supervision of the EAP was felt by the CO that held
“no executive power” but, was able to “exert influence on policy through approval of
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colonial budgets, legislation, and appointments.”147 It was deemed necessary to
restructure the whole East African Department (EAD) administration with new faces.
The Colonial Office Takes Over
Before getting into the details of the policies and positions of the CO, it is
important to understand the initial changes that were made by the CO to better
supervise the protectorate at the time of the 1905 takeover. Officials with experience
from different British territories were called upon to form a team creating the EAD.
According to Mungeam’s analysis:
At the transfer a special East Africa Department was created with the Colonial
Office, responsible for the Protectorate of East Africa, Uganda, and British
Somaliland, and for the King’s African Rifles. At its head was R. L. Antrobus, one
of the four Assistant under secretaries in the Office, who also had responsibility
for the West Africa Department and West Africa Frontier Force. Under
Antrobus, in descending of seniority, were H. J. Read, drawn from the West
Africa Department, W. D. Ellis, from the North America and Australasia
Department, and W. C. Bottomley, also from the West Africa Department. These
were joined on 1 January 1906 by R. Popham Lobb, seconded from service in
West Africa in an acting capacity only. At the head of the officials, as Permanent
Under-Secretary, was Sir Montague Ommaney.148
Following these initial steps of reorganization then underway in London with the
transfer of the protectorate to the CO, the white settlers in the EAP were beginning to
feel as if there was some hope on the horizon, that maybe some in the CO would begin to
at least listen to their demands. Two weeks after the transfer of the FO to the CO,
Grogan took the opportunity to make his voice heard about the status of the EAP which
he considered a stagnant land of opportunity for the white settlers without a defined
policy, paralyzed by incompetent officials and the lack of support from the Treasury.
Grogan sent his frustrations to the editor of the Times in which he argued that:
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In East Africa there is land sufficient to absorb enormous numbers of settlersland of first class quality, and owing to its various altitudes and rainfalls, suitable
for the successful practice of every conceivable of the great primary industry;
while the importance of a considerable concentration of British population on
these highland plateau cannot be exaggerated in its relation to Imperial strategy.
The underlying scheme of administration as initiated by the Foreign Office is
essentially sound, but its lack of elasticity and the complete absence of Treasury
response to the needs created by the sudden and rapid commercial awakening of
the past year have induced what closely approximates to a complete breakdown
in the administrative machine. The small staff which was considered sufficient to
deal with a position the most important features of which were a few sporadically
fractious natives and infinite hosts of antelope has suddenly been called upon to
handle a rapidly developing colony with all its attendant problems of landsurvey, cattle disease, and, above all, control of the relations between well
intentioned, unsophisticated natives and white wastrel flight, which invariably is
the van of any movement of population to a new country.
The sole trouble is an absence of any clearly defined line of policy, and the lack of
special knowledge of, and the organization to cope with, the problems which the
unexpected awakening has evolved. This is due, not to any lack of local
enthusiasm, but to a starved exchequer. On every side one sees not only that the
country is severely handicapped, but that its future is actually imperiled by the
local officialdom's fear of appealing to the stony heart of the Treasury.149
Within the CO, however, some degree of pessimism with regard to the future of
the EAP prevailed. Secretary of state Alfred Lyttelton was among this skeptical group.
He seriously questioned the significance of the EAP within the context of the global
British Empire. At best, the Protectorate could serve as an expanded “outlet for Indian
emigration.”150 It is also clear that Lyttelton’s men shared in the secretary’s dour
outlook on the EAP. There was talk among them of displeasure with the FO’s prior
concessions and land grants to settlers that had taken place under Eliot’s administration
of the EAP. In fact the appointment of a land committee by Stewart that was a response
to the settlers’ displeasures provided an early challenge to the CO.
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The land committee formation that was a pro-settler team led by Delamere that
had been working from its inception until May of 1905. Beginning their work, they
called for help. They wanted some government officials in the protectorate, including
planters, farmers, lawyers, merchants or whoever present, to give their opinions on all
or some of the issues related to land regulations and their actual administration. In
reality, their circular was directed only to the chief government officials and the settlers’
community and few Indians. No opinions were needed from the Africans. The
committee ended up hearing from 44 witnesses who posted written memoranda but the
accounts of the witnesses were not included in the report they handed to Stewart. The
question that remained pending was how anybody could know if these memoranda were
of considerable assistance to the committee or not.
Nevertheless, the committee held four sittings at Mombasa and fourteen in
Nairobi. Following is the list of the people interested in the development of the country
who were consulted as witnesses:
Table 3.1. Names and Occupations of Witnesses Who Gave Evidence before the
Committee

Name

Occupation

Residence

V. M. Newland

Land Agent

Nairobi

D. O. Roberts

Licensed Surveyor and
Land Agent

“

A. Flemmer

Landholder

“

W. J. King

Manager, Colonial Stores

“

J. Boyes

Farmer

Kiambu

W. A. Gain

Builder

Nairobi
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J. S. Elliott

“

“

E. S. Grogan

Landholder

--

F. Knowles

Settler

Kamiti

F. W. Krieger

“

Kiambu

T. A. Wood

General Agent

Nairobi

H. H. Heatley

Settler

Kamiti

B. G. Allen

Solicitor

Nairobi

N. A. Macgregor

Agent of Dr. Düring

“

A. Linton

Director of Agriculture

“

C. N. M. Harrison

Solicitor

“

A. G. W. Anderson

Director of B.E.A.T. & D.
Coy.

Mombasa

J. R. Wood

Settler

Kiambu

J. O. W. Hope

Collector

Dagoretti

G. D. Longden

Settler

Nairobi

A. S. Frew

Licensed Surveyor

“

W. McC. Wilson

Secretary, Colonists’
Association

“

P. E. Watcham

Manager, Cotton Syndicate, Nairobi
Tana

John Ross

Representing Mr. Ross

Kiu

J. Ainsworth, C.M.G.

Sub-Commissioner

Nairobi

T. Kendrick

Settler

--

I. A. Grieve

Settler

Mbagathi

R. Barton-Wright

Land Officer and Chief
Surveyor

Nairobi

A. Ortlepp

Licensed Surveyor

“

Dr. Radford

Medical Officer

“

C. F. Elliott

Conservator of Forests

“
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E. L. Waring

Assistant Chief Surveyor

“

A. Marsden

Chief of Customs

“

Premji Ranchodas

Rep. Africa Hindu Union

“

Umedbhoy B. Patel

“

“

Rowji Visram

Merchant

“

Revashanker Shuckle

Medical Practitioner

“

O. Tonks

Solicitor

Mombasa

R. M. Byron

“

“

C. M. Dalal

Pleader, Rep. I.T.
Association

“

Jaffer Dewji Jamal

Merchant, Rep. “ “

“

Jewraj Khatao

““““

“

Haji Ismail

Merchant

“

W. H. Tanner

Acting Director, P. W. D.

“

Ali bin Salim

Assistant Liwali

“

Source: “Report of and the land Committee,” 25-26.

The table above is incomplete because the authors of the memoranda that were
supposedly collected should have been included. Memoranda should have been filed
and included in the report. That should not have been a comfortable task, taking into
consideration that the majority of the witnesses consulted were predominantly of
European descent with favorable opinion of white colonization of the protectorate. E.S.
Grogan and A. Flemmer were two notorious settlers whose occupations appeared in the
list as landholders. The table showed that being a settler was an occupation that
consisted of occupying land. Possessing land was a profession. “Solicitor of Land” was
also an occupation. No one was listed as speculator. The African people were not
113

consulted by the committee. Ainsworth’s name was on the list, which was important.
He had experience and was familiar with African affairs and land issues. He helped the
local authorities with the Maasai relocation, which he believed was a matter of
expediency and a matter of common sense. To Ainsworth, the Maasai move was a lesser
evil than having to witness their extinction, as Eliot suggested.151
At the end of 1904 he was asked to give his opinion about the whole issue of land
for the land committee. His memorandum survived. Professor Maxom explained how
Ainsworth reacted to the whole problem of land, European settlement and African
right’s to land when he argued that:
Not only was Ainsworth concerned with the Maasai in the Rift Valley during
1904; he continued to give consideration to land and European settlement in
Kikuyu territory near Nairobi. By the end of the year, he had concluded that
European settlement had practically reached its limits there. In his memo to the
Land Committee, he included a strong defense of what had been his policy of the
previous two years of creating reserves. He wrote: ‘In my opinion it is more than
desirable to reserve land for the natives of the country, and if we neglected it we
would, in my opinion, be guilty of the most flagrant breach of trust. I am
convinced that the safe-guarding of native rights and interests in this connection
is practically our first duty when dealing with the land question.’152
Ainsworth’s memo did not fit into the pro-settlers’ land report. The settlers did
not want to hear about or mention matters related to Africans’ rights to land. Instead
they included a range of other issues that were related to their interests. They scripted it
in their report, stating that: “In dealing with such a wide question as that of the landlaws of the protectorate-it was inevitable that other matters should be mentioned,
which, though not strictly within the scope of the reference, were yet so closely allied to
151 Maxon, John Ainsworth and the Making of Kenya, 148-149. Ainsworth asserted in private
correspondence that the Maasai would be forcibly removed from the vicinity of the railway. He was an
adherent of the Darwinian concept of the “survival of the fittest;” and he believed that the whites were the
fittest and hence, the rightful ones to decide where the Maasai or any other group should be located in the
EAP.
152 Ibid.
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the main question that it was impossible for the Committee to pass them over
entirely.”153 They further added that labor was particularly a question of great
importance to tackle. They argued that: “The question of native labour in particular is so
closely bound up with the interests of landowners and the development of the country,
and many witnesses attached such great importance to it that it was felt that it would be
impossible to do justice to the general question without referring at some length to the
subsidiary one of labour.”154
It was obvious that labor was going to be a problem that the next commissioner
would have to deal with. They foresaw problems and expressed that: “There is no doubt
that the future success or failure of the country depends entirely on the methods that
will be employed in dealing with native labour. The country must look for its
development to the labour of the natives, and if proper steps are not taken with due care
and forethought to render the natives contented and their labour easily available, and if
the laws dealing with natives are not framed in a wise and liberal spirit and enforced
with a firm hand the future prospects of the country may be irretrievably damaged.”155
Labor was an issue worthy of its own committee. Stewart’s reference did not
recommend specifically that the committee bring the settlers’ extra issues, but rather,
“to call witnesses and take such evidence as it might consider and add such persons to
its member as it sees fit.”156 No additional member was added into the committee. The
CA took total control of the committee from the get go. The clause was understood by
the committee as an opportunity to lay the settlers’ many grievances in the report.

“Report of Land Committee,” 6.
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The committee was supposed to investigate the working of existing land
legislation, as well as to investigate the operations of the Land Office itself. It was
supposed to inquire into the Africans’ rights to the land and to suggest areas to be
sectioned off for African reserves. It was also supposed to investigate the disposition of
lands along the coastal strip. In their final report, the committee addressed 87 issues.
That meant 81 issues that were not strictly within the scope of the reference.
With Delamere at the helm, however, the final committee report, issued on 25
May 1905, turned out to be nothing more than a document of pure propaganda for the
white settlers’ cause. In fact, the opinions expressed in the report were almost a
verbatim copy of Delamere’s expressions two years earlier in his tract, Grant of Land to
the Zionist Congress and Land Settlement in British East Africa.157 The report
suggested that land should be reserved for the Europeans settlers and the Indians. The
committee underlined that:
There is, however, no doubt that while in practice it might be possible to exclude
Asiatics from the areas reserved for Europeans it would not be possible nor would
it be politic to restrain the energies and capital of European planters within
limited bounds and not to permit them to be used for the development of the
resources of the country outside those bounds.
As a matter of fact there is an enormous area of land eminently suited to the
needs of Indian agriculturists outside the area which it is proposed to reserve for
European colonization, and it seems therefore detrimental to the best interests of
the country to throw open to Asiatic immigration a small area suitable for
European colonization whilst there is a far larger area suitable for Asiatics but not
for the European colonization still awaiting development. At the present moment
.157 When the offer was made in 1902, Delamere reacted strongly against it and cabled London in words
nearly identical to his later tract: “Feeling here very strong against introduction alien Jews. Railway
frontage fit British colonization 260 miles. Foreign Office proposes give 200 miles best to undesirable
aliens. Is it for this the railway was built and large sums spent on country? Flood of people that class sure
to lead to trouble with half tamed natives jealous of their rights. Means extra staff to control them. Is the
British taxpayer proprietor East Africa, content that beautiful and valuable country be handed to aliens?
Have we no colonist for our own race? Country being settled slowly surely by desirable British colonial
settlers. Englishmen here appeal public opinion, especially those who know the country, against this
arbitrary proceeding and consequent swamping bright future of country.” Lord Delamere, Grant of Land
to the Zionist Congress (London: Harrison and Sons, 1903) and Ross, Kenya From Within, 66.
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a large block of land on the Guasa Ngisho [Uasin Gishu] plateau in an area
suitable for European colonization has been offered for settlement to some Jews.
The offer was first made in 1902 and since that date nothing has been done to put
a term to the option or to insist on the development of the land. The option that
was then offered still remains open. If it is possible to put a term to what appears
to be an indefinite option it should be done as soon as may be and this block of
land which is at present held up may then be thrown open to European
colonization.158
In regard to any colonization effort, moreover, the report defined the
government in terms of being a strict landlord maintaining an almost feudal
relationship between itself and the holders of the land by objecting free transfer of their
properties. The committee outlined some of its concerns regarding the strict
development clauses inserted into leases in the EAP, as well as restrictions on the
transfer of leases and the liability of freehold land for forfeiture 117ort h non-occupation.
Therefore, the report called for a decidedly more liberal policy to foster the development
of land. The committee stated that: “It has been raised as an objection 117ort h
suggestion that transfer should be made easy that a great deal of land will, in a very
short time, pass into the hands of Indians. There is of course no objection 117ort h
general proposition that Indians should hold land in the Protectorate, but considering
that only a comparatively small area of the Protectorate is suitable for European
settlement and colonization it is desirable that land within the area should be reserved
117ort he support and maintenance of a white population.”159
The pro-settlers’ report also denied that there was any danger of speculation. In
the opinion of most settlers, already in possession of land, speculation was considered a
good thing. It was not 117ort thought of as an unsavory aspect of capitalism, but rather
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a healthy sign of activity. They acknowledged that: “Speculation and particularly overspeculation is not good for any country, but it should be remembered that the evils that
it might cause are far outweighed by the impetus given to genuine business and the
attraction held out to capital where the greatest possible security is given to title, and the
greatest possible freedom to transfer of interests in land.”160
The committee had little to say with regard 118ort h amendment of land
regulations, i.e. rents, limitations on acreage, lease transfers, etc. In other words, the
committee had little to complain about. It basically advocated for more of the same,
only encouraging legislation that would perpetuate the homestead system through the
immigration of more “yeoman farmers” and pastoralists into the EAP, 118ort h further
alienate the Africans from whatever patches of land might remain 118ort he. Alienating
the Africans meant having separate locations 118ort hem. The report insisted that
“there is unanimity of opinion in favour of keeping locations in town district for separate
races.”161 That meant separate and not equal 118ort h other races they considered
inferior.
In the final section of their report, the committee expressed firmly the European
colonists’ vision about how they wished 118ort hem economic growth, prosperity and
stability in the region. They clearly stated that:
The general future development of the country must be looked for in a
combination of capital from abroad and native labour, and it is open to question
whether it would be sound policy to encourage the immigration of Indian
agriculturists on a large scale. So far as experience has shown, hitherto, the
contact with the African native has proved but an indifferent blessing to either
race. Should Indian agriculturists, however, desire to try their fortunes in the
country there is plenty of land available 118ort hem, but the Committee think that
160
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the settlement of Indian agriculturalists should be left rather to private and
individual enterprise, as in the case with white settlement, than undertaken by
the Government.162
They finally concluded their report arguing that:
The Committee desire to say the objects which they have had in view in
making the foregoing recommendations are on the one hand a desire to see the
country opened up as speedily as possible, difficulties removed from the way of
settlers, and the future administration of all matters relating to land rendered
as simple and as effective as possible, and on the other that the Government,
while reaping a due benefit accruing from the development of the land, should
be equipped with an efficient system for administrating it in the future in the
interest both of the individual settler and the community at large.163
The committee made a bold statement with high expectations. They hoped to
gain total control of the protectorate. They suggested that an influx of capital, meaning
foreign investments, coupled with a reliable and abundant supply of African labor, were
the key elements to help jumpstart the economy of the region. In their reasoning, the
settlers believed that they were the only group in the protectorate capable of taking
initiatives to build a prosperous country, profitable for themselves and the Empire.
The land committee considered the CS’s stance about how to run the
protectorate as a direct interference insofar as their interests were concerned. They
viewed the system of administration as an impediment limiting them with senseless
regulations under the FO supervision. The committee’s land report also raised an
important issue. They stated clearly the urgency of providing cheap labor once reserves
were carved for the Africans and land alienated for the settlers’ benefits. The
committee’s foregoing recommendations were indeed an indirect proposal for building a
white men’s country at the expense of the African labor force. However, the demand for
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cheap labor could be regarded as another starting point for conflict because the question
of accessing African labor also was closely allied to the main issue of direct violation of
the Africans’ rights on the same matter.
The land committee report’s indirect petition for cheap labor turned out to be a
serious issue in the EAP. Labor troubles later became a matter of struggles between the
settlers and the CS. It was under the supervision of the CO that replaced the FO that the
problem became manifest. It caught momentum during Sadler’s administration but it
was first and formally articulated in the pro-settlers’ land committee report that Stewart
appointed on 31 May 1904. Overall, the committee’s report delivered by Delamere, to
many extents, was the prelude of the European settlers’ posterior demands when they
formally articulated them on paper and sent it to London on 23 August 1905. Prior to
the settlers’ decision to address their grievances to the CO, the commissioner finally sent
his remarks on the submitted land report to the CO on 14 August 1905.
Stewart’s dispatch was received on 16 September 1905. The commissioner started
his remarks by pointing out the remarkable effort and good work that the land
committee displayed in inquiring about the protectorate’s land question. He formally
expressed to the secretary of state that: “With reference to the report drawn up by the
Committee I appointed to enquire into the land question in the East Africa Protectorate,
I have the honour to submit to you, herewith, my comments. I consider that the report
on the whole is carefully thought out and excellently put together, embodying, as it does,
the views of the many persons who gave evidence before the Commission.”164

164 Commissioner to Secretary of State, received at the CO 16 September 1905, Papers Relating to British
East Africa, 26-27.
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The reality was that the report was carefully crafted by a pro-settler team. The
report was about what the settlers considered as vital for the promulgation of their
rights and interests in the region. Allowing land speculation, facilitating transfer of
land, defining the term of native reserves and recommendations regarding the future
administration of the protectorate were main concerns for the settlers. Considering the
position of the settlers who felt that the protectorate would be better off if entrusted to
them, Stewart provided his opinion on these matters and suggested the following:
There is undoubtedly a strong feeling among the settlers that the conditions
under which they lease land in the protectorate are too stringent, and the great
complaint is that they have not the right of free transfer. There is much to be said
on both sides. Free transfer would bring capital and increase speculation. The
first comers, who have perhaps bought land merely as speculation, and have not
done work on it, would receive a large profit by selling, and it is doubtful if the
purchasers would do any more work than their predecessors. They might simply
remain in possession of the land and wait for an opportunity to sell again at a
profit.165
Stewart’s views concurred with the land committee’s recommendations on free
transfer of land and freedom for speculation. Stewart seemed to have not paid attention
to the instructions of the CO that warned of the danger of alienating large areas of land
at the expense of the Africans for the sole purpose of speculation. Allowing speculation
was similar to encouraging a struggle for land accumulation between the settlers
without the need of having to develop the acquired property.
In that process, land would pass from hand to hand and Stewart considered that
“in the meantime, though, money is circulated by this method, the land itself is not
developed.”166 A market of land speculators dominated by the European settlers was not
a sustainable development plan to jumpstart the EAP economy. Speculation was not
165
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going to repay the large investments of the British Treasury. Speculation was not going
to generate or bring goods in the protectorate. Encouraging land speculation was going
to expose the protectorate to a new conflict. The danger of possible mass land
accumulations for the sole purpose of reselling at profit in a yet unfettered market was
real.
Regarding the issue of the transfer of land, Stewart replied that, “Whatever
decision is taken with regard to the transfers they ought to be absolutely barred to
Indians or natives in the districts suitable to European colonization. There are
enormous tracts of land in the Protectorate perfectly suitable for Indians to develop
without encroaching on the comparatively small area suitable for European settlement.
There is no objection to the small plots and gardens which have already been leased to
Indians and natives in the Highlands, as they are generally far from European dwellings,
and being of small extent, can be easily controlled.”167
This was clearly a scheme to both isolate and alienate the Africans and Indians.
The settlers did not wish for any integrative development of the protectorate if they had
to surrender even one degree of European hegemony. The preeminent status of
Europeans in the protectorate was to extend to all spheres of influence and control. To
further this aim, the white settlers insisted on the formation of “native reserves.” While
Stewart concurred that the establishment of reserves was a good idea, his opinions on
the matter of big or small reserves were fluctuating. Said the commissioner: “I have not
been able to make up my mind from the evidence at my disposal as to which is the better
method- large reserves far removed from centres of European population or small
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reserves scattered up and down the country. The opinions of settlers differ largely on
this point, and whichever scheme is adopted it will require most careful consideration as
to the locality, size, etc., of the proposed reserves. The class of native, whether
agricultural or pastoral, would also have to be taken into account.”168
Once again, we see some degree of sympathy with the settlers on the part of the
commissioner. However, the placing of the Africans on reserves was an idea much in
opposition to very concept of establishing a “protectorate,” which supposedly should
guard all of His Majesty’s subjects against alienation through the appropriation of their
very hereditary lands. And this is in line with the very core political ideology held
among the whites who decided to enter the EAP from South Africa with the objective of
turning it into a so-called “white man’s country.”
But there is a certain point where the interests of King and Empire come first,
and the commissioner declared that, “It would be very desirable to allow the ratepayers
to elect their members of the Municipal Committee by vote, but a difficulty arises in
connection with the coloured vote. As long as the Indians and natives pay taxes, they
ought to have a vote for their representative, but the white taxpayers wish to monopolize
the right of voting, and I fail to see how this could be countenanced by Government.”169
As much as Stewart shared some of the concerns of the white settlers, he realized that
his ultimate responsibility was to the Crown. Clearly, he could not allow the whites to
exercise a monopoly of the vote at the expense of tax-paying peoples of color. There
could not be a future for the protectorate in the Empire if the settlers ended up
disenfranchising the Africans and Indians.
168
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Of course, the commissioner understood that the Africans’ rights were to be
respected, if solely to keep the authorities from London and humanitarian groups from
coming down hard on them. To this end, Stewart recognized that, “The creation of a
post of Commissioner of Native Affairs is a growing necessity, and I entirely concur in
the recommendations of the Committee. If this appointment is made, I have an officer
in the Protectorate who is fully capable of carrying out the duties.”170
The issue of creating a Commissioner of Native Affairs, like many other concerns
in the protectorate, was deferred to others who had been in-country for a longer period
of time, enough to garner sufficient experience to render wiser counsel. For example, in
going back to the problem of land transfers, Stewart noted that, “A solution to this
question may possibly be found in the proposal put forward by Mr. Ainsworth, which is
enclosed herewith, namely to levy a tax on all unoccupied or unproductive land whilst
allowing free transfer of freehold property.”171 His common sense prevailed in deferring
some of the more controversial matters to his trusted subordinates.
The primary recommendation given by Ainsworth for the development of the
protectorate was the lifting of restrictions on land development. He was of the opinion
that “all homesteaders should be able to obtain a freehold title to the land they occupy,
and should be at liberty to sell out if they so desire.”172 In other words, a free market
would serve diminish rampant land speculation. The restrictions were doing little to
augment the economic development of the country, so their elimination would be a big
step in the right direction. But the problem remained that any proposal benefiting the
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settlers would be interpreted by the CA as a step towards their goal of controlling the
region for their benefit.
During the same month of August, there was talk among the white settlers of the
EAP actually becoming a full-fledged Crown colony. This would entail the
establishment of a real Legco complete with elected members. Lord Hindlip, standing
for the settlers, argued that: “The greatest grievance among the settlers and the
unofficial community, and a most natural one, is that they have no representation, and
consequently no voice in the government of the country, or in the formation of
regulations relating to matters of vital importance to their interests. Naturally for the
present representative government is out of the question, but some kind of Legco in
which representatives of the settlers and the unofficial community will have seats is to
my mind an absolute necessity.”173 As the colonists quickly came to realize that the
officials of the CO may not all be their friends, their leadership put together a set of
proposals that was pressed both in Nairobi and London, where Hindlip was dispatched
for this very purpose.
The Colonists’ Association demands
The actual CA demands to the secretary of state were received on November 13,
1905. In view of the transfer of the EAP administration from the FO to the CO, the
colonists were taking the political lead in advancing their positions in London. Clearly,
they saw the transfer as a window of opportunity, hoping that the “paramount factor in
Colonial Office rule is to govern according to the wishes of the governed.”174
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The extreme nature of the CA, reflective of the inordinate white South African
influence within its ranks, was also manifest in the document. It was made amply
apparent that the “wishes of the governed” was only reflective of the political desires of
the white settlers and not for any other group(s) resident in the EAP when they wrote:
“Our association, known as the Colonists’ Association of British East Africa, has been
founded to advance the development of this country as a white man’s colony, and
includes a great part of the white unofficial population in the highlands of East Africa,
away from the coast.”175
It was a case of the colored peoples be damned, insofar as the CA was concerned.
The leadership of the organization was obsessed with impressing upon the powers-thatbe in London of the “magnificent possibilities offered by British East Africa for white
agricultural settlement.”176 The document containing the association’s demands went
on to frame this remark with a recitation of the vast tracts of fertile land suitable for
farming and grazing that if placed under European management would yield substantial
exports that would support a larger white population in the region. The document also
drew attention to the previously unforeseen benefits of the Uganda Railway in
advancing white settler development throughout the entirety of East Africa.
Despite the potential for prosperity through white settlement, the CA members
lamented the lack of progress being made in advancing white settlement in the EAP.
Their document notes that “while the stream of settlers has slackened, many good
colonists, who had settled, are leaving in despair of making the land pay.”177 They
wanted the new CO administration to promote policies that would augment white
Ibid.
Ibid.
177 Ibid.
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immigration. They believed that this way was the only way to reverse the seeming
backward trend that the EAP had been following under the FO administration. The
European settlers consistently associated the EAP’s struggle for a start of a strong and
profitable market economy with the lack of trust vested on them by the local
administration. The extreme expatriates within the association firmly believed that
turning the protectorate over to them was the only guaranteed path to prosperity and
that became their main concern up to 1960.
In addressing the issue of securing better markets, the association members
suggested a two-pronged approach. First, they wanted a lowering of transportation
costs for their produce. This would entail a joint reduction of railway rates on the
Uganda line and steamer freights, which they deemed as cost prohibitive. The other
approach involved British East Africa’s entrance into the South African Customs Union.
But one has to wonder where the loyalties of the CA members lay. Why did many of
them leave South Africa in the first place, if it was such a model country and fabulous
marketplace? Eliot invited them with the promise of accommodating them. They came
and found grounds to complain about the unfavorable existing conditions in the
protectorate. The association membership argued that they could not “find sufficient
purchasers locally” for their crops, but that the “natural market for the country is South
Africa.”178 It is then plausible to come to the conclusion that the South African political
agenda of white hegemony throughout Africa trumped the internal economic expansion
of the EAP, at least as far as the white settlers were concerned.
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Yet another issue of political significance was the British importation of Indian
laws in the governance of the EAP. The document stated that the “East Africa
Protectorate is governed as if it were a province of India, and a large number of Indian
ordinances are applied to it. Apart from the fact that in some cases the whole and in
some, parts, of these Ordinances are inapplicable to East Africa, there is the greatest
objection in principle to placing white men under laws intended for a coloured
population despotically governed.”179 The Association document elaborated on those
perceived discrepancies that existed between the manners in which whites were treated
in India and East Africa, noting that “it is applied with more vigour to East African
colonists than to European British subjects in India.”180
The association membership also believed that they were unfairly taxed insofar as
they were not afforded proper representation through any meaningful establishment of
self-governance. The section of the demands titled “Taxation without representation”
stated:
Next to the colonists’ objections to the laws of the Protectorate, though of
equal importance, is their objection to the present method of administration.
That method may be described shortly as taxation without representation. Such
a principle is, of course, alien to the British constitution, and is tolerated only in
newly-organized territories until the number of white colonists justifies the gift of
self-government. But between one-man government and self-government the
enlightened policy of His Majesty’s Colonial Office has provided many
intermediate stages. We would respectfully claim, Sir, that the advent of
European colonists into East Africa justifies the bestowal upon them of some
share in the Administration of their affairs. If the Imperial Exchequer
contributes a quarter of a million per annum, the burden of taxation borne by
each colonist is far greater per head than that borne on account of East Africa by
each Imperial taxpayer.181
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Therefore, even when it came to questions of taxation, the white settlers were of
the opinion that their skin color automatically entitled them to exemptions and special
considerations. Also on the economic front, the association members decried the ten
percent value added duty and other fees they were required to pay on imports,182 as well
as the use of the Indian rupee as an EAP currency in lieu of the British pound.183 The
European settlers were for no taxation without representation and currency regulation
for their own economic gains.
One way in which the white settlers might introduce these change was through
the facilitation of a transition of the EAP into a British crown colony, provided the
changes made in the implementation of it were made with the consent and concurrence
of the majority of the white colonists, naturally.184 The association membership was also
concerned about the deployment of black and Indian police185 and military throughout
the EAP. In the document, the members expressed their desire to supplement this
colored force “by raising a so-called Volunteer Reserve, consisting of white colonists,
and official employes [sic].”186
Especially insofar as the troop contingents went, the overall fear of the
indigenous black population in uniform and armed was clearly stated in the document:
“Upon this state of facts, the first suggestion we would throw out is, that in dealing with
the aboriginal black races such as those to be met in East Africa, it is much the wiser
policy, having regard to results, as well as much the less costly, to use white instead of
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black troops. A small number of high-class, well-paid white troops will yield far better
results, and have a much more moral effect, than a large number of blacks.”187 What the
white settlers wanted His Majesty’s Government to do in order to carry out such changes
in the police and military structure of the EAP was to place effective command under
“Burgher Councils,” as similarly implemented in South Africa, of course. With this
system in place, every white male between sixteen and sixty would be “liable for military
service in his own district when called upon.”188 The white leadership realized that any
coloreds under arms, especially blacks, even police and military, posed a severe threat to
white hegemony. If their agenda was going to succeed, gaining control of both the police
and military was essential. With regard to possible native uprisings, the document
contained this prophetic statement: “The employment of blacks by the Government as
soldiers and police to deal with white settlers is absolutely fatal to the maintenance of
white prestige among natives, and must seriously hasten the day of black rebellion. We
stand practically on the edge of a human volcano, which may at any time burst forth in
uncontrollable eruption and destroy us. The day of that eruption no one can foresee, it
may be today, it may be tomorrow, or it may be come years hence, but that it will come
is an absolute certainty.”189
In addition to this fantastic prediction, the association also demanded that more
be done to protect and enhance the mining industry throughout the protectorate, as well
as provide non-official Europeans moderate rates for treatment at government
hospitals; and as for destitute Europeans, their health care would be free. The
association members also complained about the smaller fees for game licenses paid by
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government officials.190 That was not all; however, they wanted to also limit the freedom
of the Africans. Even in the area of semi-autonomous closed districts on some tribal
lands, the association demanded a curtailing of black rights. With respect to these
“closed districts,” the document declares: “We feel, Sir, that it is not in the interest of the
Government, nor in that of the settlers, that any districts or provinces should be closed
owing to the inability of the Government to give protection to white traders and others.
Not only is such an action a sign of weakness and fraught with danger of loss of prestige,
but it is also a direct injury to the trade and revenue of the country. In the ‘closed
districts’ at the present time the savage is permitted to follow his own instincts and
customs, and to disregard all civilized methods of law and order.”191 This was nothing
but a disguised land grab. Any perceived “acts of savagery” might be construed as just
cause for land appropriation by the white settlers resulting in further land alienation of
the blacks.
As clearly indicated in the document, moreover, the colonists believed in the
social contract theory, i.e. that government should act upon the “wishes of the
governed.” The governed, in this case however, referred only to white people. The
colonists wanted to impress upon the CO the importance of developing the EAP as a
white man’s colony. This, they believed, would ensure a bright future for the
protectorate’s conversion to a self-supporting crown colony replete with valuable trade
and “magnificent possibilities.” The colonists felt that the CO was not doing all it could
to tap into the full range of options that could make this miracle of progress happen
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under their watch. To make this happen, the CA came up with above-cited suggestions
that can be summarized as follows:
1. Adequate and readily available markets needed to be established. This could
be done through the subsidizing of a steamship line and the already existing
railway. In addition, inclusion in the South African Customs Union would be
helpful.
2. The laws of white settlement should be amended to reflect English common
law. Their situation was not analogous to the British presence in India, so
any so-called “Indian codes” need not apply to the EAP.
3. Actual English currency was needed to replace the existing Indian currency
then circulating throughout the EAP.192
4. Some measure of participation in the actual government of the EAP was
required insofar as the colonists paid license fees, rates and court fees. In
other words, “No taxation without representation.” To that end, the
conversion of the protectorate into a crown colony would necessitate the
creation of a Legco which at first would be imbued with limited powers of
representation, but whose authority would expand over time as more white
settlers arrived.
5. The military and police forces needed reorganization. The colonists did not
believe that the military or police were providing enough protection for the
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white population, who were supposedly living in constant fear of
extermination by the natives.
6. To develop the mineral wealth of the country, a Department of Mining needed
to be created.
7. The officials appointed by the CO should no longer enjoy special privileges
over any other whites in the country, i.e. no special attention at hospitals or in
the granting of game licenses at the expense of the settler class.
While the motives of the CO in the EAP sought to be consistent with the noble
aspirations of the British imperialists in London, the motives of the CA in the
protectorate were solely self-serving. The bold advances by the CA were solely in line
with the promotion of their narrow political and economic interests, riding rough over
the concerns of the Africans and Asians in the protectorate, only usurping a doctrine of
white racial superiority to justify their future brutality and exploitation. It did not
matter what these peoples desired for themselves, those in the CA thought that they
knew what was best for them. The European settler wanted the Africans and Asians to
simply work for them. This is the crux of the dichotomy that existed between the CO
and the CA. Of course, while both parties were in agreement that European civilization
and norms should prevail in the EAP, the CO wanted to protect the rights of all His
Majesty’s subjects while the CA wanted to squeeze them for all they were worth. That
was the reason why the newcomers put their demands on paper for the CO.
The receipt of the CA demands at the CO began the process of consideration by
the imperial government. Before the CO was prepared to make any comment or
decision, however, they had to wait the views of the leadership of the CS. This process
was complicated by the death of Stewart, and thus it was two months later before the CO
133

received the assessment of Jackson who acted as commissioner after Stewart’s demise.
Jackson’s dispatch, enclosed comments from other leading administrators in the EAP,
such as C. W. Hobley, John Ainsworth, and M. P. Espie.
In his cover letter, of November 11, 1906, Jackson noted: “I have treated several
of the questions in very plain language as I wish to urge that the greatest caution be
exercised before any radical changes are adopted in the Administration of the
country.”193 Jackson immediately recognized that some of the demands were
reasonable, but most of them were not. This was especially true in light of the fact that
most of the settlers had not been resident in the protectorate for any significant amount
of time to be qualified in making such demands.194 Insofar as the “possibilities”
inherent in the economic and political development of the EAP were concerned, Jackson
was quick to recognize this reality; but did not agree with the timetable advanced by the
association. Jackson stated that, “I believe, now (it is) generally recognized that East
Africa is no country for a man to settle in unless he has sufficient money to enable him
to tide over the period which he cannot reasonably expect a return on his capital
outlay.”195 Jackson felt strongly that the majority of white settlers who had arrived so
far were having too many difficulties due to the harsh realities they encountered.
Regarding these settlers, Jackson stated “it is such people that form the majority,
and are easily led by a few agitators into the belief that the Administration is responsible
for their lack of success. It is the country, not the defects in the Administration, that is
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responsible.”196 As far as the alleged “lack of progress” being made in the protectorate,
Jackson wrote that, “It is now three years since white settlers began to come into this
country in any numbers, but with very few expectations they have contributed little or
nothing towards its progress, and so far as they are themselves concerned they overlook
two very important factors in which most of them are deficient – means and enterprise
– and without a small amount of both a man need not settle in East Africa with any hope
of success.”197 Jackson was puzzled by the Association’s incessant demands for opening
markets in South Africa while totally neglecting even a mention of the European
markets. In addition, railway rates had already been lowered on various commodities
also being produced by the colored population. The competition from the Africans and
Indians in the markets of maize and potatoes had already resulted in pushing some
whites out of these crops insofar as the profit margin was slim.198
Of course, “taxation without representation” was a big issue for the association.
Their basis for a greater political say in the state of the protectorate’s affairs was based
on their supposed payment of taxes, thus earning the right to more political
participation. However, Jackson dismissed this with the following remark: “I do not
consider that we have yet reached the stage at which representative government is
necessary or advisable. The white settlers pay no direct taxes of any kind, and it appears
unreasonable for them to demand the gift of self-government so long as they contribute
so little, and the Imperial Exchequer so much in the form of a grant-in-aid.”199
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In this “pay to play” atmosphere, it seems like the CA members did not even
possess a hand that they could ante up with. However, Jackson did not totally rule out
the idea. Nevertheless, he made clear the terms under which such a legislative body
could be constituted:
I am of opinion that a Legislative Council or Advisory Board would be beneficial
to the interests of the country. This Council should consist of a few of the senior
Government officials, and I would not object to one or at the most two unofficial
members being included. I do not, however, consider that it would be wise to
allow the settler the right of choosing the non-official members. That privilege
should rest with the Secretary of State. I see no reason why gentlemen with large
interests at stake who have really done something to benefit and help develop the
resources of the protectorate, should not have a voice in the administration of the
country.200
Being intimately familiar with the protectorate, it is not surprising that with regard
to all of the Association demands, but particularly taxation and representation, Hobley
was in agreement with Jackson. He wrote
There are probably few countries in the world where the European inhabitants
contribute so little to the cost of the administration: no income tax, house tax or
land tax is levied, and undoubtedly when the colonists attain greater prosperity
one could with equity ask them to submit to slightly heavier taxation.
To turn to the question of representation: while the administration of the
Protectorate is so largely dependent on the Treasury grant-in-aid, I consider that
the claim of the colonists to participate in the control of the finances is not
reasonable, but at this time I see no harm in the formation of a council of advice
composed of the senior members of the administration and a few representative
members of the unofficial community who would be chosen not by reason of their
having the loudest voices but on the basis of having the largest interest at
stake.201
Hobley also concurred with Jackson that in all probability, the association
demands were not at all representative of the views held by the majority of the white
settler community. He believed that among this cohort there were certainly a number of
Ibid.
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“hardworking honest men” who did not identify themselves with the South African
agitators and who, at the same time, held no sympathy for them.202 Hobley wrote
concerning the settler community at large, allaying any fears they might have: “The
officials of the administration are not antagonistic to the settler community. All they ask
is that the settlers will cooperate with them in a liberal spirit and assist them to further
the progress of the country by just treatment of the natives and in other ways. European
and native interests are not really in opposition. The natives are not in overpowering
numbers considering the size of the country, and there is space for both. Moreover, the
various tribes have neither common ties nor fanaticism which would induce them to
combine against the white men.”203
The minutes of John Ainsworth were also generally reflective of the opinions of
both Jackson and Hobley insofar as the association demands. On the point of the
formation of a legislative council, Ainsworth added:
The petitioners demand a share in the government of the country- which at
present is entirely in the hands of the Commissioner. They profess that they
would be satisfied with a Legislative Council in which officials were in the
majority provided the minority were chosen with the consent and concurrence of
the majority of the white colonists.
This could only be carried out by some system of election, and this I think is to be
deprecated.
As Mr. Hobley points out, the claim of the white settlers to representation is not
strong from a financial point of view. He estimates that only some 2,500 pounds
out of 82,000 pounds raised by taxation is paid by the white colonists.
Nevertheless, and in spite of the additional work and worry caused to the officials
of the Protectorate by the introduction of a Constitution it may probably be well
to introduce a Legislative Council with unofficial nominated additional members.
It should not be too large and probably four officials, two unofficial nominated by
the Crown for five years, with the Commissioner or Acting Commissioner will do
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for a start.204
It is to say that what the officials in the EAP thought and suggested at that time would
not stop the settlers from pressing for more political concessions. They wanted a fully
recognized participation in the administration of the region.
The reply of the CO to the settlers did not come until much later in the
administration of Sadler. It was contained in a dispatch to the commissioner, and
clearly indicated that the settlers had run into a dead end insofar as dealing with the CO
was concerned. The secretary of state systematically shredded all of the colonists’
suggestions, leaving them with a sunken feeling of desperation. But more on this will be
covered in the chapter dealing with the Sadler administration.
Conclusion
The East Africa Protectorate was a purely political construct that for a few
moments in time had to deal with a large influx of white settlers, largely from relatively
nearby South Africa. These settlers formed the Planters’ and Farmers’ Association in
1903, that one year later became reorganized as the CA. At first, the membership was
largely concerned with the export of maize and potatoes. But under the leadership of
Lord Delamere and other racist firebrands, the CA soon became a revolutionary voice
for “no taxation without representation,” ultimately pressing its list of demands all the
way to the secretary of state in London in August of 1905. The Association was trying to
take advantage of the administrative transition of the protectorate’s control from the FO
to the CO, where they hoped to find a more receptive ear. Unfortunately for the
colonists, their list of demands was deemed almost laughable in London. The officials in
John Ainsworth, Minutes on the Address from the Colonists’ Association to the Secretary of State for
the Colonies, no date, CO 533/5. Ainsworth also believed that an executive council should be formed,
consisting only of officials.
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London probably wondered how such a small group of settlers could be so audacious as
to present a list that not only alienated British subjects of color, but reserved to
themselves special privileges solely based on the whiteness of their skin. The boldness of
the settlers’ demands echoed to such a level that the humanitarian groups in England
started to wonder about the question of the need to watch how the EAP was being
administrated. It was manifest the European settlers intent to monopolize power in the
EAP was an unrealistic move.
The colonists were out of step with the prevailing attitudes of their day; and as a
consequence, their days in the EAP were already numbered. Nevertheless, these
European settlers that Churchill described as “political animals” would not accept the
reality on the terrain. They decided to put up a fight and stand for their rights, in that
instance, they undertook frequent agitations. They did not hesitate to harshly criticize or
threaten the serving officials, the commissioner or the governor. They went on to even
use violence against the local population. These illegitimate and unjustified tactics from
the settlers’ camp brought a new dilemma worthy of consideration. The EAP needed a
stable administration in a healthy political climate in order to focus on tackling the main
issue of how to turn the protectorate profitable. However, after Eliot’s tenure followed
by Stewart’s brief term and the mounting demands of the European settlers, the crucial
issue was how to again find a strongman, capable of administrating the protectorate
effectively under the CO supervision. Appointing the right man for the task could only
be done after an objective evaluation of Stewart’s short administration of the
protectorate. Lessons drawn from his term as commissioner could serve as valid
indicator when choosing a new man for a job rendered difficult by the presence of the
few turbulent European settlers that Eliot invited in the protectorate.
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Chapter 4
The age of conflicts and failures in Sadler’s administration, 1906-1909:
European settlers’ violations of the Africans’ rights and intense political
agitations in the EAP
Introduction

Sir James Hayes Sadler was
the EAP’s third commissioner
and first governor. None of
Sadler’s prior assignments
would prepare him for
working with the emerging
white settler group in the
EAP. His inability to work
with the settlers defined his
governorship. As already
noted in earlier chapters, the
expatriates were ever
Image 6: Sir James Hayes Sadler. Source: Mungeam, British Rule Kenya,
152.

demanding. Most of them
hailed from the rebellious

South Africa, where respect for indigenous rights was nonexistent. Like the two
commissioners that preceded him, Sadler would try to strike a balance between the
wishes of the CO and the interests and the white settlers in the region. That he failed to
do so left a significant impact on Kenyan history.
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During this period the ringleaders of the settlers, Grogan and Delamere, brought
troubles to the administration of the protectorate. Two major incidents shook Sadler’s
administration. One was a case of a flagrant violation of the rights of some African
workers. The other was an attempt to organize resistance and thereby depose the
governor. Grogan staged a flogging of his workers in 1907, and the following year labor
troubles reach its peak with Delamere orchestrating a mass action response from the
settlers pressuring the governor not to enforce the new labor rules. With the intense
political climate prevailing in the region, issues like the implementation of the land bill
and labor regulations dragged on. It was an era of continuous agitations and conflicts
between the settlers and the administration that kept the CO as well as the officials in
the protectorate at bay. The EAP’s reputation of being the most troublesome
dependency of the British Empire was well justified. With the actions of the European
settlers, the stage was set for the debate about the very essence of impunity and the
meaning of crime and punishment in a partisan political context. The European settlers
made a resounding political mark in the history of region which traces are still visible in
the Kenya of today.
The appointment of Sadler: A familiar face in the EAP
Stewart’s brief tenure left numerous unresolved issues for the next commissioner
to deal with. While Stewart did manage to secure African reserves for the Maasai, his
military forays against the Nandi and Embu, as well as plans for further adventurism in
the protectorate and possibly beyond, set off alarms among his political superiors back
in London. The bombastic and imperialist image created by these raids was the cause
of embarrassment for the Empire. The CO would have preferred a low-profile
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commissioner, a rubber stamp for their more enlightened and humanitarian policies.
This is where Sir James Hayes Sadler came to the fore.
Sadler had a military background, too; but he wasn’t a glory hound who made
waves in the bureaucracy. He was content to carry out orders as given. Therefore, he
was viewed by the powers that be in London as the perfect fit for the next EAP
commissioner. With proven field experience in India, Somaliland and Uganda, the CO
believed they finally found a man they could trust. From 1901, Sadler provided
commendable service to the Crown as commissioner in neighboring, but smaller, landlocked Uganda. Of course, Uganda’s climate is more tropical and does not lend itself
readily to white settlement. Therefore, this was really more a caretaking position minus
the overwhelming political intrigue generated by a white settler class.
Stewart passed away only six weeks prior to Sadler’s assumption of command in
December 1905. Of interest to note, the EAP provinces of Kisumu and Naivasha had
been administrative jurisdictions of Uganda up until their transfer in 1902, and
therefore it is not unreasonable to assume that CO authorities looked favorably upon
Sadler’s dealings with these provinces and their smooth transition to the EAP under his
watch. The CO was cognizant of Sadler’s excellent work with Eliot in redefining the
western frontier of the EAP with the incorporation of both Kisumu and Naivasha. By
the time that Sadler actually assumed command as commissioner of the EAP on 12
December 1905, he already had some detailed knowledge of the operational duties of a
commissioner as well as some dealings with internal EAP matters and policies from his
close work with Eliot in fixing new borders between the EAP and Uganda.205
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British colonial administrators and contemporaries of Sadler perceived him as
an older gentleman with charming qualities.206 However, this would not be enough in
dealing with the many problems engendered by white colonization in the EAP. In his
unpublished autobiography, A. C. Hollis wrote that, “Colonel Hayes Sadler differed from
both his predecessors. He was, it is true, a soldier such as Sir Donald Stewart; but,
whereas the latter had seen much active service, Colonel Hayes Sadler’s career had been
in the Indian Staff Corps and in the Foreign Department of the Government of India.”207
Further elaborating on Sadler, at another point in his autobiography Hollis goes on to
remark that, “He was very industrious, kind and hospitable, but weak and vacillating,
and quite unable to cope with unruly settlers.”208
As we shall notice as the chapter develops, no love was lost between Sadler and
the white settler community. Lady Delamere, taking a cue from her volatile and verbose
husband, once referred to Sadler as “Flannelfoot,” a name attached to weakness and
indecisiveness that would haunt him for the rest of his life. A commissioner needed to
be resolute in carrying out the policies of the CO. If he cannot fulfill this role, then he
could follow Eliot’s course of white settler advocacy. Remaining a fence sitter got a
commissioner nowhere. But most of all, it would certainly not garner him respect from
any quarter.209
The CO, in taking into account the prevailing situation in the protectorate and
Sadler’s prior experience, had high hopes that he would be the right man for handling all
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of the onerous tasks ahead. W. D. Ellis of the CO, a former New College scholar, was
greatly influenced by humanitarian concerns and the prevailing liberal sentiments of the
age. In his minutes on dispatches from the EAP, he warned the incoming commissioner
Sadler about the dubious intentions of white settlers pouring in from South Africa. He
did not believe that the white settlers had the best interest of the British Empire at heart
in their vocalizations to create a “white man’s country” out of the EAP. Rather, he saw
these settlers as political opportunists and greedy land grabbers, certainly uncaring for
any indigenous rights. In other words, all the talk about a “white man’s country” and
“civilization” were just talk, a pretext for pushing out the Africans and creating another
“Natal” out of the best lands of the EAP.210 Ellis’ evaluation of the situation was right
because Delamere, who until Sadler’s arrival was the leader of the settlers, firmly
expressed the common aspirations of the CA.
In 1906, Lord Delamere resigned as president of the CA and Frank Watkins took
over. That change in the leadership position within the CA did not mean a change of
mentality or agenda when it came to the settlers’ determination in promoting their
interests. Frank Watkins stated that: “In unity and rectitude lies our strength”211 while
Delamere, the outgoing president was firm in his belief that the protectorate needed his
fellow expatriates for any hope of economic development. Before leaving the CA
presidency, Delamere concluded that: “in time it will be found that without the white
colonists this country would stagnate and possibly degenerate into a black man’s
country.”212 That was quite a statement because the EAP was a black man’s country and
could only remain as such, regardless the nature of the European expatriates’ political
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aspirations. The settlers that Sadler was about to deal with were well organized and
knew how to use their influence even in England.213 Sadler probably looked at this new
assignment as just another line in his resume. He apparently ignored the CO officials’
warnings, just expecting to clock in some time and then move on to a plusher position
elsewhere in the far-flung empire whence the sun never sets.
If Sadler had paid closer attention to Ellis, he perchance may have avoided many
of the obstacles that the white settlers would place in his path. Ellis’ also indicated
conflicts that existed between the CO and the FO over EAP white settler policy.214
Clearly, Sadler had no idea of the hornet’s nest he was about to bump into. Ellis,
working in the CO, decried that the office was not doing enough to adopt a policy for the
EAP that would secure the rights of Africans and Indians already there.215 As far as the
white population was concerned, Ellis did not believe that the EAP could sustain more
than 3,000, but mostly of the capitalist class.216 If Sadler was going to advance any
white interests, in Ellis’ opinion it should be those of the planters, and not the small
settlers. In the CO’s EAD, Ellis took note of the consistent record of failure on the part
of the small settlers in developing commercially successful enterprises in the EAP. All
the small settlers did was whine to various colonial authorities as to their everincreasing demand for government services and cheap labor. Ellis clearly understood
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that the EAP could not logically be compared to Australia and New Zealand, these then
considered as “white man’s countries.”217
Nevertheless, he turned to them in search of various and appropriate models of
policy and legislation for Sadler’s consideration. This would definitely lead the
protectorate in the wrong direction, insofar as taking workable policies from other parts
of the Empire and assuming that they would have equal applicability and efficiency
when applied to any other random region under British governance. Clearly, the EAP
had its own set of unique problems that needed to be addressed with engaging policies.
If the situation on the ground was relatively tranquil, then Sadler could have
probably put together a set of policies with something to satisfy all of the classes
concerned by borrowing, as it were, snippets from other crown colonies’ policies and
legislations that had proven successful. After all, he had done so in Uganda, albeit with
a much smaller white presence. In the case of the EAP, however, Sadler would be faced
with an entirely different set of problems, particularly in defining new sets of policies
appropriate for facilitating a better, overall administration.
In attempting to achieve this, Sadler found that apart from the many military
commitments that he inherited from Stewart, it was the domestic affairs of the
protectorate that would take up most of his time and tax his administrative abilities to
the utmost degree. To address the internal issues, it was necessary for Sadler to work
ever more closely with the CO in the task of formulating new and appropriate policies
for the protectorate.218 One hindrance that Sadler faced in establishing new policies that
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would find concurrence in the CO were the incessant and ever increasing demands of
the white settlers.
Although the white colonists were small in number, they were the “squeaky
wheel” that pushed the CO to shine a bigger than usual spotlight on the affairs of the
protectorate. By the time that Sadler had assumed command in the protectorate on 12
December 1905, the official address and demands of the CA had already been forwarded
to the CO, along with the attached commentary from various officials of the EAP.219 In
addition, CO S of S Lyttleton was himself aware of the settlers’ demands, having read
them in London newspapers in August 1905, one month before receiving the official
copy of the CA address as an attachment to the 18 October 1905 correspondence from
Jackson.220
Of course, Jackson, who took charge in the EAP upon Stewart’s death, in his
correspondence succeeded in placing the CA demands in their proper perspective. He
noted that the association’s declared views, for the most part, were unrepresentative of
the majority of white settlers arriving in the EAP, being mostly reflective of the more
outspoken South African contingent. In addition, Jackson pointed out that while there
were approximately 600 known white settlers in the EAP, the CA counted on a
membership of approximately 200. And even of these, there was most likely some
dissension in the ranks with regard to the formulation of various demands.221
Jackson also believed that it would be totally unfair for the CO to place any
inordinate measure of consideration to the association’s demands insofar as the Empire
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must forever be cognizant of its vast amount of colored subjects in the formulation of
policies, if for nothing else but to be fair. In the EAP he cited the following demographic
for 1905: 8,000 to 10,000 Indians and 2,000,000 to perhaps 4,000,000 Africans. How
politically expedient would it be to formulate policies that favored maybe 200 recently
settled whites, mostly from South Africa, over the interest of millions of other crown
subjects? Who would be calling the shots in the EAP, the CO in London or very small
cohort of disgruntled settlers?222
To Jackson’s reasonable voice were added those of other stalwarts in the EAP,
Ainsworth and Hobley.223 All three concurred with Jackson’s expressed view that, “To
endeavor by legislation or otherwise to make any portion of this country exclusively a
white man’s country is in our opinion doomed to failure. There is a great future before
East Africa, but it is as a mixed race country.”224 In addition, the EAP administrators
also found themselves in agreement concerning white settler political representation,
i.e. that it should be limited solely to an advisory capacity or what Hobley referred to as
a “Council of Advice.”225 Hobley took this position because he felt it was in the Crown’s
interest to defend the rights of His Majesty’s African subjects against certain white
settlers to the EAP arriving with less than pure intentions. He described these as
nothing more than “adventurers and speculators.”226 Ainsworth even felt that these
settlers should be restricted to the lands they already held, not being permitted to
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encroach on other EAP lands which rightly should remain under the control of the
administration in order to safeguard them for future development by the African
peoples and the peaceful development of the protectorate on its path to one day
becoming a crown colony.227 However, no matter what concessions could have been
granted to the white settlers, they could always be counted on to continually press more
demands for the attainment of political power.
Sadler may not have been fully cognizant of the CO’s concerns regarding this
matter, but in less than one month since he stepped into office, he became well aware of
the CO’s concerns regarding the association. Back in London, Ellis heartily supported
the recommendations of Jackson, Hobley and Ainsworth. There was no way in Ellis’
estimation that the EAP was going to evolve into some kind of white man’s country like
Australia or New Zealand. If anything, it might eventually emerge as a mixed racial
community, something akin to some of His Majesty’s Caribbean colonies. And since
African people would always be the majority population bloc in the EAP, it would be
foolhardy for the crown to allow the protectorate to be ruled by a “handful of white
settlers.”228
The small group of white settlers present in the EAP was seeking wealth and
power. They were impatient and unhappy with the pace with which the local
government and the CO were handling their primary demand- the implementation of a
representative government. The settlers expected Sadler to be sympathetic to their
pleas, despite the fact that Sadler had to answer to the CO. They wanted a pro-settler
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commissioner reminiscent of Eliot. They wanted a commissioner who would cater to
them; although “it had long been established that major policy initiatives, whether
involving legislative or administrative action, had to be approved by the S of S.
Moreover, the CO often laid out general policy to be followed and suggested the
administrative aims to be accomplished, for example on appointment of a new governor,
in the colonies it supervised.”229 Sadler knew that this was the policy and it was his
responsibility to implement it. There were two issues of particular importance in the
EAP that presented challenges to his administration. These were land issues, specifically
the report of the land commission appointed by Stewart in October 1904, and the CO’s
response to the address of the CA of August 1905.
The Colonial Office, Sadler and the Settlers
After the appointment of Sadler as the new commissioner in the EAP, the longawaited response of the CO to the pro-settler land committee commissioned by Stewart
was issued from Downing Street on 23 March 1906. The dispatch conveyed the
observations of the S of S on the land report and on Stewart’s comments about the same
topic on 14 August 1905. The S of S, in his initial remarks, pointed out that the whole issue
of land in the protectorate had to be re-evaluated. To some extent, he considered some of
the land committee’s suggestions to be logical. However, Lord Elgin, the new Secretary of
State in Campbell-Bannerman’s Liberal government was not yet ready to give his full
pronouncements on many other issues regarding the potential development of the region.
With reference to the report, Elgin formally expressed to Sadler the following:
I recognize the care and ability shown in the compilation of this report and in many
points I am in agreement with the conclusions of the Committee. Thus, I fully
229
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concur in their recommendations that a survey of the Protectorate should be taken
in hand without delay; and, as you are aware, a large provision has been made in the
Estimates of next year for this service, and some of the surveyors selected for the
work will leave this country for East Africa in the course of the present month.
There are, however, other questions upon which I am unable, as at present
advised, to concur in the proposal of the Committee; and, having regard to the
immense importance to the future prosperity of the Protectorate of adopting a
right policy in questions related to land, I have decided to take no further action
in regard to those proposals pending the report of the officer whom it is proposed
to appoint under the title of Commissioner for Land, and whose selection I hope
to be able to announce to you at no distant date.230
Adding to his first remarks, Elgin stressed the necessity of enlarging the Survey
Department’s staff and also suggested the appointment of an assistant crown advocate.
The S of S believed that these changes would lead to the resolution of the delicate
question of land ownership in the protectorate.
As much as Elgin understood the many proposals of the committee, he could not
allow land to be allocated to the settlers insofar as he felt that they might be more inclined
to resell their properties than having to develop them. The settlers wanted all restrictions
on the transfer and forfeiture of land to be lifted. They claimed that government
interference on freedom of transfer discouraged many capitalists who might otherwise
invest in land without worrying about the insecurity of their acquired titles. Nevertheless,
the S of S had in mind the consequences of a laissez faire policy that would lead to a land
rush, inspired by nothing more than speculation and greed. He realized that his ultimate
responsibility was to the crown and to all its subjects. On the dangers of speculation, Elgin
expressed the following:
I would observe that while I am as anxious as the Committee can be to encourage
the settlement and development of the Protectorate by persons either of large or
small capital, I consider the evils of unrestricted speculation in land much more
230 The Secretary of State to the Commissioner, 23 March 1906, Papers Relating to British East Africa,
36.
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serious that the Committee appears to regard them as being. It is not merely the
question of the discreditable incidents which characterize the periods of inflated
speculation known as “land booms,” or the losses to individuals who happen to
purchase land at artificially enhanced prices. If this were all, the dangers referred to
might be incurred, as the Committee appears to suggest, in view of the advantage of
attracting settlers and capital to the country, even by speculative attractions
partaking of the nature of a lottery. But the evils of allowing land in a new country to
be transferred freely, without any regard to the intention of the transferee to utilize
within a reasonable time the resources of the land, are not confined to the period of
depression and stagnation which inevitably follows a time of inflated speculation,
but have a wider scope.231
In backing up his point, Elgin gave a brief history lesson to the land committee. He
emphasized the same point that Ellis made, warning that if land tenure was not well
supervised by the CO, the office could face the same problems of arbitrary land
alienation that occurred in Australia and New Zealand.
Elgin was cognizant of the reversed land policy that plunged Australia into a
country of land speculators dominated by influential colonists with unlimited power to
purchase large areas of land to divide them into smaller tracts for sale at higher prices.
The S of S argued that:
The policy of His Majesty’s Government in the first half of the last century was
directed towards restricting the alienation of land in Australia by imposing
conditions of tenure, such as cultivation of land or maintenance of a certain
number of labourers, by putting a comparatively high price (£1 an acre) on the
sale of lands in fee simple, and by granting leases only for short periods. The
policy was, however, strongly opposed by an influential section of the colonists,
especially by those who occupied large areas under temporary licenses, which
they wished to convert into freehold tenure. These persons fought for what was
known in New South Wales as the ‘three F’s’ : Fixed tenure, fixed rents and free
sales.232
Ibid., 37.
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Elgin realized that if unchecked, the EAP land market could be controlled by the
colonists to the disadvantage of the crown. The CO did not want to take any risk by
allowing the settlers of the EAP to indulge in land alienation for speculation. It was from
this point that Elgin considered that the land committee should have known better
before pushing for the relaxation of the terms under which land could be transferred in
the protectorate.
Regarding the settlers’ intent to repeat the patterns of land usurpation as it
transpired in Australia and New Zealand, the S of S surmised that he was not alone with
his views. Elgin reminded the committee to look into the recent past of those colonies.
He wrote: “I am not aware whether any members of the Committee have had occasion
to acquaint themselves with the history of the land question in Australasian Colonies;
but it appears to me that history contains some useful warnings for other countries in a
similar position.”233
The second issue of importance was related to the CO’s response to the address
of the CA of 23 August 1905. After considering this address, on 8 June 1906, Elgin
sent his response to Sadler who, in return, had to inform the settlers.234 Of the
demands presented by the European colonists, the most important of all was the one
addressing their political rights in the region and their participation in the
administration of the protectorate. But the deepest desire of the European settlers
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was to monopolize the whole political apparatus of the protectorate. Any degree of
political representation granted to the settlers would open the gate for yet more
demands. They considered the ultimate safeguard of their interests as existing only
within the context of the full attainment of political power. On this political matter,
Elgin informed Sadler:
The Association proceed in the next place to state their objections to the present
system of government, which they describe as one of taxation without representation,
and they claim that the advent of European Colonists into East Africa justifies the
bestowal upon them of some share in the administration of their own affairs. It does
not appear, however, that more than a small proportion of the revenue raised by
taxation in the protectorate is contributed by the European Colonists, and for other
reasons I do not consider that the time is ripe for the introduction of electoral
institutions. But I agree that it is desirable that the Officer Administering the
Government should be assisted by a Council in making laws, and I propose to advise
His Majesty to issue Letters Patent providing for the establishment of a Legislative
Council in which, although the Government would have a majority, there would also
be unofficial members appointed by His Majesty, who would be chosen to represent
as far as possible the different interests of the community.235

But as to the question of representation, there appeared to be some partial
condescension in the CO toward the settlers that the CA might be able to exploit at some
future date. While Read and Antrobus did not agree with most of the settler demands
and they did not want to cede power to “a handful of white settlers” to rule over millions
of Africans, they nevertheless believed that the crown should come part way in meeting
the settlers’ position in the establishment of a Legco with a minority of nominated
unofficial members.236 To the leadership of the CA, this was opening the way for them to
get their proverbial “foot in the door.”
Since Lyttleton was the retiring Secretary of State, reflecting the views of the
Conservative Party platform, he would naturally concur with both Read and Antrobus
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that the formation of such a Legco in the EAP was a reasonable one.237 Therefore, upon
the change of command at the CO, it was Lyttleton’s recommendation to Elgin that
Sadler be provided with instructions to create such a Legco in the EAP at the soonest
possible date.238 Inasmuch as the CO could not budge on any other of the CA demands,
it appears as though a faction in the office was willing to provide for some representative
outlet for the settlers, hoping that it would be enough to pacify them. Elgin, despite his
appointment under the new Liberal Party government, believed it would be permissible
to follow the Conservative Lyttleton’s recommendation insofar as such a Legco would
prove to be powerless and nothing but a token gesture. Therefore, Elgin instructed
Sadler to establish the council in the protectorate.239 Unfortunately, no one in the CO
solicited Sadler’s opinions about the council.240
This did not mean, however, that Sadler did not have his own ideas about the
establishment of a Legco. The local press was full of reports from London, reporting
that Churchill had suggested in the House of Commons that a Legco be created in the
EAP. Regardless of the CO not asking his opinion on the matter, Sadler took it upon
himself to share his thoughts on the subject with Elgin before any decision would be
reached so impacting his new role as the EAP commissioner.241 While Sadler was not
averse to the idea of a council, he suggested that unofficial members be precluded from
the exercise of any executive control. And he also maintained that there should be two
councils, an executive council formed solely of officials to advise the commissioner on
the application and execution of past enactments, especially concerning African affairs,
Mungeam, British Rule, 181-182.
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and a Legco to “discuss and advise His Majesty’s Commissioner in regard to all
ordinances and rules having the force of law, which it is proposed to enact, and if
necessary to obtain public opinion thereon.”242 In the Legco, he advocated for the
inclusion of both white settlers and Indians. However, he demonstrated a political
weakness when he pointed out his lack of experience in working with bi-racial councils
and requested that the CO provide him with information on the workings of such
assemblies in other parts of the Empire.243 Said Mungeam of Sadler’s letter to Elgin:
“Such an expression of ignorance, although no fault of Sadler’s, was scarcely a
propitious way for the new Commissioner to begin dealings with a Council, and his
words almost seemed to foreshadow trouble in the future. By the time Sadler’s dispatch
reached the Office, Elgin’s reply to the Colonists’ Address had already been drafted.
Sadler’s views thus had no bearing on the decision to create a Legislative Council, for the
decision had already been taken before his opinions were known.”244
The CO did, however, subsequently agree to Sadler’s proposal for the
establishment in the EAP of an executive council, probably as insurance in preventing
any of the CA members from gaining any executive control/authority. The CO also
stated that they did not believe that the protectorate was ready for elevation to the status
of a crown colony; but that Sadler’s title as commissioner should be upgraded to that of
“Governor,” by which he was eventually addressed.245
The settlers, no matter what they may have thought of the now “Governor”
Sadler, were pleasantly surprised at Elgin’s decision to create a legislative council in the
Ibid.
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protectorate.246 They formally expressed their gratitude to the S of S. From Nairobi on
19 July 1906, the honorary secretary of the CA, W. MacLellan Wilson, sent the following
note to Sadler to be forwarded to the Elgin. Wilson wrote: “Sir, I have the honour to
request that you would kindly communicate to His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State
for the Colonies the gratitude of this Association for the concessions which he has made
in answer to the Address sent by this Association on 23rd of August of last year.”247
A relative peace fell over the EAP for the remainder of the year and early into
1907. Elgin’s decree appeared to have the predicted calming effect on the white settler
class. But before such a deliberative body could be established in the EAP, an
unfortunate incident occurred in Nairobi against three Africans, inspired and carried
out by white supremacists within the settler community. As it will come to be shown, a
deep wedge was driven between Sadler and the settler community as the result of this
incident, creating a chasm that Sadler would never be able to breach. Whatever peace
there was in the EAP rapidly disintegrated before Sadler’s eyes. Radical, eccentric and
volatile settlers’ leaders like Grogan and Delamere were busy going about and mucking
up the waters. These two big men were political agitators who caused so many problems
for Sadler.
The politics of violence, the meaning of Grogan’s flogging of African servants in the EAP
In 1907 the EAP European settlers were still yearning for sufficient cheap labor
and political power. Their sense of superiority and what most of them had witnessed in
South Africa regarding the mistreatment of Africans and foreign workers drew them to
believe that they could break the law, if necessary, for their interests and without
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consequences. Such was the mentality of most of the settlers that represented the CA,
and that was reflected on the political stage of Nairobi, the now capital of the
protectorate.
In March 1907, Nairobi residents witnessed the violation of the rights of ordinary
Africans at the hands of Grogan. Abuses suffered by workers under the watch of greedy,
bad and bold employers were frequent. To the eyes of many expatriates who were
supremacists, these inhumane practices were normal and turned into a form of seasonal
tradition. In the EAP political agitations and violations of African rights from the
settlers’ camp often occurred during the month of March. It could be called the EAP
“political March madness tradition.” It was Ross who asserted that:
Attention has already been called to the fact that many excited actions by
European immigrants have taken place in the notoriously touchy months of
February, March or early in April. Psychologists might suggest that what is
specially wanted for Europeans in Kenya in the trying months is an emotional
outlet, such as dancing, theatricals and musical festivals, while for school
children an avoidance of examinations and a lightening of school routine should
be arranged. In the absence of some active measure of relief, preferably such as
may stimulate the artistic sensibilities, it will probably continue to be the case
that some slight contributory cause of worry may precipitate unbalanced massaction on the part of European immigrants.248
In other words, it might be seen as a type of seasonal affective disorder. As in the
history of Rome, when you build an empire, you need to know how and when to
entertain the masses to keep the people’s attention away from the political and
economic realities of the day. If not, frustrations could rise up and burst into an
uncontrollable firestorm.
In the EAP incidents like the flogging of African workers or mass protest from
the CA challenging the local government happened during the notorious month of
248
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March. Similarly in neighboring South Africa, where most of the settlers came from,
such was the prevailing situation. Harsh punishments were inflicted on defenseless
subjects of the crown.249 The political madness from the expatriates during the month
of March became a tradition in the EAP to the point that some high ranking officials
noticed it half a century after the opening of the protectorate. S of S Oliver Lyttleton
stated in 1954 that: “The political tangle here is baffling. Europeans with the low whisky
prices and high altitude pressures, are both irresponsible and hysterical. This is the
worst season of the year and even in normal times tempers are at their most brittle in
March. One cause of this rather disheartening irresponsibility of Europeans is that there
are no Unofficial Members of the Government. Elected European members are thus in a
permanent opposition and feel able to pound the government whenever they feel
nervous.”250 The often-reckless behavior of the white settlers was constant during these
periods. They were masters of disorder and chaos, always and zealously pressuring the
administration.
The colonists’ view of Africans and the officials was generally negative. Jackson,
the acting commissioner during Sadler’s leave, reported to the CO about the tense
climate that reigned in the protectorate and the attitude of the European settlers vis a
vis the Africans. His dispatch underlined the issue of Africans’ rights and the provision
of labor for the settlers. Jackson raised the question of human rights, labor provision
and morality summarizing all in these terms: “‘to deny the native any rights whatever’
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and that ‘the labourer shall be not a labourer but a helot, not a servant but a slave.’”251
These were concerns that raised attention among officials in the CO. Jackson’s dispatch
was in fact a reaction to the abuses suffered by simple African employees at the hands of
Grogan.
Captain E. S. Grogan was a familiar face in the EAP. He attained notoriety
across the British Empire through his 1898-1899 expedition from the Cape to Cairo.
This was the first time that a white man had traveled the total distance overland. But
what he saw on the journey left no good impression. He came to the stereotyped
conclusion that Africans were steeped in a “primitive savagery” to such a point that they
were literally beyond redemption. Unfortunately, his initial experience in Africa would
extend to and inform his career decisions and actions in the EAP, whence he arrived in
May of 1904 to engage in the running of a timber mill.252 Grogan had to prove himself
as a tough settler who would stand for the colonists cause to turn the protectorate
administration in their favor. Grogan did not hesitate in challenging the government of
the EAP.
On 15 March 1907, the new president of the CA instigated and led the public
flogging of three Kikuyu servants in front of the Nairobi Court House. As a prelude to
the incident, Grogan’s sister and a family friend took a rickshaw out to the Nairobi
hospital to visit with Grogan’s wife. According to the two women, the three Kikuyu who
were employed by Grogan as rickshaw drivers had been drinking heavily. On the way to
the hospital, the employees allegedly began to bounce the vehicle on purpose by running
it too quickly, thus tossing the passengers from side to side. The women then
Jackson to Colonial Office, 23 March 1907, CO 533/28.
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complained to the Africans. However, the Africans did not take too kindly to this, and
supposedly pulled the women roughly out of the rickshaw and let them walk the rest of
the way home, thus forcing them to abandon their plans of visiting the hospital.253
So when they arrived back home in Chiromo in the afternoon, Ewart Grogan
asked them why they did not go to the hospital as planned. The women related their
account of the Africans’ alleged rudeness; and Ewart went into a fit of rage. He grabbed
a whip and right away set out to find the Africans. However, by the time the sun had set,
he still had no luck in the search. But with the rising of the sun, the Africans had
reported to work on time. Grogan tied them up and locked them away while he ate his
breakfast and pondered what to do with them, automatically presuming them to be
guilty.254 After all, if two white women said they acted rudely towards them, then that
must be the absolute truth, Ewart Grogan reasoned.
Rather than take them to a judge for an impartial ruling, Grogan decided that it
was time for a little “vigilante” justice to be meted out. So he strolled over to a
neighbor’s house and informed him that it was his intention to take the young men into
the center of Nairobi and publicly flog them. He did not believe that the Nairobi
Magistrate would do anything to help him; so he was determined to take matters into
his own hands, punish the miscreants and thereby set an example for any other Africans
who might decide to step out of their place at some future time.255
It was about 9:30 a.m. when Grogan set out with his captives to downtown
Nairobi, reaching the front lawn of the Nairobi Court House approximately half an hour
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later. A curious crowd of about fifty whites gathered around Grogan and the Africans.
Of course, the whites in the crowd had immediately assumed the worst, noting that
Grogan was carrying a large hippopotamus-hide whip and that the Africans were in his
custody and tightly bound. All sorts of imaginings passed through the minds of the
white spectators who were anxious to see what Grogan was going to do to the Africans
with that whip.
Grogan briefly explained to them what the Africans had done, at least according
to his mind, and that he was going to flog them as an example and discouragement to
any other Africans who might dare offend any class of whites in the future. Grogan, to
his credit, at least informed the crowd that the Africans did not molest the women
sexually, but rather insulted them by their refusal to carry on with the task of taking
them to the hospital. If he had not clarified this matter, the crowd would probably not
have been satisfied until the Africans were lynched. 256
The commotion outside the courthouse attracted the attention of the magistrate
himself, E. R. Logan, who came out and tried to dissuade Grogan for going any further.
Nevertheless, Grogan was defiant. The whites in the crowd demanded justice and now
Grogan felt that he would lose face if he backed down and complied with the
magistrate’s wishes. Being shouted down, Logan quickly returned to the courthouse,
whence a police captain Smith emerged and walked over to Grogan and the assembled
mob. Smith forced his way through the crowd and made it through to where Grogan
was standing. He placed a hand on the arm with which Grogan was holding the whip,
and tried to persuade him that this would not be the way to settle the issue. The crowd
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was angry, however, and pushed the police captain away from Grogan and threatened to
harm him if he tried to stop Grogan from going through with the whipping of the Kikuyu
men. Being so outnumbered, Smith retreated. At this point, the three Africans were
lying prostrate and barebacked on the ground.257
Grogan, together with two fellow settlers, Bowker and Gray, took turns in
punishing the Africans. Each one received twenty-five lashes from the hippopotamushide whip, locally referred to as a “kiboko.” Grogan made sure that a Kikuyu translator
let the Africans, who also began to gather around this sorry site, understand what the
workers were being punished for and that this flogging was to serve as warning to “their
people that white men could not stand any impertinence to their women folk in any part
of the world.” Whether or not Grogan realized just how much global attention this
incident would generate, he made his point.258
Ewart Grogan was milking the incident to gain political advantage. In Nairobi, he
was a nominated member of the municipal committee and a visiting justice in the town’s
jailhouse. He was also one of the largest landowners in the EAP, a big man with a big
ego. Just two months previous to this incident, he was elected as the president of the
CA. For the time being, the association was merely a self-proclaimed representative
organ of the settler class and had no official government recognition. But Grogan had
higher ambitions for this group and his political status in the future of the protectorate.
From the dais of the association, Grogan took great pleasure in railing against the
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colonial government and he was going to parlay this incident for all the political gain he
could siphon from it.259
Grogan’s challenge to the status quo was a reaction to what he perceived as a
sluggish administration that failed to meet the settlers’ grievances. According to
Paice:
Grogan’s single biggest bone of contention with Whitehall was that the Colonial
Office had, by the end of 1906, done nothing to address the problems caused by
the Foreign Office having pursued a ‘policy of drift’ in the Protectorate. There
were still no signs in Britain of a public and categoric definition of whether the
country was to be principally governed with what were perceived as the interests
of the African population to the fore, as was the case in neighbouring Uganda;
or as a province of India; or as a territory which would continue to encourage
settlement by Europeans. This oversight not only caused considerable confusion
but triggered a competition for rights between the settlers, the Indians and the
African population that was to last for the fifty years of Grogan’s active political
career and beyond, to Independence.260
This was the incident that gave impetus to fears of any possible black uprising. A
survey of local newspaper columns in the months immediately following this incident
gave credence to the high priority that white settlers placed on getting the colonial
government to establish a greater degree of law and order in the protectorate. Basically,
this meant that the enforcement of the law would be highly subjective. Africans would,
therefore, suffer because of the law’s inordinate application and enforcement. There
were three settler concerns with respect to the issue of law and order: the elimination of
Indian jurisdiction, greater white control of the constabulary and increased settler
political representation through constitutional changes. All of these concerns focused
on the eventual transformation of the EAP into a “white man’s colony.” These are the
issues, of course, that Grogan, as the CA president, was most vocal about.
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As more women came to join their husbands as white settlers in the EAP, the
majority of the association membership, at least, was in agreement with Grogan that the
enactment of these policies would strengthen law and order throughout the protectorate
and provide their women folk with a greater sense of security. Seeing that they brought
their wives and daughters to this new land literally surrounded by millions of Africans,
they most likely reasoned that while it was probably the very least they could do, it was a
sufficient start. With regard to Indian jurisdiction, the crown determined that the EAP
was subject to the Indian penal codes as administered by the Court of Appeals from
Zanzibar. The settlers argued that this was inappropriate insofar as having any Indians
or Indian laws holding sway over any “white man’s country,” such as they perceived East
Africa to be.261 In April 1906, the CO had, in Shadle’s words, “extended to whites in East
Africa the right to trial by juries of their peers-their only peers being other non-official
white men.”262
The issue of greater white participation in the constabulary also harkened to the
maintenance of European superiority in the protectorate. If more whites were serving in
the constabulary, they could keep a more watchful eye on the activities of the African
policemen, or “native Askaris,” making sure that they were not even detaining any
Europeans, let alone arresting them, on any charges. And lastly, there was the matter of
increased white settler political representation. Of course, at the recommendation of
the CO, Sadler was authorized to grant this to the settlers to a limited degree. The
construct and nature of this legislative council would become a hot topic at the 23
January 1907 meeting of the CA, the same meeting where Grogan was elected president.
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Now Grogan felt he could push the envelope, so to speak, and force the hand of Sadler,
and the CO, in granting the fullest political accommodations. Clearly, the issues of law
and order in the EAP were contextualized in the concept of white racial superiority.263
Since the majority of these settlers hailed from South Africa, where a relatively small
white settler community maintained a strong racial code of punishment, it is not
surprising that the CA would press for the enactment of similar laws and practices.
Clearly floggings and corporal punishments in general had racial character as
indicator in the EAP and the entire British Empire. News reports of the flogging of
Africans or workers imported from Asia were commonplace in South Africa. The
Advertiser (Adelaide, SA: 1889-1931) reported on many of these occurrences. In one
edition, it stated that,
….a heated debate took place in the Commons yesterday on the motion of Mr.

V.P. Byles, liberal member of North Salford, disapproving of the action of Lord
Milner, when High Commissioner of South Africa and governor of the Transvaal,
in authorizing the flogging of Chinese miners, and on the amendment moved by
Mr. Winston Churchill, the Colonial Under Secretary, condemning in general
terms the flogging of Chinese as a breach of the law. The amendment invited the
House, in the interests of peace and conciliation in South Africa, to refrain from
censuring individuals. Mr. Byles, in submitting his motion, contended that if
Lord Milner’s action was condoned ‘every prancing pro-consul would be
encouraged to play the little autocrat.’ Mr. J. Chamberlain, amid much
interruption, brilliantly and passionately defended Lord Milner. He seathingly
denounced what he called the ‘persecution of a great public servant possessor of a
splendid record for a single error of judgment’. Lord Milner’s opponents were
vindictively trying to humiliate him, while they were afraid to impeach him. Mr.
Chamberlain explained that the suggestion for the infliction of corporal
punishment had come from Mr. Evans, the protector of Chinese in the Transvaal.
In that suggestion Lord Milner had verbally acquiesced. In conclusion, Mr.
Chamberlain characterised Mr. Churchill’s amendment as ‘cowardly and
contemptible, being framed to catch votes by attacking without naming Lord
Milner.’ Mr. Winston Churchill stated that it was clear that Lord Milner had been
guilty of a grave dereliction of public duty in sanctioning illegal flogging. While
263
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admiring the moderation of Mr. Byles’ motion the Under Secretary of the
Colonies the practical utility of formally censoring a man who had ‘served the
Empire strenuously, faithfully, and disinterestedly, and who is now merely a
retired Civil servant without a pension or even gratuity’. Besides it was contrary
to usage to censure a man unheard. Was it worth the while of a strong party to
pursue him further? If the motion was passed it would aggravate the social and
racial animosities prevalent in South Africa.264
From this account, it is clear that news of what was happening in South Africa
was not being contained there. On London’s part, efforts to monitor and constrain the
imposition of corporal punishments in the colonies arose out of the parliamentary
debates that swirled around prison reform in the British Isles throughout the 1890s.
Joseph Chamberlain, S of S from 1895 to 1903, was particularly concerned about the
political repercussions that might arise from the excessive use of corporal punishments
both at home and abroad in the colonies and protectorates. Chamberlain held the
opinion that should punishments have to be imposed, the treatment of offenders
overseas should not deviate too far from those practices that prevailed on the home
turf.265
Of particular concern to the colonial secretary were the reports of extreme
punishments emanating from South Africa. Chamberlain was particularly drawn to a
flurry of cases from the Natal Province that had reached his desk in London. In these
cases, it was apparent that corporal punishment was being more freely resorted to than
in the United Kingdom. Chamberlain was clearly disheartened by this. He commented
that, “there has been in some instances perhaps a tendency rather to widen than to
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contract the scope of its application…. There is apt to grow up a perverted public
opinion satisfied with keeping order by the lash.”266
The political repercussions Chamberlain had in mind transcended other aspects
of the flogging and larger issue of corporal punishment. For while such corporal
methods may have seemed both effective and inexpensive, other issues rose to
prominence when the “offenders are for the most part of a different race and colour
from those who are placed in a position to control and to punish them,” and also where,
“there were not the ‘checks and safeguards’ against abuses which exist in more highly
developed countries.”267
In other words, the issue of race was the elephant in the room that very few were
willing to recognize; so Chamberlain has to be credited with at least having the fortitude
to come out and frankly admit it. Chamberlain hesitated to use the race card as a
pretext for giving license to “men of rough fiber”268 in administering the laws of the
empire in her far-flung possessions and territories. After all, perception is just as
important a factor as reality itself. A flogging may serve to restore a modicum of
discipline and order in a colony, but the long range effects spanning a global empire
could prove disastrous.
Chamberlain would have to address the issue of flogging again in 1902, after he
reissued his 1897 directive, but offered draft legislation that reduced the number of
strokes that could be awarded under any sentence of flogging. In the intervening years
since his 1897 directive, the colonial secretary was unable to restrict the frequency of the
punishment. His new strategy was therefore going to be one of reducing its severity.
Ibid.
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His new and so-called “Flogging Regulation Ordinance” reset the number of strokes that
could be applied to 24 as the maximum punishment to be inflicted for either single or
combined offenses. No prisoner could receive more than 24 strokes of the lash. And the
only one having the authority to implement this punishment would be the colonial
governor, with females being exempt from all forms of capital punishment
whatsoever.269
David M. Anderson notes that:
By the time this Ordinance was applied to Kenya (then the EAP), there were
already other laws in place permitting corporal punishments. The Indian Penal
Code, which was applied in East Africa from 1897, contained wide-reaching
provisions for corporal punishments. The power of corporal punishment was
originally given to the courts under the Native Courts Regulations of 1897,
section 72. The terms of this legislation now seem chillingly severe: floggings of
40 lashes and more were not uncommon, and multiple punishments might be
allotted to a single prisoner. In the Chief Native Court, punishments up to 100
lashes were sanctioned. Without a proper prison system in place, ‘the kiboko (a
whip made of hippopotamus hide) was regarded as the ordinary corrective
measure to be generally applied in all cases where the delinquent was a native.270
Overall in the EAP, however, social and racial animosities existed only due to the
presence of the European colonists who came from South Africa. The concern of the CO
was to avoid the violation of the Africans’ rights in the protectorate. Nevertheless when
there were violations like in the case of Grogan’s flogging of his servants, no effective
sanctions were taken, at least in a timely manner. The reality concerning the violations
against Africans was downplayed in the EAP. The High Court had become so concerned
with floggings that “were still at times unnecessarily awarded” in the EAP that by 1912
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Chief Justice Hamilton issued a strongly worded circular to all magistrates on the
subject and corporal punishment in general, severely limiting its application.271
Nevertheless the South African’s tradition of flogging workers was common in the
EAP. In the same year as the Grogan incident, “one in every 400 African adult males in
Natal (a province in South Africa) was subject to a judicial flogging- a figure that takes
no account of the extra-judicial punishments administered to labourers on the farm
without resort to the courts.”272 As in South Africa, so it was in the EAP. Here the
settlers strove to forge a community identity through the generation of a self-image of
being true “frontiersmen,” the vanguard of European civilization in Africa, the heart of
darkness. The settler farmers augmented this perception insofar as they saw themselves
as paternalistic plutocrats, lords and masters of their manors, estates and the Africans
who worked them and over whom they presided. 273
The expatriates held the final say in the disposition of any African that had the
misfortune of being tied to their land, or so they thought, and not any colonial
government fraught with liberal frailties. Of the CO, the settlers, through their
association, decried it as being distant, parsimonious and unimaginative. They saw the
bureaucrats in London as being more concerned with the rights of Africans than those of
white British subjects. The settlers saw themselves as the builders of the country, and
thus reserved the right to dictate policies to the Africans to themselves, and not the
Crown. David M. Anderson best summed it up when he wrote that, “The right of the
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settler to discipline his African labour in Kenya, as in Natal, came to be viewed as the
cornerstone of the political independence of the colony itself.”274
By all rights, the British officials had the authority to deport Grogan and his two
partners in crime. Churchill, who was in the EAP during October 1907, heartily
endorsed the EAP in taking deportation measures against the offenders.275 Churchill
penned a famous memorandum concerning this incident: “We must not let these first
few ruffians steal our beautiful and promising protectorate away from us, after all we
have spent upon it- under some shabby pretense of being a ‘responsibly governed
colony.’ This House of Commons will never allow us to abdicate our duties towards the
natives- as peaceful, industrious, law abiding folk as can be found anywhere.”276
However, Grogan and his pals got off with but a reprimand and slap on their wrists.
Potential deportation hearings were consistently delayed and eventually lost in the
bureaucratic shuffle of the EAP courts due to inside influence by the CA members in
high places. Additionally, the CO was most likely sick and tired of both hearing about
and dealing with this nasty business.277
In exercising this right to discipline African labor, Grogan touched off a political
issue with both immediate and far-reaching implications. The CO provided an
immediate impact of the flogging as officials there learned of the incident from press
reports. Elgin authorized an immediate telegram to Jackson, acting as commissioner
while Sadler was on leave in Britain, requesting further details.278 Jackson quickly
responded with a number of telegrams and dispatches. He assured the CO that he was
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on top of the situation and that the CS was taking measures to prevent any group of
Europeans from further taking the law into their hands and checking a potential African
uprising. He dismissed the latter, which was an immediate concern of the CO was that it
would bring about a severe and violent reaction from the African population, as pure
speculation as there was "absolutely no foundation" for reports of an African uprising in
the making. He assured the CO that most settlers in the EAP were not concerned about a
possible black racial uprising. He described the measures he took as precautions,
including a proposal to set up a defense committee and provide arms to Europeans who
felt threatened. Jackson pointed out, however, that only one settler came forward
expressing a desire for assistance, but he only required ammunition as he had enough
armament at his farm.279 The incident shook the EAP and produced negative
reverberations in Britain where condemnation arose in the press, public and parliament
as well as in the empire. Jackson provided details of the incident in a dispatch on 25
March with which he forwarded Hobley's observations as well. Jackson reported that his
investigation of the incident showed it was the work of a few hot heads whose
motivation was political. Grogan and the others wanted to make an example of the
Africans, hoping that it would serve as an affront to the EAP administration and
augment Grogan's growing popularity among the settler class. Jackson also noted that,
in his opinion, the alleged infractions of the Africans of bumping and shaking the
rickshaw so as to offend the two white ladies, were not as serious as Grogan and the
others made them out to be. He decried Gorgan's taking the law into his own hands in
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response to the young men's allegedly inappropriate actions. The acting commissioner
further maintained that the irresponsible reporting of some of the Nairobi newspapers
was an important factor in
stirring up the settlers. Both
he and Hobley raised the
question of whether the
planned establishment of a
legislative council should go
ahead in light of the actions of
the head of the CA.280
Grogan's actions
eventually led to his arrest
Image 7: First Sitting of the First Legislative Council in British East
Africa. Source: Gale, East Africa (British), 27.

along with his two
companions on a charge of

unlawful assembly. Jackson reported in April that at the trial Grogan, as the ringleader,
was convicted and sentenced to one month in prison, which was served under house
arrest, and a fine of 500 rupees. The other two defendants received significantly lesser
sentences.281 The issue of whether or not to establish a Legco as planned was worked
out between the CO and the CS.282 Grogan’s action had its impact. It resonated loudly
within the settler community in the region and their supporters in Britain.
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Significance of the Grogan’s incident
The significance of the Grogan incident, despite being dismissed by Jackson, was
important for four reasons. First Settlers in the region and advocates of unregulated
British expansion in Britain saw Grogan’s action as a good example to follow. Grogan
was praised for his actions, while some authorities in London and in the protectorate
rebuked them. Paice argued the following:
What did divide the public opinion was the question of whether Grogan’s
defiance of the Empire’s authority was excusable. There is no doubt that this
skirmish was won by Grogan’s adherents throughout the Empire, and marked a
significant watershed in the relationship between colonists everywhere and their
detractors. Headlines in the Protectorate’s Star, Times and East African
Standard proclaimed ‘Grogan Shows The Way’, and letters of support poured in
to colonial and domestic newspapers. ‘If ever there were a sane and heroic mind
in a brave’s man body it is Grogan’s’ read one; ‘one of those who have made our
Empire what it is – not by diplomacy, but by forceful strength of character’ read
another. Ethel Cockburn, the matron of Lady Dudley Nursing Home where
Grogan had recuperated after his operation in 1903, wrote ‘I hope you suffered no
ill effects from the gaol, we are all so proud of you here [in South Africa]. Lord
Hindlip campaigned vigorously on Grogan’s behalf in the Lords, as Sir Charles
Eliot in Whitehall. The pressure was less on Grogan than on the British
government’s management, or mismanagement, of it colonies.283
The colonists and their supporters seemed to have made their mark in the region, all
thanks to Grogan’s daring action. The colonists emerged as winners here while “the
incident attracted some attention in the House of Commons, the government eventually
producing a parliamentary paper from dispatches outlining the events; these
undermined the wide claims for self–rule the colonists were making and “again alerted a
few sections of British opinion conditions in the protectorate.”284
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Secondly, it caused the convening of the new Legco to be temporarily postponed
at the behest of both the EAP government and the CO.285 It would not be until August
1907 that the council would hold its first meeting, and this only at the behest of Elgin
who by then assumed that enough time had elapsed to let the Grogan incident just blow
over.
Thirdly, but just to be on the safe side and hoping that more reasonable minds
would prevail, the CO stipulated that Grogan was not to be nominated to this new
council, even though he had served as the CA president.286 And finally, the incident cast
a huge shadow in both the protectorate government and the CO regarding the future
prospects of white settlement in East Africa. Jackson noted in a confidential dispatch
that the incident could best be understood in the context of the work of a small band of
settlers, largely South Africans, who should have never been allowed to settle in the
protectorate. He viewed them as professional agitators whose express purpose was, “to
deny the native any rights whatsoever and to strip him of his land and cattle.”287
Jackson further explained that in all probability the Grogan incident was but a
pretext that allowed this insidious group of rabble-rousers to stir up a black uprising
that they could exploit through acts of cruelty and oppression, to seize the opportunity
for confiscating the Africans’ possessions.288 Before the power of the extant association
leadership grew any more in the EAP, Jackson believed that the EAP and the CO needed
to come together and develop a definite and workable African policy that would serve to
protect African rights. Along with his dispatch, Jackson enclosed a letter from
Jackson to Elgin, 25 March 1907; with enclosure of Hobley to Jackson, 22 March 1907; Elgin and Ellis
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Ainsworth in support of the formulation of just such a policy.289 In this letter,
Ainsworth highlighted the duty of a protectorate to safeguard all of His Majesty’s
subjects that reside within its borders. This would include the maintenance of their
personal security as well as their rights. Noted Ainsworth:
The EAP contains approximately three million native inhabitants, and about fifteen
hundred non-official whites. Yet with all of this, in so far as I am aware, no definite
native policy has been laid down, while the whites maintain in and out of the press that it
is a white man’s country. That white men have come here to stay we must accept as fact.
This being the case, it should, in my opinion, be the duty of the Government to lay down
in a definite manner, so that there can be no misunderstanding on the subject, exactly
what the native policy is to be.290

Churchill, now Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, was also in agreement
with Jackson and Ainsworth. Describing the South African cadre at the core of the
association as nothing more than “a few ruffians,” he regretted that the day might arrive
when these men would walk off with the colony under the pretext that they were going
to more responsibly govern it than either the EAP administration or the CO had been
able to do. Churchill commented that, “The House of Commons will never allow us to
abdicate our duties towards the natives- as peaceful, industrious, law-abiding folk as can
be found anywhere.”291
Elgin was in general agreement with the sentiments expressed by Jackson,
Ainsworth and Churchill. However, he felt that British policy would be judged by the
practical application of measures taken to protect the Africans and their rights rather
than by the mere exposition of platitudes and abstract principles. To make this happen,
Elgin was determined to keep shuffling the administrators around in the EAP until a
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suitable team could be assembled.292 S of S Elgin was also of the opinion that the
preservation and maintenance of African rights should be paramount in the
protectorate. In regard to Grogan and those of his ilk, Elgin understood that the
continued expansion of more rabid settler power would not serve the interests of, “the
natives (constituting as they do an immense majority of the population), but also of the
innocent white inhabitants; I am determined to restrain and punish those who commit
such acts.”293
It was clear, however, that Ewart Grogan had sympathizers. Many settlers, feeling
so outnumbered, began to view the local black population in terms of a peril to their
continued existence in the EAP. Sadler’s weakness in the face of such opposition to the
EAP government and the CO only further emboldened the white settler class. In fact,
after the flogging incident, it was the other radical leader, Delamere, who was now in the
driver’s seat at the CA. The international heat generated by the incident could only
bring the wrath of the whole British Empire crashing down on the association. So
despite the preference by the South Africans in the association for Grogan, they
prudently opted to reinstall Delamere, who had served as their leader from 1905 to
1907, the term before Grogan’s.294 In other words, the changes in the association were
merely cosmetic in nature. As the adage goes, “You can put lipstick on a pig, but it’s still
a pig.”
At about this time in the EAP, the young Churchill’s observation was revealing.
He noted in his account of his 1907 visit that “Every white man in Nairobi is a politician;
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and most of them are leaders of parties.”295 On the internal politics of the EAP,
Churchill sided more with the aims of the Pastoralists’ Association than that of the CA.
The Pastoralists were opposed to the Colonists’ practice of applying for extra land
allocations in the names of their dependents and also of the undue influence gained by
the CA in the newly formed Legco. The Pastoralists were largely centered in the
highlands where they first organized themselves into an association at Nakuru. The
Pastoralists were under the leadership of Robert Chamberlain, who from his arrival in
the EAP, spoke out vigorously against Lord Delamere with his vast landholdings and
undue political leverage.296
Chamberlain thus offered a moderating alternative. Should the settlers follow
Chamberlain’s lead, they might secure an improved standing with colonial officials. But
following the incident, it was apparent that the settlers were divided. What future would
they have in the EAP without an effective spokesman to clearly articulate their demands
from a unified political base? Could they rely on Delamere, whom they largely
distrusted because of his elitist heritage, or should they place their bets on Chamberlain
and his London-favored Pastoralist wing? Getting right down to it, the majority of
settlers, mostly of South African origin, would have preferred that the flamboyant and
rabble-rousing Grogan remained as their leader.
Nevertheless, his involvement in the racist incident would certainly block any
efforts at reinstatement, at least in the immediate aftermath. After the incident, Grogan
left protectorate and went to England with his wife who was sick. He went on to try to
do politics in England but did not succeed. Grogan later returned to the region in 1910.
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The EAP was the only political arena where he could make noise. Once back in the
protectorate, he would again lead the settlers in their quest for political recognition and
power. Nevertheless, in Grogan’s absence, the colonists still remained active. In the
EAP, if Grogan was not leading the settlers, Delamere carried the task.
Delamere and the Colonists’ Association claim for cheap labor
After Grogan’s flogging of his workers, a year later in 1908, Delamere and the
settlers challenged the governor not to introduce new labor rules that they considered
detrimental to their interests. The colonists turned the table on Sadler. Jackson, the
Deputy Commissioner for Eliot’s administration, once noted that the EAP was turning
into a “country of nigger and game-shooters” and that Delamere was the ringleader
among them.297 Jackson further added that he and Delamere were as “thick as thieves”
and did what they could, along with Eliot, in promoting white settlement and
diminishing the power of those who tended to be “quarrelsome with the settlers.”298
That Delamere put the shooting of African blacks on par with the dispatching of
game animals is evidence of the racist mentality that prevailed in Eliot’s administration
and even carried over into Sadler’s among the settler class. By January of 1907, racist
feelings among the white settlers were running at a fever pitch, culminating in the
election of Captain Grogan as the President of the CA.299
In 1908, Delamere and the settlers’ frustrations with the status of labor provision
were ever-increasing. In the EAP, beside the ongoing question related to the adequate
transfer of land, the provision of a sufficient and reliable labor force for the expatriates
was a puzzle that the administration had to sort out. Such would not have been the case
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if there were no European settlers in the region. The problem stemmed from the policy
formulation of the second administration after the completion of the railways. “With the
decision of the protectorate’s second commissioner, Sir Charles Eliot (1901-4), to permit
and encourage white settlement, the employment pattern hitherto coastal and railway
began a total change. Settlement involved three major labor problems: to obtain men
either by recruitment or compulsion; to retain them, in the local context to prevent them
from deserting; and to make them work diligently. All three problems were to lead to
incessant conflicts and to crises in 1908 and 1912-13.”300
There was another dilemma in the EAP, which consisted on how to manage a
situation where Africans had to work for themselves and for the colonists while being
also taxed. Another paradox was that when all the best land was alienated, it limited the
African holdings. And adding insult to injuries, the European settlers were not keen
with the idea of establishing reserves for the Africans. Reserves for the local population
meant that they could remain far from the latecomers’ sphere of influence. The settlers
were astute because they wanted to have the African segmented in small groups with
insignificant holding so that they would benefit from the new setting by obtaining
abundant cheap labor. That strategy was an illustration of the process of ghettoization
and exploitation.
It should be no surprise that the issue of labor supply was going to be a problem,
when the origin of settlers and their mentality is taken into account. The colonists were
invited to the EAP; land had been alienated to the benefit of the invitees, the acquired
properties needed to be developed and a labor force established. This was easier said
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than done. The colonists, who viewed the Africans as passive, seemingly were not apt to
carry the task of developing their acquired land. Long hours working under the sun was
deemed impossible for the colonists to bear. This was a lame excuse and an
exaggeration. When the protectorate opened, the first European who crisscrossed the
region praised its quasi-temperate climate and beautiful highlands as suitable for
European settlement. The EAP was talked about as a Nova Scotia. After the first phase
of settlement on the highlands, there was an immediate need for labor. The settlers
postulated that they needed the Africans to work for them. They wanted to assume a role
of master with plenty of docile servants.
Assuming the role of master in the early days of the protectorate was not a big
challenge for the settlers. The situation in the EAP was unique because the region had
experienced natural calamities that affected the local population. When the Europeans
arrived, recovery was just catching steam. The Africans were starting to get back on their
feet. The last thing they needed after the pacification phase or, perhaps we could call it
the “hammering period,” was having to leave behind their families, crops, and cattle to
work for European masters who were not even willing to accommodate and pay them
right. Testimony before the Native Labor Commission of 1912-13 helps to illustrate these
conditions. A witness claimed:
There were well-known cases of employers who, engaging labourers for a
month’s work, became increasingly severe at the end of the month approached. A
few days before pay days, some display of ferocity or injustice, resulted in the
whole, or a large portion, of a gang of labourers absconding quietly at night from
employment which had become intolerable. Alternatively an impossible task of
work might be set, and the natives discharged for not completing it. The
employer in extreme cases, secured the labour of upwards of 200 men for 25 days
without payment to any of them. . . . A common practice among European
employers was to withhold a portion of the labourer’s earned wages when pay day
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arrived.301
These practices evidenced the reasons why there was no incentive for the Africans to
work in European farms and that became a problem that led to the labor troubles in the
EAP. Added to this, 1908 marked the peak of European settler immigration to Kenya
before 1914. These newcomers competed with earlier arrivals for African workers Some
“280 Transvaal Boers” arrived in the protectorate in 1908.302
In that scenario, the now-settled colonists considered the Africans as the
available work force for the task. When confronted with the question of remuneration
for the provision of that labor, the newcomers quickly figured it out. According to the
big men of the likes of Delamere and Grogan who had vested interests in settling in the
EAP, taxation was the answer. Putting the Africans to work and taxing them would
economically lift the protectorate and in the same process awake the lower races from
ignorance and laziness. This was a whole new plan of economic development that could
only work, not in a free market, but in an established white men’s country. As Clayton
and Savage explained this situation:
In economic terms white settlement meant an injection of white capital, or capital in the
form of skills, for development. This capital was spread over a large number of small
projects, most of which in themselves were without sufficient cash capital. Apart from
market-gardens around Nairobi large-scale farming was necessary if profits were to be
made. To clear the ground, in the absence of skills and equipment, the farmer was
obliged to seek a sizeable labour force of several score, sometimes several hundred men
to work with their own rudimentary instruments. But the capital necessary for such a
labour force was beyond the reach of most of the new settlers, whose difficulties
worsened by the high interest rate charged by banks on loans. The situation was neither
an economic climate in which the interest of labour was likely to flourish nor the
labourer likely to receive a wage which genuinely and permanently attracted him. The
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attitudes of the settlers themselves to their labour reflected these difficulties.303

Nevertheless, the colonists wanted cheap labor no matter how. To their way of
thinking, they found a way to justify their claim. Some radical leaders of the CA had
long nurtured a disdain towards the Africans whom they regarded as passive with no
incentive for work. It was Grogan who proposed an outrageous solution to the labor
question in his early days in the protectorate. In his memoir he stated the following: “A
good sound system of compulsory labour would do more to raise the nigger in five years
than all the millions that have been sunk in missionary efforts for the last fifty. . . . Then
let the native be compelled to work so many months in the year at a fixed and
reasonable rate and call it compulsory education, as we call our weekly bonnet parades
church. Under such a title, surely the most delicate British conscience may be at rest.”304
There was no doubt that Grogan’s suggestion was a bold and inflammatory
proclamation with no moral validity. He simply suggested a system of forced labor and
such was the point of view of the majority of the settlers who held land waiting to be
developed.
To the colonists in the protectorate, Grogan’s idea of Africans working for
European settlers without complaints was brilliant because such a system would provide
the locals with a good education. The only thing that was needed from that labor force
was total submission. “The natives’, says the planter, ‘evince a great reluctance to work,
especially to work regularly.’ ‘They must be made to work,’ say others. ‘Made to work for
whom?’ we innocently ask. ‘For us, of course,’ is the ready answer; what did you think
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we meant?”305 From that observation of Churchill, it was not difficult to understand
that the colonists wanted an implementation of a quasi-free labor as a fait accompli, but
the obstacle in front of them was that the extant government, ipso facto, could not
satisfy their pleas.
By November 1906, and as a result of the recommendations advanced at the
January 1905 meeting of the CA,306 such a proposed Masters and Servants Ordinance
had still failed to prove acceptable to Elgin insofar as it was patterned too closely after
some South African enactments.307 However, with the arrival of 1907, one suggestion of
the Land Committee was acted upon, that being the appointment of a Secretary of
Native Affairs in the EAP, whose express duty was to be that of dealing with the “labour
supply.”308 At first glance, this may have seemed exactly the type of African labor
department that the settlers were looking for; but the new secretary, A. C. Hollis, had
other ideas. He was clearly on the side of the African workers and did not wish for them
to be exploited in any way by the settlers or any other employers.
Upon inspection, Hollis found many labor abuses that needed to be addressed.
What distressed him most was the failure of employers to feed their African workers at
the end of a contract or even provide them with return transportation to their homes of
record. In his efforts to change these and other sorry conditions of employment, he did
succeed in getting Sadler to issue a regulation providing for the feeding of employees
upon discharge. However, as to transportation and any concerns related to recruitment
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methods and other terms of service, no headway was made by the time that Churchill
personally arrived in the EAP in October 1907 to check out the dire African labor
situation. On his way from Mombasa to Nairobi, Churchill took note of returning
African workers in a bedraggled condition, plodding their way slowly along the railroad
tracks, attempting to find their way their home on their own after completing some
labor contract. Of course, Churchill investigated this situation in some detail and upon
his arrival in Nairobi, bombarded Sadler with endless questions regarding the lack of a
suitable EAP labor policy to protect these workers.309
Beside personal meetings with Sadler and Hollis, individually and jointly,
Churchill put forth his recommendations in writing to address any labor shortcoming
that he perceived in the protectorate. Clearly, Churchill did not trust the settlers when it
came to treating their African laborers with any sense of fair play. In his formal letter,
he appointed K. R. Dundas to assist Hollis in the work of generating new rules that
would protect these workers’ rights.310 Churchill’s recommendations were ultimately
approved by Elgin, who noted to Sadler “these arrangements appear to me to be
absolutely necessary unless some very shocking scandal in the employment of contract
labour is to occur.”311 As Churchill had returned to London, Dundas, Hollis and Sadler
were left with the task of implementing laws that would help protect at least some of the
African workers’ rights. This they managed to incrementally accomplish, despite the
growing consternation of the settlers, who by March of 1908 had grown so fed up with
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the government’s perceived anti-settler positions that they were marching on the
Government House.
Sadler’s administration had put forward a code of conditions by which the Native
Affairs Department was willing to assist in locating labor for the settlers in exchange for
an enforced ban on the violent and compulsory methods previously utilized in filling
ever increasing labor shortages. Lord Delamere called a special meeting of the CA in
March 1908 to demand that the government pass a motion that would abolish these new
labor regulations. Sadler would not take any immediate action, but did promise that he
would at least consider the “relaxation” of some of the provisions. Delamere, totally
unsatisfied with Sadler’s response, led a demonstration of some one hundred settlers
outside Government House in Nairobi, calling for Sadler’s resignation.312 On the
following day, Sadler met with Delamere and a delegation of the CA. He steadfastly
refused to withdraw the regulations, but he did appoint a board of inquiry to look into
the matter.313
The elitist Delemere was envious of Grogan’s popularity in the white settler
group. One can easily see that Sadler’s perspective on the demonstration was correct:
Delamere used it to rile up the disgruntled settlers, so often frustrated in their attempts
to eke out a meager existence off the land but too proud to do any back-breaking work
themselves. If the settler, therefore, thought of the African worker as inferior to himself,
then he had no problem in forcing this worker into compulsory labor and further
abusing him in the process. He would never have to treat the black worker with respect
as in the white settler’s mind the black was in no position to demand equal rights. That
By this time, Delamere was a member of the first Legco, though he had already submitted his
resignation in December 1907 only to later withdraw it. Huxley, White Man’s Country, 211-212.
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the Sadler administration might, even inadvertently, change this paradigm was
completely unacceptable to the white settler class, and Delamere was going to milk it for
all it was worth.
Consider Sadler’s commentary on the matter: “The whole thing is due to political
agitations working on certain amount of distress among poorer settlers. The
demonstration was the result of Delamere’s ungovernable temper and of excitement of
meeting after lunch at which he presided, subsequently conducting the mob up to my
house. At this meeting a resolution was framed but afterwards withdrawn, calling on
me to resign unless I immediately acceded to their demands.”314
Sadler, with his strong military background, thought it incomprehensible that a
loyal subject of the realm would challenge the law in such a public and disgraceful
display, especially enlisting the aid of Boers and their sympathizers in the process. The
CO was cognizant that white settlers in the highlands, for the most part, were not
making a lot of money and many had even abandoned their farms and stations. In their
desperation, these settlers were turning back to some of the same tactics employed in
South Africa such as forcing the Africans to work by direct compulsion or outright
appropriating their land or cattle. And when such maneuverings were carried out in
South Africa or other parts of the far-flung British Empire, the Crown was quick in
taking actions to bring these activities to a cessation, even if troops had to be deployed
in military engagements to make this happen. W. D. Ellis and others in the CO were
growing weary of white settler abuses upon the African population in the EAP, and
following Delamere’s demonstration in Nairobi urged the British government to come
Sadler to Elgin, telegram, 26 March 1908, CO 533/42. For full accounts of the demonstration and
impact, see: Great Britain Correspondence relating to Affairs in the East Africa Protectorate, Cmd 4122
(London: HMSO, 1908). E. A. S., March-April 1908.
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down hard on these political opportunists. The idea of white repatriation was actually
given an impetus following the Delemere incident,315 but by the advent of World War I
had to be sidetracked in order to enlist white settler aid in countering German influence
in the south. Said Ellis: “These methods have led over and over again to wars in the
Cape and Natal: and it would probably pay the British taxpayer to repatriate all of the
whites and forbid their entry except on payment of a heavy poll tax. Such a cost is,
however, impracticable….”316 The Liberal government in London was clearly
apprehensive about white settlement in Africa, and particularly noted that the EAP was
its most “troublesome” of the new responsibilities on that continent.
Lord Elgin, the Secretary of State in Campbell-Bannerman’s Liberal government,
frequently expressed his concern about the proliferation of so-called “white men’s
countries” throughout the British Empire.317 It seems that just because a country has
certain advantages as far as natural resources, the Empire was allowing and even
encouraging unlimited immigration there. After opportunist individuals like Delamere
arrived in Africa, however, the authorities in the CO began to take a dimmer view of the
situation. Initially, they thought Delamere and other settlers would help the empire in
the task of introducing regulation and order in all departments. What a surprise it was
when these settlers, from all walks of life, i.e. peers to commoners, ended up siding with
the racist Boers. By the time Lord Elgin turned over the CO to Lord Crewe in 1908, he
had come to the conclusion that he and others in the Liberal government had failed in
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their duty to the EAP and especially to the “natives who inhabit parts of it, and I
suppose, formerly owned the whole.”318
Labor troubles and significance of Delamere’s incident
Looking at the constant labor demands from the settlers’ camp, one could clearly
see the problems that the protectorate was facing and that had repercussions on the
development of the region. The EAP was a political mess riddled with discontent and
agitations caused by the demanding colonists and for that reason, a permanent attention
was needed to keep it from falling apart. The CO and the local administration had to be
on the same page to make sure that the protectorate would not completely fall in the
hands of the settlers. Meanwhile, the leaders of the colonists wanted to be a force to
reckon with. Delamere stood up to challenge the governor and that had a considerable
significance.
Delamere's reaction was swift. He took Sadler's refusal to withdraw the law so
personally that he decided to directly challenge him.319 Since Grogan's incident,
Delamere placed himself as the rising star and leader of the settlers. He spearheaded a
famous settler revolt. The issue revolved around Sadler's decision to introduce new
labor rules. The rules were to protect the African workers from abuses, because by
enforcing them, a more fair provision of labor contract would be limiting the settlers
from breaking the law by mistreating their employees. Delamere's actions weakened
Sadler's position. It was a political maneuver that benefitted the settlers. Delamere
raised political dust and could have never foreseen the impacts because party politics
was flown into chaos for the coming decades in the political history of Kenya. Sadler
As quoted in Ibid., 410.
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had to leave the protectorate because the settlers wanted a man reminiscent of
Commissioner Eliot. Delamere's actions were aimed at enforcing the Africans to work,
but also, it was a message to the Indians in the region. The colonists nurtured a disdain
vis-à-vis the Indians who also thought of settling in the highlands and feared their
competition. To contain that threat, they pushed for the isolation of the Indians in the
lowlands. The incident also stopped all prospect of cohabitation in the region while the
pending land and labor issues were yet to be resolved. Following the demonstration,
Delamere was suspended from the Legco, but that would not change the colonists’
mindset. Making noise and causing trouble were their strategies.320 The settlers wanted
relaxed land and labor rules that would oblige the colored people to work without
complaints. In other words they wanted to set the terms of land acquisition and labor
provision by themselves, which was synonym to a minority enforcing new rules thereby,
bypassing the governor and the authorities in London.
Any changes in land or labor policy were bound to raise a stink with the white
settlers. The previous administrations of Eliot and Stewart reserved the Highlands for
European settlement and gave them an “exclusive right” to this area largely because the
deficit in EAP expenditures was borne by the British taxpayer and also because the
white settlers who had come to the highlands did so with the understanding that it
would be shared solely by other whites. Also, the huge influx of Indians into the EAP
was a cause of some concern to the CA as they did not want this new immigrant group to
impinge on their area of control in the highlands, and they voiced this concern to Sadler.
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Indian Question
Always between a rock and hard place with the CA, Sadler took care in
formulating his response. Sadler recognized that Asians played a key role in both the
conquest and development of the EAP, but assured the members of the CA that he
harbored no intentions of reversing the policies of Eliot or Stewart with respect to the
highlands. The concerns of the CA were advanced at a general assembly in May 1906,
and they wanted Sadler to state in writing that the Indian policies of prior
administrations would not be reversed insofar as highlands settlement was concerned.
Nevertheless, Sadler would not be bullied by the association, and said that he was not
going to guarantee the highlands solely for whites by legislation, but would follow “in
principle” to guidelines for settlement established by Eliot and Stewart of not granting
land “outside municipal limits” to Indians.321
While Ellis and others in the CO were not in accordance with excluding any class
of His Majesty’s subjects from holding land in any part of a British protectorate,
including the EAP, they were willing to keep in mind the “comparatively limited area
suitable for European colonization” there.322 This produced the first “Elgin pledge” that
reserved a portion of the highlands between Kiu and Fort Ternan on the railway for
exclusive European settlement by administrative action rather than legislation.323 Of
course, the white settlers were grateful for this small concession, but they still wanted a
firm guarantee, in writing, that the Highlands were going to remain forever under white
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control. What the CA wanted was the total exclusion of Indians from the Highlands area
and even from any representation on the Legco.324
These Elgin Pledges, made at the behest of the European settlers during Sadler’s
administration, proved a very critical aspect of the Indian Question in Kenya history. So
also did the issue of Indian political rights in the EAP. In 1907, for example, Churchill,
specifically challenged Sadler on the omission of Indians from the Legco on the basis
that “there can be no reason for excluding this large and meritorious class.”325 Churchill
was of the opinion that the appointment by Sadler of an Indian to the Legco would serve
to instill, from its outset, good principles in the EAP. Sadler had no name to
immediately suggest for a seat on the council. Rather, he operated from the assumption
that if he did nothing he would do nothing wrong. But all that he accomplished was to
raise the ire of the Indian community of the EAP that in April of the following year sent
him a petition for a nominee to the council. Then Sadler recognized that the Indian
community projected “legitimate claims,” yet he still sat on his hands and pretended
that all was well in the protectorate. The first Indian to be named to the council was A.
M. Jeevanjee in 1909, and his nomination was put forth by then Acting Governor
Jackson. Sadler was on his way to a new post as Governor of the Windward Islands,
having been demoted for his overall tepidness.326
After the protest, the concerns were clear. The Liberal government recognized
that Asian immigration to other parts of the empire was a growing problem, and
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particularly so in East Africa. White prejudice was probably more intense against
immigrant Indians in the EAP than Africans. Clearly, the EAP was no Australia or even
South Africa, as the members of the CA would have preferred it to be. But Elgin and
others in the CO were at least willing to concede, in principle, that the highlands could
remain a European enclave while Asian immigrants, most notably Indians, could be
encouraged to trade and settle in more tropic climates.327
At least from the start of construction on the Uganda Railway, Indians in East
Africa had sought, as British subjects, to gain equality of treatment and standing in the
country of their adoption. Besides the white settler class, many Africans were also
opposed to their settlement and the so-called “Indian question” has been a recurring
theme throughout the region’s history. During Sadler’s administration, the Asians held
the majority of the skilled or semi-skilled artisan jobs and were found as small traders
throughout the country, much as they still are in contemporary Kenya. In many
instances, the African has felt crowded out by the strong Asian immigrant presence. The
whites, on the other hand, also feared the Asian presence for the economic and political
threat that they posed. Being non-white, the European mentality reasoned that the
Indian or some other Asian may form an alliance with the blacks against them. This
mode of thinking was pure paranoia, of course, but when the white settler community
shunned Chamberlain in favor of extremists like Grogan and Delamere, what more
could be expected? Thus a decade later the Indian Question emerged as one of the key
issue facing British rule in Kenya.
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Sadler consistently pushed Elgin and others in the CO for a legislature in which
more Europeans were represented in order to get the CA off of his back. Because His
Majesty’s Imperial government certainly wanted to guarantee the rights of all British
subjects in the EAP, regardless of race or ethnicity, a trusteeship power was granted to
the Governor to make it so. This resulted in what may essentially be referred to as a
dual political system. Thus, in the Highlands the white settlers gained a dominant
influence over important areas but were blocked by the Liberal government in London
from actually realizing the self-government they so desperately yearned for. More so in
the Sadler administration, this dichotomy led to a stalemate over the EAP’s projected
political course and development. Insofar as the Africans were concerned, Sadler acted
as nothing more than an authoritarian and paternalistic guardian whose only success
was in at least keeping the white settler class from overturning what few laws were laid
down to protect the black worker. And as far as the Asian-Indian community was
concerned, total inaction was the order of the day. The situation in the protectorate was
no longer sustainable and the CO, once again, had to intervene.
Conclusion
The EAP was a region invaded by a few colonists who turned the region into a
political nightmare. The EAP was difficult to properly administrate. In 1909, The CO
grew tired of Sadler’s inaction. He did not finish his term as governor. The CO originally
appointed him because of his military background, hoping Sadler would bring some
backbone to the situation and put the settlers in check to allow for the gradual uplifting
of all His Majesty’s subjects throughout the EAP. Thus the CO felt the need to bring in a
stronger man from outside, and that was Sir Percy Girouard. Here was an administrator
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who had performed a great work in reestablishing functional control in Northern
Nigeria.
That Sadler failed to reestablish functional control in the EAP may be due to the
“grilled cheese” political effect, with Sadler being the cheese. On one hand, he had to
answer to the Liberal government’s CO, whose officialdom from top to bottom,
including administrative staffers in foreign outposts, were largely controlled by the
“Oxbridge” elites, i.e. graduates of Oxford and Cambridge. In the EAP, for example,
between 1890 and 1909, of the known social backgrounds of 22 EAP administrative
officers with university degrees, ten hailed from Oxford and 3 from Cambridge. There
were none from South Africa or other Commonwealth countries. And of these 22, four
hailed from military and technical academies. 328 This group formed the bottom slice of
bread upon which the slice of cheese rested. And then came the top slice. This was the
lousy settler class, mostly composed of white South Africans, principally Boers.
On the concept of subject races, the South African John Buchan has penned: “The
root of the trouble is that England and South Africa talk, and will continue to talk, in
different languages…. The Englishman, using the speech of conventional politics, seems
to the colonist to talk academic nonsense; while the South African, speaking the rough
and ready words of the practical man, appears as the champion of brutality and
coercion. The difficulties are so real that one cannot but regret that they are
complicated by verbal misunderstandings.”329 So here lies the crux of the matter.
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Sadler needed to pick one side and go with it, and not try and placate both sides. For in
the process of doing so, he was aptly grilled and consumed.
Here it could be said that the Europeans settlers succeed in maintaining pressure
and disorder that had the governor cornered in a middle of political storm. The EAP
remained economically stagnant and politically divided with a majority population that
stood without representation. The governor failed to strike a balance between the
wishes of the CO and the interests of the colonists in the region. Instead, there was
chaos that held back the region from a peaceful economic take off. A clear policy
formulation was long overdue because the Africans and Indians living in the region
could not be written off. They also needed land and fair rights to compete and prosper.
Changes were needed for a better administration of the region. Once again, it was time
to reshuffle. Mungeam summarized:
By the end of 1908 it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Protectorate as a
whole was suffering from a bankruptcy of ideas. Within the Protectorate, apart
from the enthusiasm of Hollis in the fields of labour and land, none of the senior
officials appeared capable of offering concrete ideas that might revitalize the
country. The constant struggle with the settler population, the comparative lack
of leadership at the top, the long years of service in the Protectorate, all combined
to turn men of the seniority of Jackson, Hobley and Ainsworth into sound but
somewhat unimaginative administrators. In Whitehall, important changes had
taken place. Asquith’s reshuffle of May 1908, which replaced Elgin and Churchill
by Crewe and Seely, meant the loss of an Under-Secretary who had taken a keen
interest in the affairs of the Protectorate. Indeed, Churchill was the one first-class
man, amongst the many politicians concerned with the Protectorate in its early
years, to have shown an active interest in its problems and to have taken the
trouble to pay it a personal visit.330
Nevertheless, the issues of land and labor regulation were still to be sorted out,
and the newcomers were still not satisfied with the manner that the CO was supervising
the protectorate. With the transfer of Sadler, the colonists were hoping for the CO to
330
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back up the right horse to run the protectorate for their interests. Their wish came
through when the CO sent a railway engineer to for the job. With this quick fix, the
troublesome protectorate was entering another era of political agitations and abuses on
the expense of the colored people of the protectorate.
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Chapter 5
The peak of European settlers’ political influence and interference in the
East Africa Protectorate’s administration under Governor Girouard from
1909 to 1912
Introduction
The period from 1909 to 1912 was the time that Sir Percy Girouard was the
appointed governor of the EAP. The CO authorities who entrusted him with the mission
of bringing order and getting things moving in the right direction in the protectorate
had firm expectationsabout how Girouard would differ from the previous
administrators. The CO expected him to deliver. Nevertheless, Girouard’s
administration turned out to be the biggest political train wreck the protectorate had
ever witnessed. The governor embarked in dangerous liaisons with the politically active
European settlers, who wanted privileges and power.
European settlers’ politics in the EAP was an activity profoundly related to the
issues of governance. Ross asserted that: “from the earliest days the Government of the
East Africa Protectorate displayed commendable willingness to listen to advice from
local European residents. Critics of a sardonic turn of mind might perhaps interject that
it had no option in the matter, the advice having been tendered in such strident tones as
to compel attention.”331 The general tone was set during Eliot’s administration, which
created a context of political obligation to solely benefit the colonists, inviting them to
take up land and develop the region. That was how the EAP’s political stage ended up
being heavily dominated by the influential European settlers since Eliot’s resignation in
1904; the colonists in 1909 were hoping to have a similar man in the spot who would
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stand for their interests like their political progenitor did. With the noisy European
settlers always pushing for more concessions, the EAP struggled to find the necessary
political stability for a steady economic development. This would turn into a pattern that
left a mark in Kenya’s colonial and post-colonial political history.
Since the departure of Hardinge, the protectorate experienced a succession of
commissioners and governors who were sent to get things moving in the right
direction. Peace, order and a just society were requisites for the EAP if it was to have
any hope of economic development. Nevertheless, by 1909 it was clear that the EAP was
a racially divided society with the Africans and the Indians being pushed off the political
stage. This was indeed a far cry from the vision of Sir Harry Johnston that he expressed
just after the completion of the Uganda Railway. Johnston stated that he “had long
believed in the development of Africa in racial harmony and so could speak of this land
also as a possible America of the Hindu.”332 Unfortunately, as George Bennett noted,
“the troubled story of racial politics in Kenya has belied his hopes.”333 What did become
clear, however, was that the European settlers were not going to let the EAP become any
sort of America, either for the Hindu or the African. The European settlers present in
the protectorate did not want any form of political cohabitation. The political isolation
of the Indians and the Africans was the only guarantee for the establishment of a
successful self-governing white man’s country. That simply meant segregation in the
EAP could be the new reality. The European settlers’ presence coupled with their
ideology rendered difficult the very issues of governance in the EAP.
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After Sadler’s difficult tenure, the CO sent Governor Girouard to assess the
situation and recommend needed action. The CO wanted him to stabilize the region and
implement fair policies that would economically benefit all parties, thereby reflecting
well on the Empire. In compliance, Girouard reported back to the CO on the whole East
Africa situation. However, he started off on the wrong foot, showing favoritism for the
settlers. He wanted more European settlers and increased representation in the Legco,
thus facilitating their active participation in running the protectorate. Girouard fell into
the settlers’ net. He came under Delamere’s influence and became engaged in a
dangerous political liaison that would ultimately result in his resignation in 1912.
Girouard’s governorship was far more open and flexible to the settlers’ interests than
even Eliot’s administration was. The new governor totally discarded the rights of the
Africans and the Indians. The Indian community felt isolated and protests came forth
from them against the settler’s political dominance.
With the deliberate backing of Girouard, the Convention of Associations (C of A)
was formed in 1910. The C of A was the united settlers’ party standing for all its
members’ interests in the region. The colonists’ decision to come together as a one
strong political party was evidence of their determination to use all strategies and tactics
possible to defend their interests and achieve their goal of acquiring a self-governing
country. Keeping the political context and climate of the EAP in mind, it is apparent
that the colonists were developing broad strategies and plans for the achievement of
goals, along with specific methods and tactics to carry out the same. The settlers’ tactics
included a claim for electoral participation, i.e., voting, campaigning, influencing public
opinion, lobbying governmental and non-governmental agencies and associations,
verbal protests, threats, mass action, demonstrations, marches, disruption, litigation,
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and even violence. All of this carried with it, of course, an intense focus on the
expansion and internal development of the white settler community.
The European settlers had tremendous influence and confidence and did not
hesitate in pushing for more concessions. So bold were the settlers that they came up
with yet more demands in February and August of 1911. They demanded elective
representation in the Legco, albeit it would still remain under the supervision of the
CO. The settlers were not above employing violence to meet these ends, either, as we
will note in the case of the murder of an African by Galbraith Cole, a settler related to
Delamere, with the rest of the Empire be damned in the process.
As this chapter develops, it becomes apparent that the political situation in the
EAP was unique. On one hand, the political challenges the settlers brought to the CO
under Girouard’s watch marked an era of extremes, led by a few agitators that Churchill
once referred to as “political animals”334 with the sole objective of turning the
protectorate into a white men’s country. Paradoxically, as far as the Africans and
Indians were concerned, it was an era of political and economic disenfranchisement
with all odds stacked against them. Less land was being made available for them and
they had to pay taxes. Girouard went too far in favoring the colonists, even to the point
that the Africans again suffered clear violations of their rights. In this instance, a
promise was made to transfer some of the Maasai land to the settlers. With such
violations sanctioned for the sole propose of favoring the European colonists, Girouard
ended up like Eliot, tendering his resignation to the CO. Girouard’s administration was a
déjà vu, a worse facsimile of Eliot’s tenure. It was an attempt to make the settlers’
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interests paramount in the region. Nevertheless, the lesson to be drawn from his
governorship was that the CO was still in charge and the European settlers’ political
dreams and goals were yet to be realized.
Sir Percy Girouard as the new man in the spot
In 1909, the CO came to the conclusion that it was time to remove Governor
Sadler from the troublesome EAP. This was not a surprise. When it came down to
matters related to who could best administer the protectorate, the CO had a method that
consisted on shuffling servers of the crown from one protectorate or colony to another.
It was a quick-fix designed to be utilized at any time that they realized that they had the
wrong man in some trouble spot.
Officials at the CO came to the realization that Sadler had bitten off a little more
than he could chew in governing the EAP. For in 1909, one year prior to his scheduled
transfer from the governorship of the protectorate, Sadler received and accepted an
appointment as governor of the Windward Islands. These are the southernmost islands
of the Lesser Antilles, a long chain of islands wrapped around the eastern end of the
Caribbean Sea along the boundary of the Atlantic Ocean. Sadler himself seemed relieved
to be leaving the constant turmoil that existed in the protectorate. The Windward
Islands would prove to be a near Eden for Sadler. He was not anticipating any serious
administrative difficulties in those remote Caribbean islands so neatly tucked away from
the flurry of imperial machinations that existed in East Africa and other contentious
areas of British global dominion.335
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Sadler’s designated successor to the governorship was the French-Canadian, Sir
Edouard Percy Girourard (1867-1923); and like Sadler, he was also a man of some
military distinction. A graduate of the Royal Military College at Kingston, Girouard
entered the British Army in 1888. Eight years later he participated in the Dongola
expedition in the Sudan, whence he received the Khedive medal with two clasps. One
year after that, he played a part in the Nile expedition and subsequently went to work in
opening up and directing the operation of British railways in both Egypt and the Sudan.
He was so effective in this position, that in 1899 he was transferred to South Africa,
where he served as the Director of Railways until 1902 and the conclusion of the Second
Anglo-Boer War. 336
Girouard demonstrated outstanding administrative abilities in the work of
building and maintaining efficient railroad operations. From 1902-1904, he served as
Commissioner of Railways in the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies. Girouard
clearly respected the hard-working South African railway workers. Despite their
political differences with the British Empire, Girouard expressed a grudging admiration
for the hardscrabble settlers in South Africa. Following his South African service,
Girouard served as High Commissioner and Governor in Northern Nigeria on the West
African coast where the economy depended heavily on African peasants’ agricultural
production. During this time, most would have described him as a small yet dapper
man, bursting with energy and self-confidence. His reputation as a gentleman with a
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remarkable flair for administration extended all the way to London, so naturally those in
the CO were paying close attention to Girouard’s rising star.337
Keeping in mind his dutiful service to the Empire, in 1907 Girouard was
appointed to succeed F. D. Lugard as the High Commissioner and later Governor of
Northern Nigeria. Girouard was ostensibly committed to carrying out Lugard’s goal of
the establishment of a dual mandate in Northern Nigeria and other areas of tropical
Africa.338 Basically, the dual mandate entailed indirect British rule in colonial Africa.
Lugard believed that such indirect rule would assist in facilitating the spread of
Christianity in Africa, in addition to hastening the end of the more so-called “barbaric
practices” that still ensued on the continent. Lugard believed that the British statesponsored colonization of African protectorates was one way to protect missionaries,
local chiefs, and local people from each other as well as from foreign powers. For the
far-sighted Lugard, it was vital that Britain gain control of unclaimed areas before
France, Germany, Portugal, or any other European powers claimed the land and its
resources for themselves. Lugard was of the opinion that there were vast profits to be
made through the exporting of natural resources and through taxation of of the African
populations, as well as importers and exporters. In addition, these resources and
inexpensive African labor could be counted on to provide vital fuel for the industrial
revolution in resource-depleted Britain as well as monies for public works projects. And
most importantly, Lugard reasoned that colonization efforts would not need to be
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augmented if Britain were to retain its position as the greatest global empire in
history.339
The CO at best thought of Sadler’s administration as weak whereas they viewed
Girouard, a disciple of Lugard, as being fresh and dynamic. Here was just the type of
firm administrative leader that could give the EAP the boost it needed to regain some of
the luster lost during previous regimes in place in East Africa. They also viewed
Girouard as the type of man who could be relied on to effectively deal with the settlers
and their overwhelming South African contingent in the EAP. After all, his work with
the railways in South Africa proved beyond a doubt that he had a way with the local
population and could be relied on to build up the necessary momentum behind various
projects. Here, it is worthy to mention that there were no settlers in Nigeria.
In most respects, Girouard was seen as the “best possible man” for the post.340
The CO believed that he could control the settlers while at the same time add the needed
vitality to the EAP administration. His successful work on various colonial British
railway operations also bode well for Girouard’s economic guidance of the protectorate
to the harbors of efficiency and profitability.341 So Girouard was heading to the British
East Africa highlands with the CO high expectations that the new man in the spot will
deliver and guide the protectorate to prosperity. There was hope of finally seeing the
region generating revenues. The CO wanted a well-administrated protectorate where
the European settlers would remain content with what they already had. The CO also
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wanted an extension of the pax Britannia in the region and that meant the safeguard of
all subjects’ rights under the crown.
Sir Percy Girouard’s general constats de faits of the protectorate’s status quo and his
inclination towards the European settlers
Upon taking over the governorship of the protectorate, Girouard was ipso- facto
shocked by the fact that there was no clear policy for an effective administration of the
region. There was still the familiar issue of reserved land for the settlers to be defined.
The need to protect the African and the Indian population was also crucial. Looking at
the situation, Girouard realized that the settlers were not sympathetic with the
incorporation of the Indians in the emerging economic system. Adding to that reality,
they considered taxing the Africans as a way to generate revenue while securing labor.
The expatriates from South Africa had gained such influence that any official sent in the
protectorate was expected to side with their association. The settlers had the habit of
scrutinizing any commissioner or governor sent by the CO in the EAP. Failure to come
under the influence of the main leaders of the settlers was like opening the gate for
troubles. The CO wanted to avoid further disturbances from the expatriates’ camp.
Unfortunately, Girouard fell under Delamere’s influence, which was a recipe for more
conflicts under the watch of the officials of the CO.
By sending his first alarming reports to the CO, the new governor took a
stand for the European settlers. In his 1910 report of the protectorate, for
example, Girouard showed clear signs of being aware of the role that he wanted the
colonists to play in the political arena of the region. The governor went on to
criticize the state of the protectorate and the officials in place. He complained
about the lack of a definite policy to lift up the protectorate and generate revenue.
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Nevertheless he seemed to only consider the settlers as an alternative for change.
Girouard suggested to the CO “that a strong administrative machine should be
created and that the settlers should be given the opportunity for greater
participation in government.”342His references to the Legco made plain how strong
the settlers’ influence had become: he wanted a strong colonial secretary to give
lead on the council, where he found the officials weak both in numbers and in
debate. But he wanted more European unofficial members there also, for their
active participation in government was ‘essential’.”343 Girouard quickly came to
the realization that European settlement was a reality that could not be ignored.
Settlers’ participation in the development and administration of the protectorate
was unavoidable. But, the problem here was that the colonists were not the
majority capable of developing the region. They did not want to work or pay taxes,
and many of them lacked the resources or skills necessary for their new adventure
in East Africa. The settlers’ stand was to play without having to pay and that
meant representation without taxation. Girouard did not realize that at first. The
reason why Girouard sympathized with the settlers had nothing to do with his
personal record, but one is driven to consider his experience with the South
African settlers as a factor.
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Image 8: Lord Delamere found a “firm friend” in the new governor. Source: Sorrenson,
Origins, 149.

Liasons dangereuses, Girouard and the European Settlers’ alliance
This combined with the fact that Girouard soon found a firm friend in Lord
Delamere and engaged in political actions favoring the settlers. That alliance turned
into a huge fiasco, a massive political train wreck. Girouard made the false assumption
that Delamere would become his “firm friend.”344 Girouard made the overture of
sending a telegram to Secretary of State, Lord Crewe, wherein he recommended that
Delamere be reappointed to the Legco, from which body he had resigned in May 1909.
In this same telegram, Girouard questioned the presence of A. M. Jeevanjee, the leader
of the Indian faction in the EAP, on the Legco. Girouard could have argued that
Jeevanjee was largely illiterate, and the position called for a more educated and hence
344
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articulate spokesman. But his rationale for the challenge was that other ethnic groups,
like the Arabs and Swahilis, who outnumbered the Indians by a two-to-one margin in
the protectorate, would soon be demanding representation on the council for their
particular factions. For if the Arabs and Swahilis, who so outnumbered the Indians,
were deserving of knocking out the Indian representative, what of the white settler
representative whose constituency numbered but a few hundred?345 Once again, it
appears as though Girouard acted too hastily. Had he checked with the published
official gazette, he would have noted that official recognition for Jeevanjee had already
been granted in London and that it was too late to do anything about it.346 He also
tipped his hand and inadvertently revealed his racist tendencies by demanding that
Jeevanjee be dismissed from his legislative post.
The Indians were mostly ordinary working class, the actual builders of the
railroad. They were very industrious and could perform works vital for the development
of the region. Among them, there were mainly traders, masons, carpenters, porters,
clerks, and surveyors. They served the protectorate well, working in many different
areas like road construction, post offices and customs. In fact, many Indians adapted
well to East Africa and did not feel the need to return back home. Indian agglomeration
in the growing cities was economically considerable and quite noticeable. As Bhatt
noted, “According to the earliest census carried out in the protectorate in 1911, there
were approximately 11,000 Indians in the country. In Nairobi with a population of
14,161, Indians were 3,171 while 591 were Goans. The rest of the population comprised
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of 799 Europeans, 76 Eurasians and 9,524 Africans. Mombasa’s Indian population was
3,820.”347
Although many Asiatics were not keen on becoming cash crop agriculturists, the
vast majority opened bazaars along the railroad and other trade routes, developing
profitable businesses. Indian small businesses reached many corners of the
protectorate. They were mainly established in the growing urban centers like Nairobi,
Machakos, Kisumu, Naivasha, and Kisii, just to name a few. They ventured and traded
in rural areas that provided markets for some farm produce like dairy products, beans,
potatoes and more. They were also successful businessmen who prospered in the EAP
where many European settlers could not even scratch the surface yet, despite possessing
the best land. Bhatt pointed out that: “A.M. Jeevanjee, and Allidina Visram had
established vast business empires that covered much of East African region. Others
included Adamjee Alibhoy who had been invited to Machakos by the provincial
Commissioner for Ukamba Province, John Ainsworth in 1898 to establish a retail outlet;
Gulamhussein Abdulah Datto who established a successful auction business in Nairobi;
Deroda Shami Harji who established a succesfull construction company in Kisumu,
among others.”348
The CO was cognizant of the Indian contributions in East Africa. In fact, the
Indian rupee was used as the official currency since 1898. And according to Mangat, it
replaced “the Maria Theresa dollar which had been operational until this time, and in
1910 the National Bank of India became the official bank of the protectorate.”349 This
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was not well welcomed by the settlers who wanted everything to be modeled in
conformity to the English system back home.
The Asiatics were important contributors in the economy of the region and some
British officials who visited the protectorate took notice. Sir Edward C. Buck, Secretary
of the Department of Revenue and Agriculture in the Indian government, witnessed the
important involvement of the Indians in East Africa since 1905. Also Churchill, on his
visit to the protectorate in 1907, noticed the tenacious character of the Indians and was
of the opinion that they deserved a fair political representation in its administration. But
when it came to Girouard, he seemed to have not realized the valuable contribution of
the Indians. He failed to recognize the importance of the Indians in the region. For a
man of his experience, this was a big misstep because the Indian presence was manifest
almost everywhere in the protectorate. The governor paid more attention to the small
European settler community. He was a bold, but shortsighted, governor.
With Girouard as the locomotive engineer, he was now full-steam underway to
the carrying of his settler passengers to their homes in the “white man’s country” he was
going to carve out for them in the highlands. The settlers needed a free ride to the
Legco. This was utopia because so far the settlers’ contribution in the economy of the
region was quasi-insignificant, and they feared the Indian competition. They viewed the
Indians as a force that was quickly proliferating and could, with all due justice in mind,
stand for their rights. If deprived of representation and ignored, the Indians would
eventually rise up for their rights. Churchill foresaw the danger of a possible isolation of
the Africans and Indians earlier in his visit to the region. He was against the opinion
that the protectorate could ever become a white man’s country in the sense of Canada or
the United Kingdom. Confronted with the conflicting claims of European, Indian and
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African, he argued that the tropical protectorates were big enough for all, that a place
could be found for the European settler and for the Indian trader and agriculturalist in a
country that fundamentally belonged to the Africans. Churchill understood the
complicated social context of the EAP and wrote the following: “In truth the problems of
East Africa are the problems of the world. We see the social, racial and economic
stresses which rack modern society already at work here, but in miniature . . . The
British Government has it in its hands to shape the development and destiny of these
new countries and their varied peoples with an authority and from an elevation far
superior to that with which Cabinets can cope with giant tangles at home. And the fact
stirs in mind.”350
Nevertheless, the governor had a different view of the situation. Girouard
believed that the small group of whites was entitled to representation on the Legco
solely based on their race. Nothing else makes any sense, given what we know about
this situation. The reasoning behind Girouard’s position with regard to Jeevanjee
actually served to undercut the right of the settlers to have a representative on the
Legco. Girouard was not making a good impression in London or with the colonial
administration in place in the protectorate. He appeared as a sad little fool. Moreover,
his opinions and actions favoring the settlers in this case laid the foundation for the
Indian question, which caused such great controversy later in Kenya’s history.
What did Girouard get for his troubles on behalf of the settlers? He got nothing,
up to this point. Yet he continued to go out on a limb for them. Another example of this
was Girouard’s favoring the settlers’ point of view in his handling of the CO’s desired
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changes in the EAP’s land laws. That was not all the governor tried to do for the
colonists. When he was confronted with the issue of labor provision and taxation in the
protectorate, he also tried to formulate policies that would benefit the colonists.
The dragging issues of the land bill implementation, sufficient labor supply and
taxation.
The new governor was concerned about the rather “moribund” state of the EAP’s
economy. He believed that most of the settlers were “discontented and bitter” because
the economy was not growing and was failing to provide them with opportunities for
development. Land policy and the terms of leases were important elements in this. In a
telegram to the Secretary of State in early 1910, Girouard reported on the revision of the
Crown Lands Ordinance that had been suspended pending his input. The new governor
took up Delamere’s position in opposing the writing in of rent revision after thirty-three
years. He agreed with Delamere that the settlers would, “very probably” get some form
of self-government by then, thus making the provision nothing but an “unnecessary
aggravation.” He reasoned that it would most likely be undone.351 In this Girouard was
compliant with the wishes of Delamere and the large landholders. Even as early as
November of 1909, Girouard urged that the size of any holding was of no importance.352
It only mattered that the land was being developed. In our contemporary parlance, this
was tantamount to throwing the small farmers “under the bus,” most of whom were
people of color who would be soon find themselves alienated from their land and homes
all to make room for the expansive development plans of the white settler class, whose
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dreams included turning the EAP into a “white man’s country,” like their beloved South
Africa.
So what did Girouard demand from the settlers for this huge concession? Once
again, no demands were made. As it was during Eliot’s administration, Girouard had
his own way of formulating policies he found suitable for the protectorate. He also
interpreted the orders of the CO in his own way. For instance, he failed to implement the
land ordinance the CO had long desired. This was a dragging issue due to the fact that
the late governor Sadler failed to get the land ordinance amended to meet the desires of
Lord Elgin and the CO.
With the governorship of Girouard, still no progress was made on the matter. In
part, as Sorrenson underlined, this was due to the fact that “Crewe had agreed to
withhold a decision on the version passed by the Legco in 1909 until Girouard had
examined the situation on the spot.”353 With time elapsing and the problem over the
land bill unsolved, the Europeans settlers were busy with their efforts in trying to block
the implementation of the revised ordinance desired by London. Girouard knew that the
colonists did not want any implementation of the land bill. He approached the CO,
pointing out that: “there was a very strong feeling . . . in the country entirely averse to
any revision of rentals within the period of a 99 years lease.”354 It is to say here that the
general mood and discontent in the protectorate were the manifestation of the settlers’
frustrations who believed that they were being hampered by the CO. Any effort made to
prevent dummying or an introduction of land tax was not desired by the settlers. They
considered land accumulation, as normal phenomena in this new protectorate that they
353
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believed would become a self-governing territory in a very near future. Girouard
appeared to be so in tune with the settlers that he did not even need to ask them what
they needed. He wanted the land bill to remain the same and that translated to the
benefit of the expatriates pushing for cheap land.
Reactions in the CO emerged when the governor formally asked not to modify the
land bill. Butler, the private secretary of S of S Lewis Harcourt, noticed that the governor
was leaning more and more towards the settlers’ camp. Butler affirmed that the
governor was “prepared to throw over, in deference to the wishes of the White Settlers,
the conditions imposed by the Secretary of State.”355 The governor was like a magic
goose that could be counted on to continually lay golden eggs for the influential
newcomers. The fact that settlers, with Girouard by their side, were successful in
blocking the land bill marked a significant turning point in Kenya political history. With
the unsolved land issue in the EAP, a major problem was created without a solution and
sooner or later it would resurface in the region as long as the settlers were present
asking for privileges while aspiring for political power. Their longtime cry was “no
taxation without representation” alluding that the Africans must be taxed and forced to
work.
The necessity of implementing the land bill was not the only issue facing
Girouard. The European settlers had long been concerned with securing an adequate
supply of labor. They also believed that measures needed to be put in place to effectively
monitor and tax the Africans. In the EAP, no colonial administration enjoyed much
success in dealing with these issues, deemed so important by the European settlers.
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Girouard also inherited labor troubles from Sadler’s administration; and this was largely
due to the settlers’ constant demands for the cheap provision of men ready to work.
Land ownership, labor supply and taxation were issues of concern for the
colonists because they never stopped advocating tax increases to manipulate the
Africans into working for meager wages. The newcomers also expected the Africans’
holding of land to be limited so that they could benefit from the situation by getting a
more readily available labor supply. The idea was that with Africans confined in small
groups in alienated areas, a permanent labor supply would be secured. The colonists
feared the possibility of the creation of reserves where the Africans could remain far
away on their own, dodging taxes and working for themselves. The Africans, whom the
settlers thought of as "lazy children who must work harder if they wanted to get out of
poverty," were not free to choose their own destiny. Keeping Africans in reserves or
having them living in small groups for the sake of fulfilling the settlers' need for labor
was altogether wrong. There was no policy suitable for the Africans as long as the
European colonists were lobbying for their interests in the region. With the European
settlers being able to wine and dine the governor, their political influence had its effect
in shaping the policies of the EAP. One of their best tactics was to effectively manipulate
the governor by befriending and winning his confidence. Consequently, the political
influence of the colonists had its effects on the governor’s theory of solving the pending
labor crisis. As Clayton and Savage described it:
…he wished to follow the South African pattern of a Native Affairs Department actively
‘encouraging’ men to work for settlers, thinking in terms of a ‘Recruitment of Native
Labour Ordinance’ and a ‘Masters Union’ of employers for recruiting. The Colonial Office
offered no support for this latter proposal and it found little favour locally. Nevertheless
Girouard personally urged chiefs to recruit labour, and his administrative officers
returned to the old practices of ‘encouragement’ with few questions asked, even giving
the chiefs quotas of men which their area were to produce. Girouard’s views on land,
taxation and policy in the reserves also coincided with the views of the more moderate of
the settlers and served their interests. His work included a general improvement in the
efficiency of the administration, measures to strengthen the authority of the chiefs,
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instructions to administrative officers on their duties which for example included a
requirement that provincial commissioners were to include notes on where labour might
be obtained in their handing-over reports, and increases in the number of these officers
in the more heavily populated reserve areas to tax and perhaps ‘encourage’; these actions
all greatly helped the settler and his labour supply.356

Looking at the other side of the coin, one comes to the realization that having the
Africans do the work to develop the protectorate and pay the taxes only added to their
misery; and that was a dangerous social situation in the making because the day would
eventually arrive when the mistreated, underpaid, and landless workers would rise up
and strike blows to secure their freedom. Keeping the Africans down in favor of the
European settlers was not something desired by the CO, but the decisions being made
always benefited the settlers. The colonists in the EAP would not even be satisfied with
the fact that the Africans were required to pay taxes or face penalty of imprisonment. A
hut and poll tax ordinance was introduced in the Legco in 1909. A poll tax was
introduced in 1910 for adult men who had not paid hut tax. For adult African men, this
tax was mandatory. The tax was 3 rupees payable in cash or in kind.357 In March 1911,
Delamere demanded increased freight rates be levied on the unbleached white garment
worn by Africans and blankets. 358 That was synonym to a method of indirect taxation
coercing the Africans further to work for Europeans. The European settlers who
believed in representation without taxation decided earlier in 1909 to join forces and
come together politically as a single strong party.
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Together as one: The European settlers’ Convention of Associations
The settlers for whom Girouard blocked the implementation of the CO’s desired
changes in the land ordinance were not unified politically. The settlers differed in
background, wealth, priorities and political inclination. The smaller landowners of the
Pastoralists’ Association, largely centered around the region of Nakuru in the highlands,
voiced concern over Delamere and some of the more wealthy arrivals and their
acquisitions of vast lands along with attendant political influence. Robert Chamberlain,
another South African immigrant, had emerged as the spokesman for this group. But
realizing their overall small numbers, the pastoralists and other small organizations
came to the conclusion that it would be better to work with the likes of Delamere and the
CA than to fight them. After all, presenting a unified front to the administration of the
EAP as well as the CO was to be essential if any progress were to be made among the
white population. Chamberlain was of the opinion that such a “Confederation” would
best serve the interests of all concerned.359 And apparently others in settler leadership
were in agreement, for in September 1908 the idea of forming a “Central Committee”
was advanced for consideration; and just two years later, a Convention of Associations
was convened. As Ross described the process:
Ideas of combined action progressed slowly at first. In 1909 the Colonists’ Association,
the Pastoralists’ Association and the Malindi Coast Planters’ Association decided to form
a Central Committee of Federated Associations. A split took place in the Colonists’
Association because it was becoming too political. Mr. Grogan’s scheme of April 1907 for
a political federation of all the European associations in the country had not been taken
up. He appealed again, on August 3rd, 1910, for an association, not of individuals, but of
associations. Lord Delamere had just previously placed his resignation, on some pretext
or other, before the Colonists’ Association (on July 25th, 1910), and withdrawn it four
days later. On August 4th he again resigned, demanding the adoption of the Convention
of Associations. This being conceded, he withdrew this resignation also. No count has
been kept of the number of times that Lord Delamere has resigned from various bodies
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in East Africa. In a circle that was formerly wide, but which is now narrowing, the threat
has often sufficed to effect compliance with his wishes. Eight associations and two
chambers of commerce were invited to meet for the first Convention on October 3rd,
1910. The proposal was then formally put and adopted, and an inaugural dinner was
held next month, with Governor Sir Percy Girouard as an invited guest. One Association,
the Limoru Farmers, formally revoked its previous non-political character. The others
slid into the new activities in which the promoters of this new venture chose to utilize
their services.360

This was the dawn of a new day. From now on, the governor and administration
of the EAP would then have to deal more with the representatives of a powerful
organization, the Convention of Associations (C of A), rather than with individual
settlers. This body was sometimes referred to solely as the “Convention,” and at other
times as the “Settler’s Parliament” or “White Parliament.” Dilley maintained that it
“exerted an influence far beyond any unofficial organization.”361 By this, she meant that
it served to provide a medium for the expression of European settler political opinion.
By and large, this C of A operated in accordance with the principal that the “squeaky
wheel gets the grease.” In this, the settlers did not hesitate to employ the tactics of
agitation in achieving their objectives. They were so proficient in this political technique
that seemingly “spontaneous campaigns” could quickly be assembled and mobilized.
Ross, who was present in the EAP during that time, consistently maintained that the
convention was so powerful that every governor of the protectorate ended up being
subservient to it. The settlers’ influence was high to such a degree that Girouard became
their envoy to London to defend their cause. The continued settler agitations for
legislative representation persisted throughout 1910, so much so that in August of that
year the governor made a trip to London where he took hold of the opportunity to
discuss this issue with the powers-that-be in the CO. As Girouard proclaimed that he
360
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was making this trip at the behest of the settlers,362 the CO decided to listen carefully to
his message and graciously received him. Usually, the governor would find that the C of
A was quite helpful to him in addressing most issues facing the protectorate, except for
that of African and Asian labor. On their part, the settlers remained politically active.
In 1910, the chairmanship of the C of A passed to the hands of the ruthless
Grogan and that meant that more settlers’ grievances were going to emerge. The first
meeting of the C of A was convened in February 1911. There were 19 delegates from
eight regional organizations in attendance. Some of the issues coming before the
Convention were the so-called “Colonists’ Plot,” the Asiatic question, railway
management, the construction of a deep water pier, the protectorate’s representation at
a forthcoming Imperial Conference, a pass law for the Africans, the so-called “Kaffirfarming” question, European educational standards and the matter of a poll tax. But
most on the minds of the delegates was their uniform concern with securing greater
representation on the Legco; and this is the issue that would persist in settler demands
well into the next decade.363
The settlers, now politically organized to a higher degree than ever before, began
to think of themselves more as a “parliament,” of sorts, when they assembled for this
first meeting of the C of A.364 At this gathering, many of the EAP’s officialdom were in
attendance, as pressing issues such as the enforcement of the “native pass laws” and the
nagging “Asiatic questions” were brought up for panel discussions.365 Delegations were
sent to the governor about the attainment of elected representation, which the settlers
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believed was “almost within a hand’s reach.”366 Girouard was sympathetic with the
delegates, but expressed his opinion that the CO would most likely not do anything to
make this happen anytime soon.
However, by this time the CO realized that London was dealing with another
“loose cannon” on the deck of the EAP. Girouard was supposed to be their man in the
protectorate, representing the interests of the crown. But here he came to London,
pressing the demands of the small but vocal group of settlers, who had now bonded
together in a semi-parliamentary type of political organization. Interestingly, as time
advanced, the power of the Convention continued to grow. Later governors would come
to rely even more heavily on this representative body, whose ranks became filled with
colonial officials and heads of various departments who would serve in an advisory
capacity in hearing, discussing and putting forth “reasonable views” for both the EAP
administration and the CO to dutifully consider. But to say that the Convention was
truly reflective of the “official world” would not be accurate, for some of its most vaunted
members were actually appointed by the crown to be there as representatives of the
EAP’s vast African population.
Clearly, the C of A membership was very effective in generating propaganda to
advocate for the cause of the settlers as well as rally against those officials who may have
worked against their interests. Ross referred to the C of A propaganda apparatus as the
protectorate’s “Big Noise.” Wrote Ross, “The Convention was in no way representative
of the official world, nor of the vast African population for which some of the official
members stood as representatives. It shows to what an extent the mind even of a keen
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observer, when new to the Colony, could be obsessed by the importance of one noisy
political group.”367 Clearly then, the propaganda machine only went into gear when it
operated in the interest of the small amount of white colonists in the EAP. Heaven
forbid that it should have anything positive to say advancing the interests of the Africans
or Asians.
Without a doubt, Girouard was nothing like anyone in the CO had even vaguely
imagined. He was acting without authority, and doing more than any other
administrator to represent the settlers’ interests over every other subject of the crown
within the territory of the EAP.368 This way of favoring the European settlers
deliberately awakened the Indian’s conscience and they finally expressed themselves.
Indians in the EAP, deprived of representation in the Legco since
September 1911, put forward demands for an Indian to be a member of the
council. In early April 1912, moreover, the Mombasa Indian Association
sent a petition to the governor protesting against the new non-native poll
tax. The major basis for their protest was as there was no Indian member
of the Legco, the measure was equivalent to taxation without
representation. In forwarding the petition to London, acting governor
Bowring maintained that the absence of an Indian member was ‘not
because we refuse the principle of Indian representation but because no
suitable member of the British Indian community is available.’369
Such was the attitude of the CS vis a vis the question of Indian representation.
Nevertheless, the Indians later organized themselves like the European settlers to better
channel their grievances. They later went on to form the East African Indian National
Congress (EAINC).370 As regard to the Africans, they had no political representation yet
and they were subject to all kind of abuse under Girouard’s watch.
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Death of an African and the case of a flagrant miscarriage of justice
Just how far Girouard would go in advancing settler interests over not just those
of Indians but those of the crown was more than aptly demonstrated in his handling of
the so-called “Cole case,” an action that was construed as a severe violation of the
human rights that should have been afforded all Africans in the protectorate. The
incident that reflected poorly on the Girouard governorship was the 31 May 1911 trial of
the white settler, Galbraith Cole, charged with murdering an African that he suspected
of robbing some of his sheep, and further complicating the matter by not reporting it to
the police. Turning a blind eye to a crime as severe as the murder of an African in the
protectorate was not going to pass unnoticed at the CO. Nevertheless, the governor
tried to minimize the impact of the crime just to protect Cole.
While, the French Canadian engineer ruled the rails of the British East Africa
Protectorate, a massive train wreck was in a making. Girouard played the role of
supervisor and administrator of the EAP, and that led to his downfall. The governor did
not understand that the CO was his employer. In the Cole case, Girouard went on too
far in not wanting to be clear with the CO. Why didn’t Girouard play fair and accept his
role? He wanted to please the settlers no matter the price. It was for this reason that
Girouard had earlier decided to cater to the big men from the colonists’ camp.
Regarding the murder case, it was important to point out that the settler involved here
had influence. Galbraith Cole was not just an ordinary settler, at least in the sense of
being cut from the traditional South African cloth of the vast majority of whites finding
their way into the EAP. He was the son of the Earl of Enniskillen and the brother-in-law
of Lord Delamere, himself the wealthiest and most influential of the settlers and the
anointed of the newly emergent C of A. Reflective of his high status among the settler
223

class, Cole owned and supervised the operations of a large ranch estate near Lake
Elementeita.371
The court had convened in the heart of the white highlands, Nakuru district; and
at the trial, which lasted but the space of a couple of hours during one afternoon, Cole
brazenly admitted that he had shot a black man that he suspected of stealing some of his
sheep. And while the judge did admonish the jury of nine white men to confine
themselves to the evidence at hand pertinent to the charge of murder, they nevertheless
took but five minutes to reach a decision of acquittal for Cole.372 And while the jury’s
decision sparked outrage throughout the whole of East Africa, it took Girouard one
entire week before he even bothered to inform the CO by telegram of the incident.
While Girouard did mention that it might be possible to appeal the verdict, he
went on to state that he, upon receipt of legal counsel, would strongly advise against
taking such an action. It was better to just ignore the incident, hoping that the memory
of it among the Africans and others incensed by it in East Africa would quickly fade.
Girouard actually sided with the settlers in this case, letting the CO know, in his
telegram, that “the crime is due to the prevalence of unrestrained stock theft.”373 In
other words, the life of a black man in East Africa counted for less than that of a sheep.
Girouard was already up the proverbial creek without a paddle, for the East
Africa Department (EAD) had already garnered some details of the Cole case through
pre-trial press reports of the preliminary inquiry, held five days before the actual trial
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took place. The head of the EAD, H. J. Read, was outraged by Girouard’s apparent low
prioritization of this case. Read noted that, “It seems to me that murder is murder and
that it is out of the question to let the matter slide in the easy manner he [Sir P.
Girouard] appears to contemplate.”374
Others in the CO were in agreement with Read. Sir George Fiddes, the assistant
under-secretary of state, felt that “Girouard had a plain duty to appeal such a
particularly atrocious case.” To correct this situation, Read wanted the CO to reply with
a strong telegram to Girouard. And even the Secretary of State Lewis Harcourt jumped
in, dashing off a telegram to Girouard on 12 June 1911 that made it more than clear that
“a callous and unjustifiable murder” had transpired in the EAP and that a “gross
miscarriage of justice”375 had been allowed to occur.
And that is what happened. The CO’s telegram urged Girouard to “appeal from
the order for acquittal if you are advised that it is possible,”376 regardless of whether he
felt that it would result in a more favorable decision for the crown. Of course, the
British Empire must always be seen as standing on the side of justice for all its subjects.
Nevertheless, one week later Girouard, in replying to the telegram, stated that
such an appeal was legally impossible. For the remainder of the month and most of the
next month, Girouard did not hear anything more from Harcourt or anyone else at the
CO. He was beginning to worry. He knew that the case had stirred up a hornet’s nest at
the CO and he was not hearing anything more. He knew that the CO wanted some
corrective action and that it was up to him to provide something. If Girouard did not
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throw the dog a bone pretty soon, he was going to get his legs gnawed off. That per se
would not have been pleasant for Sir Percy Girouard.
And so it was that at the end of June the governor sent an official dispatch and
private letter to London providing further details about the case. This dispatch also
included a thorough copy of the Nakuru district court proceedings. Unfortunately,
Girouard could not help but including a reference to the crime as being “due to the
prevalence of unchecked stock thefts.”377 Apparently, he learned nothing from the
receipt of prior communiqués that this was considered by the CO as nothing but a lame
excuse for the unjust murder perpetuated by Cole and sustained by the exclusively white
settler jury. Nevertheless, in his private letter of 25 June, Girouard did recommend to
Secretary of State Harcourt that within the EAP there be a “suspension of trial by jury”
and that the “deportation of Mr. Cole” be facilitated. He also asked Harcourt for some
guidance on this matter, insofar as he was “unsure of my exact rights and your possible
orders in the case.”378
The hornets were now abuzz in the EAD of the CO. H. F. Batterbee was
befuddled as to why the defense counsel “did not attempt to set up any defense and
evidently relied upon the jury to acquit simply because he was a white man.” And the
permanent under-secretary Sir John Anderson stridently urged that Girouard’s second
recommendation for the deportation of Cole be expeditiously carried out in accordance
with the provisions of Section 25.1 of the 1902 East Africa Order-in-Council, insofar as
Cole was “conducting himself so as to be dangerous to peace, order and good
government in East Africa.” To make this happen, Anderson pointed out that all that
377
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Governor Girouard needed to do was sign a single affidavit attesting to Cole’s despicable
actions, thereby ordering his deportation. The Secretary of State was in total agreement
with Anderson and noted that it was “a very horrible case…. Cole must be deported.”379
Therefore, on the very same day he received Anderson’s recommendation, 28 July 1911,
Harcourt send the following telegram to Nairobi: “On reading papers in the Cole case,
have come to the conclusion that he must be departed under Section 25.1 of Order-inCouncil. If you have any observations to make, telegraph them at once as I wish to
direct deportation immediately.”380
What was it about the word “immediately” that Girouard failed to understand? It
took him until the 10th of August, after many telegraphic promptings at that, to finally
respond to Harcourt; and his response was totally unsatisfactory when it was received at
the CO. Harcourt and the others at the CO were in a state of shock. Girouard had
conducted an end-run around them, consulting various judges in the High Court and the
Executive Council instead of immediately carrying out the deportation order. As the
judges informed him that an individual acquitted could not be deported, Girouard
deemed it sufficient to close the case. However, as the CO saw it, Girouard did not need
to consult any judges on a case that might someday appear before them, as all they could
do is offer up an opinion, and not a legal binding decision. Girouard, they believed, was
duty-bound to carry out their directive per Section 25.1 of the statute and deport Cole
from the EAP forthwith.381
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Concerning this failure to comply with orders on the part of Girouard, the CO had
quickly responded, duly informing the governor that he had entirely misunderstood the
reason for the deportation. Concerning this matter, the CO observed that the only
connection with the trial was that evidence there established that Cole “is conducting
himself so as to be dangerous to peace and good order whose continued presence in the
protectorate may provide reprisals by natives.” The CO legal advisors held that no
appeal could be made against a deportation order under section 25.1 of the 1902 orderin-council. Thus Girouard was ordered “to undertake the necessary steps to effect the
deportation.”382
On 22 August, Girouard telegraphed the CO, still indicating his reluctance to
carry out the deportation order unless law officers of the crown in London would make a
determination that it was a legal action. Harcourt, of course, was not at all happy with
Girouard’s delaying tactics. He sent a telegram back to the governor stating that he was
not going to refer the matter to legal advisors in London and that Girouard should not
further resist in issuing the deportation warrant.383
The governor, however, still remained obstinate. On 5 September 1911, he
telegraphed London with word that he had once again consulted his Executive Council
and that he was going to issue the deportation order, but in protest, and only under
orders from London. He then sent a convoluted critique of the interpretation of Section
25.1 as previously provided by the CO.384
Everyone at the CO was aghast at the nerve of Girourd in defying specific
instructions. Since when has the governor of a protectorate acted in such defiance?
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Read noted that Girouard was clearly attempting to “divest himself of all responsibility
in the matter;” and that was something that simply would not do. Harcourt, for his part,
consulted with legal counsel, and immediately issued a strong telegram urging the
governor to comply with the provisions of the 1902 order exactly. The Secretary of State
also reiterated Read’s concerns about the governor divesting himself of the
responsibility of carrying out instructions issued by his office and noted that, “I regret
that throughout this case I have failed to receive from you the cooperation to which I
consider myself entitled.”385
While Girouard eventually carried out the order, Harcourt could not help but
lament the governor’s reluctance in following through with Cole’s deportation. After the
dust of the Cole case had settled, Harcourt personally rebuked Girouard: “So far as
lending me ready assistance, you continued to raise difficulties which appeared to me to
be adequately covered by the instructions and opinions already sent to you.”386 Harcourt
realized that the incompetence and unwillingness of the governor to obey his orders
were clear proof that Girouard was not the right man to run the protectorate. He was an
embarrassment for the CO because he blatantly favored the colonists at all cost. In fact,
the period of the Cole’s murder case turmoil that kept the CO officials on edge was not
the only time Girouard would risk his career and reputation to protect the settlers. The
Europeans settlers who always wanted cheap land and more living space for potential
relatives, who might join them in settling permanently in the region, were directly the
benefactors of Girouard’s decision to relocate the Maasai. The settlers’ political
influence greatly influenced the governor’s daring policy formulation. Girouard went on
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to deliberately move the Maasai dispossessing them of their land for the benefit of the
colonists. This was déjà –vu all over again because the first Maasai move took place in
1904 under Stewart administration.
The second Maasai move: Stirring up a hornet’s nest
The second Maasai move was a clear example of the governor’s deliberate and
unfair policy formulation in favor of European settlers, as in the Cole case. If Girouard
had looked at the history of the first Maasai move, he would not have engaged in
negotiations and new tactics to again displace the pastoralists. Creating a new reserve
was synonymous to a clear violation of the Maasai’s rights, a disruption of their long
traditions and way of life. You can call this the second Maasai predicament.
Commissioner Stewart, who witnessed and slightly participated in the negotiations that
sanctioned the first displacement of the Maasai, warned about the danger of having the
settlers in the region demanding more land.
The initiative of moving the Maasai in 1904 was problematic. The issue dragged
over from Eliot’s administration to Stewart’s brief tenure. Stewart then made a
prophetic prediction and, as narrated by Ross, stated the following: “After Masai stock
had grazed and improved the rough land on Laikipia, to which they were going, settlers
would be certain to cast envious eyes upon it as they had already done on the Rift Valley,
and he had therefore inserted a phrase in the Agreement of August 1904 that would
obviate further trouble. It was the ‘settlement now arrived at shall be enduring so long
the Masai as a race shall exist, and that Europeans or other settlers shall not be allowed
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to take up land in the Settlements.’”387 The agreement fell into oblivion, and for a second
time in less than seven years the pastoralists were being forced to move again. It was
clear that moving the pastoralists was going to directly benefit the European settlers.
One might speculate that Girouard’s falling out with the CO on this issue had less
to do with his moving of the Maasai out of the area than with his promise of their
vacated land on the Laikipia plateau to the white settlers. Girouard, on 7 October 1911,
in replying to a telegram sent to him by Harcourt on 5 October 1911, assured the
Secretary of State that no land rights of former Maasai lands had been given or
promised. This was good enough for Harcourt, who then advised the House of
Commons in mid-April 1912 that, “no alloctions of land occupied by the Northern Masai
had yet been made.”388
But much to the dismay of the Secretary of State, it appears that such promises
were made. According to the Provincial Commissioner C. R. W. Lane, farms had been
promised to settlers as early as April 1910, to be carved out of Maasai lands at Laikipia.
But this was not actually confirmed to Harcourt by Girouard until he was on home leave
to London in May 1912. The governor was at a complete loss in reconciling his denials
of 7 October 1911 with what he was relating to Harcourt in this 8 May 1912 interview.389
As in the Cole case, Girouard was not being truthful with the CO. The Maasai
eventually contracted European attorneys to help them file suit for the return of their
appropriated lands; but the Secretary of State down to the lowest functionary of the
EAD at the CO was thoroughly embarrassed by the affair.
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After Girouard’s forced resignation from the colonial service in July 1912, his
successor as governor, Sir Henry Belfield, would of necessity be required to spend about
a third of his time refusing to recognize promises previously made to the settlers during
the prior administration. One CO official, six years after the tenure of Girouard, noted
that “there is nothing in his [Girouard’s] record in East Africa to show that his efforts
would be directed to the permanent welfare of the country rather than to the expediency
of the moment and his own popularity.”390 Girouard was captured by the colonists’
political machine and as long that he was going to favor them by economically
suffocating the Africans and Indians, more struggle for a clear plan of economic was in
the horizon.
The CO, however, did realize that some of the promises made to the settlers
would have to be kept, even if at least partially, to preserve the integrity of the crown.
Harcourt later conceded that this would apply only to any contacts entered into by
Girouard on the part of the EAP with the settlers during the year of 1910.391 Girouard’s
eastern express locomotive that was carrying the most extreme and boldest European
political animals in the EAP finally crashed. His administration was a disaster worse
than Eliot’s chaotic tenure as commissioner of the most troublesome British possession
in Africa.
The demise of the European settlers’ ally: A fait accompli
Girouard was highly regarded by the CO, which expected him to hit the ground
running. With his appointment, the CO wanted to foster peace and development
throughout the protectorate. The main concern of the CO was to make sure that
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Africans were not left behind, all the while generating profits for the British Empire. In
the EAP, Girouard hit the ground hard and crashed. And so it was that Girouard’s star
fell from the heavens like a blazing comet. His poor handling of both the Maasai move
and the Cole case demonstrated his unparalleled ability to treat the CO personnel like
mushrooms, always keeping them in the dark and feeding them manure. Both issues
raised concerns about the validity of British justice in the EAP. Furthermore, all of
Girouard’s policies were sympathetic to the settlers and gained nothing for the empire
or its interests in the area.
Confident that they had Girouard on their side, the settlers through their C of A
went on to demand elective representation in the Legco in November of 1911. To that
demand, Girouard gave an astonishing answer. He explicitly wrote the following: “A
petition was presented to me for transmission to the Secretary of State praying for the
application of the elective principle for the unofficial members of the Legco. This was
duly forwarded, but I could not see my way to recommend the proposal at present.”392
The governor, for the first time in his mandate, rebuked the colonists’ demand for
elective representation. Perhaps Girouard by now realized that he did not gain anything
from his liaisons with the colonists. He appeared like a sad fool because he painted
himself into a corner and had to wait until the paint dried before he could get out of the
room. The response of Girouard clearly contradicted the remarks he made in his first
report about the political state of the protectorate. When he took over the governorship
of this trouble-ridden British dependency, he criticized some of the officials in the
Legco, finding them weak and passive. He then wanted to see more unofficial members
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from the colonists’ camp to have seats and participate in the political debate of the
Legco.393
Girouard now flip-flopped, making a 360-degree about face. Paying attention to
the last line he wrote concerning the petition: “I could not see my way to recommend
the proposal at present,” one could easily surmise that he was just waiting for the
political cloud covering the troublesome protectorate to clear. For by attesting that
there was nothing he could do at that present time, he left the political door open for the
settlers. What he wrote meant that if not now, maybe or surely later, the colonists’
petition will be able to resurface. Knowing the nature and character of the settlers,
coupled with their traditional season for trouble from February to April, it would be just
a matter of time before the CO would be hearing from them again, knocking on their
door with the same tired plea. The colonists’ persistence in pushing their agenda was
pointed out by Dilley, who remarked that:
From the first Europeans have looked forward to the time when they would have full
self-government, or responsible government, for themselves. Always, even while urging a
particular change, such as appointed unofficial on a legislative council in 1905 or elected
representatives in 1913, they have insisted that they were asking for a moderate change
in no way endangering the control of the Colonial Office over the population of the
Colony. However, they have always had the ultimate goal in view. As soon as one gain
has been made, sometimes before it has been completed, demands have begun for
additional reforms. While they were waiting for elective representation, responsible
opinion was demanding changes in Colonial Office practice granting more power to the
Legislative Council, including the elected representatives. Lord Delamere, when the
terms of the legislation were being discussed, in his first election manifesto said: ‘The
chief duty of your representative is, I am sure, to help forward any policy which by
increasing the population and wealth of the country brings nearer self-government.’394

The settlers’ strong belief in the possibilities of running the protectorate by themselves
in the near future emboldened them to act like “pure political animals”, on and off the
EAP’s political stage. They wanted the protectorate to be left to them.
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Such an agenda was pushed in a variety of ways during Girouard’s term. To the
settlers, success meant creating a white man’s country; and the likes of Grogan and
Delamere carried themselves as if they had already established it. Grogan’s flogging of
Africans and the murder of an African by Galbraith Cole were clear indications of the
violations of Africans rights. These cases are definitive examples of how most of the
colonists behaved in the EAP. The colonists thought that they were above the law and
believed that they could act with impunity, meaning that no punishment whatsoever
could be levied against them, no matter how grave the crime they committed. These two
cases, although they occurred during two different administrations, with the former
during Sadler’s tenure and the latter under Girouard’s watch, brought the debate of the
true meaning of crime and the application of punishment in the EAP. Could the
European settlers get away with crime without enduring the reaction of the CO officials
or the humanitarians in England? Nevertheless, in the EAP when justice was served to
the colonists, it never matched the gravity of the crime. Impunity in the early political
days of the protectorate left a blue-print in the history of crime and punishment in
Kenya. More than a century after settlers’ violations of Africans’ rights, the president of
Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, found himself before the international criminal tribunal having
to respond to allegations of masterminding human rights violations and murder against
ordinary Africans who simply stood for their rights.
In the case of governor Girouard, who himself believed that unfair political
formulation benefiting the settlers was going to remain without consequences, it was
this kind of attitude that led to his downfall. Violations of Africans or Indians’ rights,
whether physical or discriminatory in the EAP, could not continue to be the news that
the CO was receiving from the protectorate because anything leading to a political
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embarrassment was not desired at Whitehall. Political embarrassment was a sour pill to
swallow because it could derail the political career of any official serving the British
Empire in the EAP.
Girouard, an appointed official of the British Empire, embarked on a fruitless
quest to crown himself the “king of the settlers,” without even taking into account that
their acclamations were kept for the likes of Delamere and Grogan. Girouard, now
considered a pariah in the colonial service, hobbled on until he finally saw the light and
resigned in July 1912. Everyone in the CO, and especially the EAD, let loose with a huge
sigh of relief.
Conclusion
Governor Girouard had done his best to safeguard the interests of the European
settlers throughout his tenure in the protectorate. The colonists grew stronger politically
and were pleased with the fact that the governor was their man. By the time that
Girouard resigned, three years after he took over, there was no doubt that the EAP was
not being administrated along the lines of British West Africa. The man that the CO
regarded as the right choice to bring peace and steady economic development in this
troublesome dependency did not fully count upon the contributions of the East African
people in the fulfillment of his mission. In the EAP, pro-European settlers policies
replaced pro-African policies such as were implemented in West Africa. In the EAP, the
presence of the European settlers changed the sociopolitical dynamic of the region due
the fact that it led to the economic disenfranchisement of the Africans, as well as the
Indians who also considered the region as their new home. Their demands to be
provided with cheap land, a plentiful labor supply and more political power shifted the
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balance of the priorities of the governor. His policy formulation directly benefited the
colonists. Ross elaborates on the “star power” Girouard exercised among the colonists:
With the European community Girouard was able to claim a considerable
measure of success. Apart from his championing of settler interests over the
Masai move there had been a decline in the settler spirit of factious opposition to
Government, and greater co-operation between Government departments and
the European population had been achieved. The reason for this was not hard to
see. The settlers had found themselves being led by a Governor who appreciated
many of their difficulties, and who was prepared to take active steps to improve
their lot.395
Nevertheless siding with the influential settlers to the point of depriving the
Africans and other groups present in the protectorate of their basic human rights was
not something desired by the CO. The office took action in removing undesirable settlers
like Cole from the protectorate and sacked Girouard; but the problems of the
protectorate were far from over. What kept the European settlers relatively quiet during
Girouard’s tenure was the fact that Girouard himself made numerous promises to them.
Of course, to the colonists these promises were regarded as a contract that the
successive administration would be obligated to follow through with. Girouard’s tenure
put the CO in a bind. The passage of years would not diminish the CO’s low estimation
of Girouard and his tendency to promise what he knew that neither he nor the empire
would be able to satisfy. A private Secretary at the EAD, W.C. Bottomley, later expressed
the fallouts from Girouard’s administration stating that:
The mark he left on the protectorate at the end of the administration in 1912 was
rather one of promise than of performance. His promises in fact were the chief
difficulty in the way of his successor and Sir Henry Belfield was continually in a
position of having to refuse to recognize alleged promises made to settlers by Sir
Percy Girouard…. There is nothing in his [Girouard’s] record in East Africa to
395
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show that his efforts would be directed to the permanent welfare of the country
rather than the expediency of the moment and his own popularity.396
It was clear to everyone in London and the protectorate itself that the policies, which
Girouard put in place, were going to cripple the following administration; and that
meant that the struggle to contain the settlers was not at all finished.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The various administrations imposed on the EAP between the period of 1902 and
1912 manifested as a continual struggle between the European colonists’ explicit desires
for cheap or free labor and land, as well as immediate and disproportionate political
representation against the CO’s desire for a caretaking and intermediate regime that
would ultimately, in the fullness of time, transfer power to the Africans and others of
His Majesty’s subjects in the region. The CO wanted to see the EAP converted into a
self-sustaining and democratically administered Crown Colony, with equal
representation for all, much on the same footing as Australia, Canada or New Zealand.
Dilley noted that: “This desire to establish a British colony in East Africa had certain
Imperial aspects. A white colony loyal to the British Empire would be the most effective
way of holding the country. It would assist in the support of the Uganda Railway. There
was a certain element of Imperial pride in the establishment of a British colony on the
equator, and it was important link in the north-and-south route in Africa. But there was
little active encouragement of colonization, as such, by the British authorities; their part
came in supporting those colonists who had gone out on their own initiative to settle
and develop a new country.”397 The European settlers who came to the EAP engaged in
politics of imperialism.
The politics of imperialism was a hotly debated subject in the Great Britain of the
early twentieth century. Both civil and political freedoms were viewed as mutually
dependent. But for the majority of His Majesty’s subjects, scattered across a global
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empire, these freedoms were virtually nonexistent. Perhaps it can be said that some
degree of representative government existed in Australia, Canada and New Zealand; but
even in these areas considerable population blocs seemed to be disenfranchised from
the body politic, i.e. Aboriginals in Australia, Quebecois in Canada and Maori in New
Zealand, to name a few. Let us not forget the exploited non-Northern European
immigrant labor force in all of these countries. The failure of even these larger British
colonies with majority white populations to incorporate these groups did not bode well
for any claims of the emergence of any genuine democracy in these places. In those
areas under British rule where the whites were vastly outnumbered, the idea that any
sort of democratic system was in place was purely laughable. For example, with regard
to South Africa, the point of origin for most of the white settlers in the EAP, one political
scientist of the day astutely noted that, “In Cape Colony and Natal events testify how
feebly the forms and even the spirit of the free British institutions have taken root in
States where the great majority of the population were always excluded from political
rights. The franchise and the rights it carries remain virtually a white monopoly in socalled self-governing colonies, where the coloured population was, in 1903, to the white
as four-to-one and ten-to-one, respectively.”398
In some of the older Crown colonies extant in 1905, there did exist, at least, some
representative element in government. Of course, the administration was totally vested
in a Crown-appointed governor, who in turn was assisted by a council of his own
choosing. Nevertheless, the colonists were afforded the right to elect a portion of the
legislative assembly. This system was in place in many of the British Caribbean islands,

398

Hobson, Imperialism,115.

240

in addition to the further reaches of Malta, Mauritius and Ceylon. But even in these
areas, the representative element never out-numbered the non-elected element. In
other words, these colonies’ respective legislative assemblies exercised more of an
advisory role rather than an authentic legislative function. Hobson elaborated on the
political implications of this situation: “Not merely is the elected always dominated in
numbers by the non-elected element, but in all cases the veto of the Colonial Office is
freely exercised upon measures passed by the assemblies. To this it should be added
that in nearly all cases a fairly high property qualification is attached to the franchise,
precluding the coloured people from exercising an elective power proportionate to their
numbers and their stake in the country.”399 In the EAP, this system of representation
was advocated by the CO.
Now it has been demonstrated that the CA comprised no more than 300
members at any time. Most of these members arrived in the EAP from South Africa
with big dreams of striking it rich, and in the process converting the protectorate into
one of the more prosperous of the Crown colonies; a true “white man’s country.” In lieu
of their small numbers and outrageous demands, and in consideration of the slow
democratization taking place in other areas with large colored contingents throughout
the Empire, it appears that the association members held an exaggerated view of their
own importance in the larger scheme. By acting against the Rudyard Kipling-inspired
“White Man’s Burden”400 of extending all manner of education and service to lift the
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quality of the colored races and bring them to the light and knowledge of Anglo-Saxon
civilization, they were also going against the wishes of the CO. The colonists were out of
step with the prevailing attitudes of their day; and as a consequence, their days in the
EAP were already numbered. Nevertheless, these European settlers that Churchill
described as “political animals” would not accept the reality on the terrain. They
decided to put up a fight and stand for their rights, in that instance, they engaged in
frequent political agitations which impacted the socio-economic stability of the
protectorate. The colonists’ political aggressiveness was not hard to detect due to the
fact that they had an incommensurable influence upon the imperial government and the
local administration. The newcomers’ political strategy led to a clear racial division
within the protectorate and that caused a problem that the CO did not want to see
happening in the region.
The various racial divisions within the protectorate worked against the long-term
goals of the CO and the empire in general. This was expressly noted in the highly vocal
European settler camp, many of whose members hailed from nearby South Africa.
Despite their meager numbers, the white settlers continually pushed the envelope,
generating incessant demands for concessions from London that would work in
transforming the protectorate into a so-called “white man’s county.” For that reason,
the ten year period from 1902 to 1912 might best be categorized in what Berman and
Lonsdale referred to as the emergence of “storm-tossed relationships of power” that
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only served to inhibit the social construction of a viable CS in line with the overall
objectives of the British Empire for the region.401
This was the main contradiction that needed resolution before the protectorate
could begin to advance to the status of a full-fledged colony. The plight of the Kikuyu
peoples is most demonstrative in this area, being highly representative of the complex
issues dealing with racial tension generated in both the African and European settler
communities. The Kikuyu, like most African peoples in the protectorate, came to be
viewed in terms of a “tribe” or as children who needed assistance from the civilized
colonists of the Empire. This negated, in turn, any further investigation into the interior
structures inherent in their society, as well as any rights they may have within it to claim
a nation state for themselves based on any true sense of Kikuyu nationalism. In other
words, their tribal status relegated them to the paternalistic whims of the CS.402 The
early political history of the protectorate was marked by the case of a majority of people,
referring in this instance to the Africans and the Indians, who had no political power.
One can call it representation without political power. These two groups were left
behind only to pay taxes to their new masters representing the British Empire.
The political isolation of the Africans and Indians was a total contradiction to the
way that the European colonists organized themselves. They formed their political
parties and many of them thought of themselves as political leaders apt to run their own
party. Winston Churchill noticed the acrimonious political atmosphere that prevailed in
the EAP during his 1907 visit. The colonists’ political aggressiveness was not hard to
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detect due to the fact that their tactics had an incommensurable influence upon the
imperial government and the local administration. They were good agitators. The
colonists were able to guide their opinion everywhere and with anybody as long as their
demands were going to be secured.
The introduction of the Europeans settlers in the protectorate raised many issues
of great political significance that the early successive administrations had to deal with
under the supervision of Whitehall. The commissioners and later governors sent to the
protectorate had to wrestle with complex issues ranging from the adequate definition of
land tenure, rent, exclusive rights to the white highlands, labor provision, taxation and
the expatriates’ perplexing political demands for representation in the Legco. Mungeam
noted that: “The biggest test for Government officials in the realm of local organization
came with the entry of the European settlers. These newcomers, encouraged in so casual
a way by Eliot in 1903, soon threatened to dominate the scene, and increasingly
occupied the attention of the officials.”403 From Eliot’s administration stretching to
Girouard’s governorship, the newcomers increasingly gained influence and forged a
fortification to defend their interests. They argued and fought to assert that their
presence in the protectorate was legitimate and most of the big men “could argue with
some justification that they had entered the country at the invitation of the government,
and it was the government’s responsibility to assist them, at least to the extent of
ensuring that they had adequately demarcated land and a sufficient supply of
labor.”404 The most politically active and influential settlers had the support of Eliot.
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Powerful men like Delamere, Grogan and other settlers took the lead and started their
own political journey to defend the colonists’ interests.
The settlers formed their political associations and started to voice their
demands. At first, these were divided by personality and type of farming, amongst other
things. They wanted large concessions of land with limited government interference, no
taxation without representation and application of British law for them only. Far away
in London, the authorities recommended to Eliot that he exercise caution in not
frustrating the Africans and Indians already living in the region. Nevertheless, Eliot
formulated land policies suitable for the settlers who were acquiring cheap properties
without enforcing the terms of the 1902 land ordinance as wished by the FO. The highly
regarded commissioner resigned mainly because he was promising land to his favorite
settlers without London’s approval. The FO found a quick replacement and Stewart
took over the administration of the protectorate in 1904.
It is significant to note that the replacement of Eliot by Stewart was an important
step taken by the FO. One could interpret Eliot’s departure as an anticipated resignation
because he lost the trust originally vested in him by the FO. Additionally to consider,
there was the intervention from the FO not to let the issues related to the proper
distribution of land fester. The action taken by the FO about Eliot’s insufficient handling
of the issue of land was clear. Regulation and moderation were needed. The welleducated commissioner was technically sacked; but no matter from which angle one
looks at the commissioner’s actions, it was time for the FO and Eliot to part ways. The
FO chose to send Stewart in order to serve mainly as a “safety valve.” He was instructed
not to repeat Eliot’s bold policy formulations solely benefiting the European settlers.
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During Stewart’s tenure, the European settlers pressed for CO control; they
desired a Legco and Crown Colony status. Stewart appointed a land committee to sort
out the issue, but influential settlers made their first move and stood in charge of the
committee. A pro-settler team led the investigation and presented a one-sided report.
The CO was not impressed by the work of the pro-settler land committee and so the
issue of an adequate land survey, and land policy, dragged on. Stewart appeared weak;
and neither the CO officials nor the settlers were happy with his bureaucratic
nonchalance. The bold European settlers also were politically concerned with their role
in the protectorate and went on to present their demands to the CO in 1905. Their hope
was to begin the process that would lead them to a self-governing country and that
meant obtaining some form of representation on a council. Before Stewart received any
response from London to communicate to the settlers, he passed away.
Stewart did not finish his term; but there were clear indications that he was on a
collision course with the white settler’s political machine. His decision of appointing a
pro-settler land committee indicated that he was letting the settlers test the political
waters of the protectorate and that marked the beginning of the settlers’ direct
participation and interference in the EAP’s political matters. It was an important
political debut for the European settlers and for the political history of the region. The
commissioner sent some hungry land grabbers to survey the region; and this was an
obvious farce. Stewart sent the fox straight into the hen house. Nevertheless, the land
committee team was delighted to carry out the task of surveying land and delivered a
report full of pro-settler recommended concessions. The response of the CO regarding
the issues of land and the Europeans settlers’ first formal political demands fell in
Sadler’s hands. He governed the region from 1906 to 1909.
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Under Sadler, the settlers learned that the CO found their petition for some form
of representation on a council reasonable; and they celebrated the news because that
gave them the right to participate in the internal politics of the region. Not content with
just having a seat in the Legco, the expatriates again voiced their motto of “no taxation
without representation.” In the EAP, the questions of labor supply and taxation became
crucial issues because the settlers wanted to be exempt from tax burdens while
possessing the best land and obtaining cheap labor. Land, labor and taxation were
correlated.
In East Africa, next to owning land, labor is the most important commodity.
Without it, land remains unproductive. But because of the climatic conditions
prevailing in the region, it was generally agreed that white men could not long endure
the manual labor required to work the land properly. Consequently, the African worker
was of paramount importance in the development of the settled areas; and the history of
white settlement was closely connected with the struggle for an adequate labor supply.
Many difficulties between government and settler sprang up over African labor. And
most of the general anxiety which prevailed in the colony was caused by concern over
this supply.405 The adequate provision of labor was meant to satisfy the settlers’ need to
develop their properties. The expatriates refused to work under the hot African sun,
preferring to sit under the shade of the verandas built onto the sides of their houses
constructed by imported Indian workers. The Africans developed the land; but this
white propertied class reaped all the economic benefits. The European settlers also
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pressed for some relaxed labor rules where Africans should be obedient and forced to
work. There was no room for Africans to disobey, complain or quit their jobs.
This was graphically demonstrated in 1907 when reports of the flogging of some
Africans at the hand of Grogan emerged. This grave incident was left unpunished
because the punishment did not reflect the gravity of the crime. Grogan’s flogging of
Africans brought on the table the debate of the need to protect the Africans’ rights, much
as it was intended with the opening of the protectorate. But here the argument was that
without the presence of the settlers, one could not argue about the necessity of
protecting the very basic human rights of the Africans who only wanted to live in peace
in their land. When many Africans lost their lands, some of them had no other option
but to work for the newcomers.
The Africans who were flogged by Grogan worked for him. They were at the
mercy of their flamboyant master who acted like a plantation owner inflicting pain on
his enslaved workers without remorse and thinking that nothing was wrong about
correcting workers or servants from the so called “lower races.” Grogan acted like an
outlaw in the wild EAP by hijacking the law and acting with impunity. Other settlers
who also wanted to raise hell for the governor went on to challenge him with the issue of
adequate labor supply. Delamere was the ring leader opposing Sadler, whom the
majority of settlers apparently thought was not sympathetic to their grievances.
In 1908, when Sadler decided to redefine the labor supply rules so that it would
be fair, the European settlers erupted and demonstrated in front of the governor’s house
and asked him to resign. The settlers wanted to block any new rules that would render
difficult the provision of labor. For the expatriates, no rule was the best rule. New land
or labor rules were not desired by the settlers. A laissez-faire policy for the exploitation
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of the region meant potential rapid economic development for the big land owners who
were very aggressive and most of the time irrationally violent.
Sadler’s governorship marked the era of violence, crime and political
disturbances perpetuated by the settlers without consequences. The CO realized that
Sadler was having many difficulties running the protectorate and transferred him. The
reality was that the settlers wanted a “man on the spot,” much as Eliot was, whom they
considered their most respected servant. The CO decision to transfer Sadler to the
Windward Islands meant that this body was still in political control. Nevertheless, once
again, London did not act fast enough in removing him. Indications here were that
Whitehall tended to let the problems affecting the administration of the protectorate
brew to a boiling point before intervening. Sadler was too easily manipulated by the
white settlers and proved to be a weak governor. It was time for the CO to make a
change. Governor Girouard took over after Sadler and was welcomed by the colonists.
Girouard arrived in 1909 with instructions to bring order and efficiency to the
running of the EAP administration. The CO expected him to get things moving and deal
firmly with the European settlers. The issue of the implementation of the land
legislation and the need to make the protectorate profitable were crucial for the CO.
Girouard arrived and immediately began promoting settlers’ interests. He showed
favoritism for the settlers as he wanted more European input on the Legco, as well as
their active participation in running the protectorate. As was the case with Eliot,
Girouard also fell under Delamere’s influence. For their part, the colonists combined
their various political parties and formed the C of A in 1910 so as to be politically more
relevant, vocal and aggressive.
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With the backing of Girouard they demanded elective representation in the
Legco. With Girouard, the second Maasai move also took place, albeit without the
consent or knowledge of London authorities. Naturally, this would come back to haunt
him and push him out of office. In addition, in 1911 Galbraith Cole, the brother-in-law of
Lord Delamere, shot and killed one African whom he merely suspected of stealing one of
his sheep. A jury of white men fully acquitted Cole, but much to the consternation of
London authorities, who decried that Girouard let Cole get off so easily without even an
enforceable deportation order, let alone having him serve even one day of any jail time.
There was no justice for the family of the victim. When compared to Commissioner
Eliot, one realizes that Girouard assisted the settlers more in their quest for political
control.
As Eliot did, Girouard also resigned; and the reason of his departure was very
similar to Eliot’s case. Catering to the European settlers was a recipe for disaster. And
once again, the CO was not fast enough in removing him. Problems continued to mount
with the way he was running the protectorate. The expatriates were pleased with
Girouard and felt like they lost their man, and almost for the same reasons Eliot was
sacked. Still, the CO was in control of the EAP.
The study of the early political history of the protectorate showed that the
stability needed to properly run the region was never achieved. Instead, a pattern was
set where a strong man leading a strong political party would always try to dominate the
political scene and break the law with utter impunity and without any meaningful
consequences being levied against them. Girouard’s administration thus left behind the
Africans and the Indians. His favoritism to the colonists was so apparent that Indian
protests now emerged and were directed against settler dominance. A balancing
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political force was needed to counter the settlers’ interference in the internal issues
related to the administration of the region. The European settlers were busy. Their
political coalition under the umbrella of the C of A was a political maneuver that sought
to dominate the political scene of the protectorate.
The European settlers were well-organized and politically active. The Europeans
expatriates were flexible enough to form a coalition of associations to come under one
political umbrella. This was a smooth political move because the unification of all the
parties provided them with a solid pedestal where they could have their voice heard loud
by the CO and any man on the spot trying to effectively run the protectorate. With a
strong political base, the settlers could pile up demands after demands working on the
edification of their dream land. The settlers were the political progenitor of the notion
of one strong political party under one vocal and strong leader dominating the political
stage. This created a context where a vocal big man had to rise and dominated the
political scene.
In their intent of dominating the region, the expatriates did not hesitate to
harshly criticize or threaten the serving officials, the commissioner or the governor.
They went on to even use violence against the local population. These illegitimate and
unjustified tactics from the settlers’ camp brought a new dilemma worthy of
consideration. White supremacy and the desire to achieve a white man’s country meant
depriving the Africans and the Indians of rights and fostered a culture of impunity and
this conflicted with the ideals of the modern British Empire and British practice. That
belief and attitude meant that they were entitled to enjoy their rights as Englishmen at
home, but no other group in Kenya could do so. For instance, Grogan’s flogging of
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Africans and the murder of an African by Galbraith Cole were clear indications of the
violations of Africans rights.
These cases are definitive examples of how most of the colonists behaved in the
EAP. The colonists thought that they were above the law and believed that they could
act with impunity, meaning that no punishment whatsoever could be levied against
them, no matter how grave the crime they committed. These two cases, although they
occurred during two different administrations, with the former during Sadler’s tenure
and the latter under Girouard’s watch, brought the debate of the true meaning of crime
and the application of punishment in the EAP. Could the European settlers get away
with crime without enduring the reaction of the CO officials or the humanitarians in
England? Nevertheless, in the EAP when justice was served to the colonists, it never
matched the gravity of the crime. Impunity in the early political days of the protectorate
left a blue print in the history of crime and punishment in Kenya. More than a century
after settlers’ violations of Africans’ rights, the actual president of Kenya, Uhuru
Kenyatta, found himself before the International Criminal Court (ICC), having to
respond to allegations of masterminding human rights violations and murder against
ordinary Africans who simply stood for their rights.
Following the Kenyan national election in 2007, discontent manifested as
political street agitation, allegedly orchestrated by the Kenyatta faction. This resulted in
some violence, extending into 2008, whereby some ordinary citizens lost their lives,
being caught up in urban crossfire. Kenyatta fell under suspicion for both instigating
the political disturbances and the unfortunate deaths of the innocent bystanders. Of
course, while the Kenyan authorities no longer needed to answer to a distant colonial
office in far-away London, they still found themselves required to address these issues
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before the ICC. At the beginning of the 20th century, the officials in the protectorate
maintained communications with the Colonial Office in London via telegraphic cable
and dispatches. It would literally take weeks, however, for the general public to get
word of incidents and allegations insofar as the flow of pertinent data regarding cases of
violence were being classified, compartmentalized and pigeon holed in the overall
bureaucratic imperial structure. But now, more than 100 years later, with an
independent Kenya in the age of satellite transmissions and digital communications,
time is no longer is a factor favoring the powers-that-be. Rather, important news
reaches the attention of the public at the speed of light.
Despite the technological marvels of the age, where evidence of human rights
violations comes to the instantaneous attention of the United Nations and the entire
world, the legacy of impunity, established in the colonial regimes of the protectorate era,
yet persist in contemporary Kenya. While the world received a continuous flow of
detrimental information concerning the allegations against Kenyatta, the investigation
purposely dragged on back in Kenya, allowing Kenyatta to win the presidency in the
2013 national election. The charges-while serious and substantial-were finally dropped
by the ICC in December 2014. And this hearkens back to the Cole murder case that took
place under the nose of the Girouard regime, whereby the CO continually demanded the
truth but received nothing but obfuscated correspondence, thus stalling the matter to
oblivion.
The authorities in Kenya were successful in defending themselves against charges
of political conspiracy in any violations of human rights that may have occurred in
Kenya. Six years after the end of the period of political violence in question, it seemed
as if there was still no explanation or justice for the families of the victims. The
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dropping of the ICC charges against Kenyatta naturally brought on a political reaction in
Kenya, strengthening Kenyatta’s grip on power. He has emerged as the “strong man” in
Kenya, and even throughout the East Africa region. Looking deeply at Kenya’s present
political system and its leaders, one has the impression that by tradition the name
Kenyatta is deeply rooted in the political history of Kenya and in the heart of many
Kenyans. The actual present Kenyatta family member has fervent supporters in the
country. For instance, the UN Ambassador from Kenya, Macharia Kamau, in defending
his country, stated that, “There is nothing in the history of our country, nothing in the
manner in which we have cooperated with the prosecutor of the ICC in general, that
should ever be construed as a lack of cooperation without clear determinable evidence
being provided.”406
In contrast to the official view, leaders of the opposition saw the entire affair as a
“cover-up” of huge proportions. Nicholas Gumbo, the Rarieda MP from Siaya County,
asserted that the withdrawal of charges against Kenyatta at the ICC can be attributed to
the lack of government cooperation with that august body, and, of course, this is nothing
new in the history of Kenya. Said Gumbo, “It is not only about post- election violence,
we have historical injustices that have not been addressed to date. Honestly, before we
come out and address those, then we are still postponing our problems.” The MP added
that, “If the court found the president not guilty, then it was crucial to ensure the people
responsible for the 2007-2008 post-election violence are brought to book. If the court
has found him not guilty, the question is who was responsible for the violence and
crimes against humanity? You cannot depart with the past. We must sort out the
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injustices because we live in a country where some communities live as squatters in
their own country and it is time this is stopped.”407
Nevertheless, in the Nandi community in the North Rift Region of Kenya, the
news of Kenyatta’s clearing by the ICC against the alleged charges was received with
great enthusiasm and excitement. The pro-Kenyatta faction led by Nandi Senator
Stephen Sang and Major John Seii went on to even express high confidence that other
cases against a couple Kenyans will eventually be withdrawn by the ICC. Sang and Seii
were jubilant. Reports from the Standard emerged and stated that:
Nandi Senator Mr. Stephen Sang and Major John Seii, the Emeritus chairman of
Kalenjin council of elders said that they were excited and happy with the
dropping of charges against President Uhuru. ‘I am very excited that the court
has reconciled itself with reality that Kenyan cases were not properly investigated
and not credible. The remaining cases will crumble down too,’ said Sang.
The Senator said the ICC cases ‘started crumbling from the start after former
Minister Henry Kosgey and former Police commissioner Hussein Ali’s cases
failed to be confirmed and later the dropping of the case against Francis
Muthaura’.
‘The president is now a free person, citizen and can freely run the country. The
other remaining cases are just like two sides of a single coin and will equally come
down due to lack of credible evidence and witnesses,’ said Sang.408
Here again Sang seemed to have not been aware of the testimony of ordinary Kenyan
citizens. After all, there was a case that:
A prosecution witness has disowned evidence he allegedly gave, detailing how he
attended two meetings in which Deputy President William Ruto instigated the
2007-2008 post election. In his statement recorded with the Office of the
Prosecutor (OTP) in April 2010, the witness claimed to have attended the secret
meetings, one at Sirikwa Hotel in Eldoret and the other at Ruto’s Sugoi home.
In tape –recorded interview, he had claimed that the meeting at Sirikwa was held
on September 2, 2007 and was chaired by Ruto, who was then Agriculture
Minister.
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The witness had claimed that he paid Sh3, 000 to gain entry into the alleged
Sirikwa secret meeting. The second meeting, he claimed was held on September
2,2007 but later changed and said it was on November 2,same year.
He had told the prosecution that the meeting was to organise coordinators and
attacks in South and Central Rift Valley. He had claimed to have heard all the
speeches made at the event. The Prosecution had taken his evidence so seriously
and asked him to tell all the details accurately and precisely. And so precise was
the evidence that the witness had offer to draw sketches of both Sirikwa meeting
venue and Ruto’s house. The evidence was then filed before the Pre-Trial
Chamber in 2011 and used to confirm the charges against Ruto and journalist
Joshua Sang in January 2012.409
Nevertheless, the case lost momentum when the same witness here turned
around and said that he could not remember about the details of his testimony. From
the above, the Kenyan analyst comes to understand that the political legacy of impunity
is the very bridge connecting the colonial regimes to the present situation. Whereas for
every action there is an equal or opposite reaction, it should come as no surprise to
discover that the other key element in the political legacy of Kenya is that of mass
action.
The Europeans settlers were the first to engage in mass action tactics for the
promulgation of their rights in the protectorate and that left an enduring legacy in
modern days Kenya’s politics. Today’s political tactics of mass action in Kenya could be
considered as an ongoing tradition originating from the European settlers political kit
bag. The frequent use of political tactics directed to the local government was even
acknowledged by Michael Blundell, a later settler political leader, who clearly stated
that: “[Y]ou made a tremendous political row and forced the government to do what you
wanted.”410
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The political strategies adopted by European politicians in the EAP have exerted
a lasting impact on politics in the region, extending to present-day Kenya. One of the
most utilized and effective of these political tactics is that of the mass action campaign.
For the most part, there was an emergent trend for these campaigns to coalesce around
two partisan groups. The first group consists of those who believe that there exists a
deep crisis insofar as the spiraling cost of living is concerned and the growing inability of
the average Kenyan citizen to keep her or his head above the rising and swirling
financial flood. This group manifests a particular disgust with the president and the
weak use of his constitutionally granted executive power to guarantee security and
promote an overall confidence in the course of the nation’s economic development.
With respect to this situation, one prominent Kenyan editorialist wrote, “To
resolve this problem, nothing less than a national convention of some kind will help pull
us out of this mess. To press their point home, the leaders of this group have set 7 July,
the storied ‘Saba Saba Day,’ as the date on which they will commence on a campaign of
mass action to compel the government to accept their proposal.”411 The second group
argued that while the nation had serious problems that required immediate attention,
these could and must be solved only within the context of existing institutions. The
second group also contended that the need for national dialogue on these matters is
limited, insofar as the power to handle any situation has already been granted to the
people’s duly-elected representatives. They also believed that any mass mobilizations
and subsequent actions would bear little profitability in helping to resolve any of these
issues. With respect to the political dichotomy existing between these two factions, the
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Weekend Star editorialist wrote “Recent events starting from the massive crowds that
turned up at former PM Raila Odinga’s homecoming political rally at Uhuru Park
remind us that there has been very little reconciliation between those who found
themselves on opposing sides in the 2013 General Election.”412
The use of mass action as a political tool in contemporary Kenya can be seen as a
throwback mechanism reminiscent of the political tactics employed by the settlers from
the very foundation of the EAP, more than a century ago. Just as the settlers so long ago
discovered that political mass actions can be a powerful weapon in the destabilization
and even the overthrow of governments, so too have the current crop of Kenyan
politicians found some utilitarianism in playing this card. For example, in the 1990s,
the non-violent mass action campaigns led by former cabinet ministers Kenneth Matiba
and Charles Rubia demonstrated that this type of political protest is a definitive strategy
in undermining a government’s credibility and legitimacy. Even after the instigators of
these mass actions were detained, the political momentum even picked up its pace.
However, in contrasting the political leadership of the settlers with that of the presentday Kenyan politicians, one must keep in mind that the settlers could at any time resort
to mass action tactics without fear simply on the basis of their white privileged status,
whereas the black Kenyan politicians were at the most detained. Nevertheless, despite
the detention of the Kenyan politicians, the effectiveness of their mass action campaigns
was not diminished. And hearkening back to the days of the protectorate, one must also
consider that the consequences of instigating mass actions on the part of people of color
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could have confirmed the fears of the European elites, thereby resulting in severe and
perhaps lethal repercussions.
On the relatively recent Kenyan political situation, the editorialist writes, “Even
though President Daniel Moi remained in power for another ten years, after the return
of multi-party politics, it is this mass action by ordinary Kenyans which put an end to
Moi’s single party rule and fundamentally changed the Kenyan political landscape.”413
In a similar vein, one can see the effectiveness of mass action at work on the part of the
white settler class in early 20th century EAP politics. None of the regimes installed in
the protectorate by order of the CO were able to withstand the mass actions instigated
by Delamere, Grogan and other leaders among the small but growing and vocal C of A.
This was particularly evident in the fall of Sadler, who was seen as weak and vacillating
by the CO and who granted concessions to the settlers far beyond his authority to do so.
This obviously did not go unseen by the Kenyan black population, who later formulated
their own nationalist groups to work in their own self-interest and ultimately establish
an independent black republic, thus putting a nail deep into the coffin of any prospects
for a so-called “White Man’s Country.” Since the opening to the EAP, there was not yet
a single British official capable of running the protectorate while efficiently reconciling
the need to protect the Africans and Indians with the bold political demands of the
settlers. Talks of European settlers paramountcy in the EAP was a lousy brouhaha, it
was not a realistic agenda that took into consideration the ethnic composition of the
country. The EAP at the beginning of the 20th century was the least governable British
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dependency in the whole Empire. Any intent of favoring the late newcomers by any
commissioner or governor sent by Whitehall was tantamount to a certain failure.
In the case of governor Girouard, who himself believed that unfair political
formulation benefiting the settlers was going to remain without consequences; it was
this kind of attitude that led to his downfall. Violations of Africans or Indians’ rights,
whether physical or discriminatory in the EAP, could not continue to be the news that
the CO was receiving from the protectorate because anything leading to a political
embarrassment was not desired at Whitehall. Political embarrassment was a sour pill to
swallow because it could derail the political career of any official serving the British
Empire in the EAP. That reality remains as such today in Kenya. Nevertheless, fifty
years after gaining independence from Britain, Kenya’s political leaders of today seem to
have gotten drunk of power by using the inherited political chalice of impunity.
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